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Chapter 1
Reasoning about causation
Felix qui potuit rerum
cognoscere causas
Vergil, Georgica (II, 490)
Philosophers have been thinking systematically about cause and ef-
fect since the very beginnings of philosophy as a discipline. Availing
itself of mathematical methods and formal semantics in the last century,
epistemology at once had the means to shape prevailing problems in sym-
bolic form, express its achievements with scientific rigor, and sort issues
within formal theories from questions about intuitions and basal pre-
misses. David Lewis was among the first ones to utilize symbolic tools
and approach causality within a framework of formal semantics.1 After
Bertrand Russell had famously and brusquely turned his back on any
further pursuit of establishing criteria for causal analysis in his treatise
On the Notion of Cause (1913), David Lewis re-thought the words of an
earlier mind: In 1740 David Hume had listed causation among one of the
principles that are “to us the cement of the universe” and thus “of vast
consequence [. . . ] in the science of human nature”.2 Hume gives various
hints about what his account of causation might be – one way of read-
ing suggests that he argues for an innate human causal sense by which
we discover the relation of causation in our surroundings.3 Although
Hume is later sharply criticized for this empiricist account by Immanuel
Kant, who in turn claims that causal principles are of synthetic a priori
1Cf. especially [Lewis 1973a].
2These statements are from An Abstract of a “Treatise of Human Nature”.
3Cf. [Garrett 2009].
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nature,4 David Lewis refers back to one specific counterfactual explica-
tion of the semantics of causal statements in Hume’s writings, moreover
bases his thoughts on Humean supervenience, and unfolds a detailed
method for causal analysis in the framework of his possible worlds se-
mantics. Approaching the field from a computer science perspective in
the 1980s, Judea Pearl introduces networks of belief propagation as
the basis for Bayesian inference engines in an AI engineering context.5
His interventionist account of causation, most elaborately presented in
his book Causality (2000/2009), draws on structural transformations of
formal causal models for the identification of cause-effect relations. As
a defendant of a thicker concept of causation, Nancy Cartwright de-
cisively rejects Pearl’s thin, formal approach and makes a case for a
family-like understanding of causal concepts.
In the following chapters the line of thought from Lewis to Pearl
shall be traced, partly by examining their replies to one another, before
I want to make the attempt to locate causation and causality in the
ontological landscape and try to pave the way for an epistemic under-
standing of the relation of causation, finally applying this conception to
examples from recent and older philosophical literature. An overview
on ways of implementation and applications of the suggested methods
will conclude this text. Before getting into technical details, a short list
of important approaches towards the analysis of causal concepts (and
their most prominent advocates) shall be given – especially as a point of
reference and distinction for what follows. What suggestions have fueled
the philosophical discussion?
1.1 Causal powers
One metaphysical approach towards causality, which has recently gained
interest again, is the ascription of essential causal powers or capacities
to objects of reality.6 As an answer to the Humean view of the world as
consisting of distinct and discrete objects, causal powers theorists argue
for the metaphysically real category of dispositions, which are necessar-
ily separate from their token instantiations but at the same time linked
to those instantiations of themselves through a necessary causal rela-
tion. Before this background, powers are seen like enduring states with
4Cf. [Watkins 2009] or also [de Pierris & Friedman 2008].
5Cf. e. g. [Pearl 1982].
6Cf. for this and the following [Mumford 2009].
Reasoning about causation 3
the hidden disposition to objectively produce events or states by singu-
larly contributing observable quantities to their manifestations – most
times in combination with other contributing or also counteracting pow-
ers. One question that arises within this framework seems to be the
question about the nature of the connection between powers and their
manifestations. Can one realistically postulate a certain disposition if
it, for example, never manifests itself? And if one sees causation as an
asymmetric relation, is there a way to understand the directedness of
powers as necessary causal directedness from cause towards effect? Con-
troversial questions seem to remain open as yet, but if powers of this sort
are understood as basic building blocks of reality, one need not stick to
events as relata of causal claims – e. g., explanations of equilibria (two
stellar bodies orbiting one another at a stable distance and like exam-
ples) are easily given by determining the contributions of each power
to the situation under examination. And as Cartwright claims, gen-
eral causal statements are best understood as compact statements about
the capacities involved, as in “aspirins relieve headaches.”7 Finally, in
distinction from other theories of causal relations, the main goal of the
theory of causal powers is to say what and where causality really is, and
– from the point of view of causal powers theorists – thus distances itself
as a metaphysical enterprise from other theories that only settle for a
description of the symptoms of (supposedly existing) actual causation.
Another contribution to this line of reasoning was made by Karl Pop-
per in 1959. Popper argues against the nowadays so popular subjective
interpretation of probability in favor of an objective yet not frequentist
interpretation of probability with dispositional character as “a property
of the generating conditions”.8 He compares these propensities to phys-
ical forces:
I am inclined to accept the suggestion that there is an analogy
between the idea of propensities and that of forces – especially
fields of forces. But I should point out that although the labels
‘force’ or ‘propensity’ may both be psychological or anthropomor-
phic metaphors, the important analogy between the two ideas does
not lie here; it lies, rather, in the fact that both ideas draw atten-
tion to unobservable dispositional properties of the physical world,
and thus help in the interpretation of physical theory.9
7[Mumford 2009, p. 272] refers with this example to Cartwright’s Nature’s
Capacities and Their Measurement (1989, Oxford: Clarendon).
8Cf. [Popper 1959, p. 34].
9Cf. [Popper 1959, pp. 30–31].
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This view of (conditional) probabilities as causal dispositions has been
famously criticized in 1985 by Paul Humphreys, who replies to Pop-
per with a detailed illustration of an argument that shows how the
determination of dependency between variables must fail for the propen-
sity interpretation of probability – due to the fact that dependency is
necessarily not symmetric for propensities unlike as for standard prob-
abilities.10 Still, Popper’s thoughts have stirred notable dispute and
provoked refinements of his deliberations up to now.11
1.2 Causal processes
At the core of process theories of causation lies the explication of causal
processes and interactions, seen as more fundamental than the causal re-
lation between events.12 Initial versions of this programmatic move can
be traced to Wesley Salmon, who – replying to Carl Hempel’s deliber-
ations on scientific explanation – grounds his own theory of explanation
on causal relations and argues against subjective or agent-relative ap-
proaches towards causation for an objective account. Avoiding the ques-
tion of what exactly it means to be an event, Salmon defines causal
processes in a first version of his theory by introducing the principle of
mark transmission:
MT: let P be a process that, in the absence of interactions with
other processes would remain uniform with respect to a character-
istic Q, which it would manifest consistently over an interval that
includes both of the spacetime points A and B (A 6= B). Then, a
mark (consisting of a modification of Q into Q∗), which has been
introduced into process P by means of a single local interaction at
a point A, is transmitted to point B if P manifests the modification
Q∗ at B and at all stages of the process between A and B without
additional interactions.13
He goes on by explicating the concept of causal interaction:
CI: Let P1 and P2 be two processes that intersect with one another
at the spacetime point S, which belongs to the histories of both.
Let Q be a characteristic that process P1 would exhibit throughout
10Cf. [Humphreys 1985].
11See e. g. [Albert 2007].
12Cf. for this and the following [Dowe 2009].
13
Dowe refers with this quotation in [Dowe 2009, p. 217] to p. 148 of Salmon
(1984): Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton:
Princeton University Press).
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an interval (which includes subintervals on both sides of S in the
history of P1) if the intersection with P2 did not occur; let R be a
characteristic that process P2 would exhibit throughout an interval
(which includes subintervals on both sides of S in the history of P2)
if the intersection with P1 did not occur. Then, the intersection of
P1 and P2 at S constitutes a causal interaction if (1) P1 exhibits
the characteristic Q before S, but it exhibits a modified character-
istic Q′ throughout an interval immediately following S; and (2)
P2 exhibits R before S but it exhibits a modified characteristic R
′
throughout an interval immediately following S.14
Now, what it means to be a causal process within this proposed
framework is best understood by considering an example Dowe gives as
an illustration: A billiard ball moving across a billiard table is a causal
process, because the ball can be marked physically, e. g., by applying
some chalk to it, and this mark is transmitted throughout the entire
movement. On the contrary, the movement of a shadow cannot be un-
derstood as a causal process along these lines, because the shadow itself
cannot be marked physically, and no persisting substantial feature can
be made out as part of its appearance. Moreover, the collision of two
billiard balls is a causal interaction – the two balls change speed and di-
rection of movement but would have continued to move on unimpededly
had the collision, i. e., the causal interaction, not taken place.
Especially due to various criticisms of the counterfactual core of both
definitions above, which seems to shift the whole burden of justifica-
tion to some semantics of counterfactual statements, Salmon even-
tually became dissatisfied with this approach towards the analysis of
causal processes and set out to rebuild his theory on the basis of the
concept of conserved quantities together with Phil Dowe. In an effort
to distinguish actual causal processes from other subjectively perceived
non-causal pseudo-processes, Dowe states a possible explication of the
concepts above in terms of conserved quantities:
CQ1. A causal interaction is an intersection of world lines that
involves exchange of a conserved quantity.
CQ2. A causal process is a world line of an object that possesses
a conserved quantity.15
14As above, Dowe refers with this quotation in [Dowe 2009, p. 217] to p. 171 of
Salmon (1984): Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World.
15
Dowe refers with this quotation in [Dowe 2009, p. 219] to Dowe (1995): Causal-
ity and Conserved Quantities: A Reply to Salmon (Philosophy of Science 62: 321–33).
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Dowe goes on by saying what these conserved quantities might be essen-
tially. He states that “[. . . ] current scientific theory is our best guide as
to what these are: quantities such as mass-energy, linear momentum, and
charge.”16 (CQ1) and (CQ2) might be close to a modern understanding
of physical mechanisms, but they return in most cases too many cause
candidates when queried in causal analysis. Refinements of the theory
with definitions of actual causal connections are discussed controversially,
especially since the “theory is claimed by both Salmon and Dowe to be
an empirical analysis, by which they mean that it concerns an objective
feature of the actual world, and that it draws its primary justification
from our best scientific theories.”17 The question might be justified,
whether such an analysis is – against its initial program – merely intro-
ducing metaphysical overhead into physical theories that seemingly do
cope well without formalized causes? Common sense causal statements,
as well as statements about mental or historical causation, can only be
analyzed before the backdrop of an elaborate reductionist approach. The
same is true for cases of causation by omission and the likes. One way
to uphold this specific approach towards causal analysis through causal
processes would supposedly be supported by Nancy Cartwright, who
would see this theory as contributing to an holistic understanding of a
multifarious entity, “because causation is not a single, monolithic con-
cept. There are different kinds of causal relations imbedded in different
kinds of systems [. . . ]. Our causal theories pick out important and useful
structures that fit some familiar cases – cases we discover and ones we de-
vise to fit.”18 Causation in the natural sciences, she claims, is best traced
in laboratory-like settings and under specifically described conditions.
1.3 Natural experiments
Nancy Cartwright refers back to Herbert Simon in making her point
for an approach towards causal understanding that is aware of the
methodology we employ to assess settings on the search for causal con-
nections:
If we want to tie method – really reliable method – and “analysis”
as close as possible, probably the most natural thing would be to
reconstruct our account of causality from the experimental methods
we use to find out about causes [. . . ].19
16Cf. [Dowe 2009, p. 219].
17Cf. [Dowe 2009, p. 223].
18Cf. [Cartwright 2004, p. 805].
19Cf. [Cartwright 2004, sect. 2.4, p. 812].
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In this short quotation the general tendency Cartwright argues for be-
comes obvious. In her eyes, transferring causal knowledge from narrowly
defined lab conditions to situations of larger scale or everyday experience
cannot follow one single principle. On the contrary, she emphasizes the
fruitfulness of binding our causal knowledge to our knowledge about the
methodology used for providing us with initial data about causal depen-
dencies – naturally as diverse in character as the methodology applied
itself.
1.4 Logical reconstruction
In reply to purely physical, “Humean” views of causal analysis and – at
the same time – to naive regularity accounts that try to identify causes
as events which are necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of later
events, J. L. Mackie develops a structured logical form to define causal
efficacy. He does so by introducing “the so-called cause [as] an insufficient
but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient
for the result.”20 Mackie’s inus condition is defined as follows:
A is an inus condition of a result P if and only if, for some X and
for some Y , (AX or Y ) is a necessary and sufficient condition of
P , but A is not a sufficient condition of P and X is not a sufficient
condition of P .21
Moreover, he identifies a set of criteria as supposed truth conditions of
singular causal claims such as “A caused P ”:22
(i) A is at least an inus condition of P – that is, there is a
necessary and sufficient condition of P which has one of these
forms: (AX or Y ), (A or Y ), AX, A.
(ii) A was present on the occasion in question.
(iii) The factors represented by the ‘X’, if any, in the formula for
the necessary and sufficient condition were present on the
occasion in question.
(iv) Every disjunct in ‘Y ’ which does not contain ‘A’ as a con-
junct was absent on the occasion in question.
As a refinement, clause (i) is later enhanced by relativizing it to a so-
called causal field, which sets the background of discourse and indicates,
in relation to which setting the cause candidate does make a difference:
20Cf. for this and the following [Mackie 1965].
21Cf. [Mackie 1965, p. 246].
22Cf. [Mackie 1965, p. 247].
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(ia) A is at least an inus condition of P in the field F – that
is, there is a condition which, given the presence of whatever
features characterize F throughout, is necessary and suffi-
cient for P , and which is of one of these forms: (AX or Y ),
(A or Y ), AX, A.23
An example from Mackie’s text shall serve as an illustration of the con-
cepts involved: Consider the causal statement “the short-circuit caused
the house to burn down.” In this statement, the short-circuit A might
be considered to be an inus condition for the result P (the burning of
the house) because it can be analyzed as an insufficient but necessary
part of the expression (ABC), where B is the conjunction of possible
other contributing factors (the presence of inflammable material, oxy-
gen, etc.) and C stands for the absence of other impeding factors (a
broken sprinkler, the fire alarm being defect, etc.). (ABC) in turn can
then be understood as one of the disjuncts that are individually unnec-
essary but jointly sufficient and necessary for the occurrence of the result
P – with Y consisting of further possible circumstances [(A′B′C ′)∨ . . . ]
that might cause the house to burn down in other ways (stroke of light-
ning, arson, etc.). A causal field F indicates the context in which such
a causal claim is uttered. In this example, the history of the house F
serves as the background before which the short-circuit A does make
a difference and does trigger a change of state. A different context F ′
would maybe physically partition the house, thereby emphasizing that
the whole house burned down as opposed to only parts of it. Mackie
is subsequently forced to base his explication of cause on basal universal
propositions for both generic and singular causal claims (which in turn
can only be understood in terms of counterfactual dependence).24 Since
his formulation does not hinge on the full declaration of Y (oftentimes
not even of X), the proposed account somehow mirrors everyday causal
talk more than fine-grained physical explanation. He emphasizes that
23Cf. [Mackie 1965, p. 249].
24J. L. Mackie illustrates the transition from generic causal claims, based on uni-
versal propositions that contain information about the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for the situation under examination, to singular causal claims by rephrasing
the short-circuit example in [Mackie 1965, p. 254]:
Thus if we said that a short-circuit here was a necessary condition for
a fire in this house, we should be saying that there are true universal
propositions from which, together with true statements about the char-
acteristics of this house, and together with the supposition that a short-
circuit did not occur here, it would follow that the house did not catch
fire.
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“much of our ordinary causal knowledge is knowledge [of] incomplete
universals, of what we call elliptical or gappy causal laws.”25 Mackie’s
causal principles could thus – as principles of information transfer – be
carried over to reasoning about mental causation or human action, were
it not for various criticisms, especially about the purely logical program
pursued with the inus condition.
Judea Pearl discusses the inus condition approach in detail when
reflecting on the insufficiency of necessary causation in his book Causal-
ity (2000/2009).26 Pearl makes out two main flaws of the logical ac-
count. The first surfaces when at-least-inus propositions such as A→ P
are reformulated via contraposition, thereby conserving their truth value:
¬P → ¬A, where ‘→’ is to be read as ‘results in.’ In this case it turns out
that the negation of the effect results in the negation of the initial inus
condition. ¬P becomes an at-least-inus condition of ¬A. Or in Pearl’s
words: “This is counterintuitive; from ‘disease causes symptoms’ we can-
not infer that eliminating a symptom will cause the disappearance of
the disease.”27 Another problem Pearl addresses is implicitly entailed
knowledge which is not explicated in the logical expression. We might
reasonably consider the following chain inference:
AX ∨ Y −→ P
AX ←→ Z
∴ Z ∨ Y −→ P
where the conclusion is licensed through Leibniz’ law and A is supposed
to represent an inus condition for P . Now, the inferred expression in
the last line does not show A anymore – is it also justified to analogously
conclude that A is not really a cause of P anymore?
Although logically structured inus conditions seem to provide deeper
insight into causal reasoning (than flat statements about necessity and
sufficiency) and to make patterns of causal claims more transparent,
obviously even more structure is necessary.
25Cf. [Mackie 1965, p. 255].
26This is the title of the introduction to [Pearl 2009], chapter 10, The actual cause.
27Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 315].
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1.5 Correlation and probabilistic causation
Nancy Cartwright opens her critical discussion of probabilistic ac-
counts of causation in What Is Wrong With Bayes Nets? (2001) by
stating that “[p]robability is a guide to life partly because it is a guide to
causality.”28 Although she goes on to argue against a purely correlation-
based concept of causality, various philosophers have approached causal
reasoning from a probabilistic perspective in two respects: For some (like
Suppes) the probabilistic analysis of causation means that causal rela-
tions can be characterized in terms of (or even reduced to) probabilistic
relations,29 for others (like Salmon) causality being probabilistic simply
means that it is not deterministic.30 A probabilistic approach towards
causal analysis tries to overcome those difficulties a follower of Humean
regularity faces – the central claim is that the influence of causes on
their effects shows in the fact that the occurrence of the cause changes
the probability of its effects. This does not exclude cases where the ef-
fect occurs despite the absence of the event initially ascertained as its
cause, which might be due to initially unforeseen, now efficacious addi-
tional influences. Nor are cases excluded in which the potential cause
does not trigger the predicted effect. Some counteracting influences with
low probability might have changed the normal course of events. Thus,
“smoking causes lung cancer” is typically rather understood as a state-
ment about smokers to be more likely to suffer from lung cancer (than
non-smokers) than about certain and unalterable regularities. As Pearl
postulates, “[a]ny theory of causality that aims at accommodating such
utterances must therefore be cast in a language that distinguishes vari-
ous shades of likelihood – namely, the language of probabilities.”31
Hans Reichenbach (in his later deliberations about causation in
1956) grounds his analysis of the direction of time on the analysis of
directed causation by formulating his Principle of Common Cause in
terms of probabilistic inequalities, namely expressions of conditional in-
dependency.32 At the core of this characterization lies the twofold prob-
abilistic claim that (i) a cause raises the probability of its direct effects
and (ii) no other event renders the cause and a direct effect probabilis-
28Cf. [Cartwright 2001, sect. 1].
29Cf. e. g. [Hitchcock 2010, sect. 3.7].
30Cf. for this and the following [Williamson 2009].
31Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 1].
32Cf. for a contemporary reformulation of the original notation [Williamson 2009,
pp. 188 f.].
Reasoning about causation 11
tically independent.33 A few years later, in 1961, I. J. Good suggests
an alternative to what Reichenbach had presented, because he objects
one would always be able to conceive of an event that renders two other
variables probabilistically independent – thus reducing Reichenbach’s
principle to a vacuous analysis because it does not yield any causes any-
more. Explicitely incorporating the direction of time into his account,
Good provides an expression to quantitatively measure potential and
actual causation.34 With E and F being distinct events (E and F their
non-occurrences, respectively) and H consisting of all background con-
ditions including prevailing laws of nature the tendency of F to cause E
is expressed by
log
P (E |FH)
P (E |FH)
.
Also building on the direction of time, Patrick Suppes develops the
definition of a genuine cause as a prima facie cause which is not spurious
resting his explication on the following definitions:35
Definition 1.5.1 (Suppes’ Prima Facie Cause)
The event Bt′ is a prima facie cause of the event At if and only if
(i) t′ < t,
(ii) P (Bt′) > 0,
(iii) P (At|Bt′) > P (At).
Definition 1.5.2 (Suppes’ Spurious Cause)
A prima facie cause Bt′ is a spurious cause of the event At if there is a
prior partition πt′′ of events (with t
′′ < t′) that screens off Bt′ from At,
i. e., for all elements Ct′′ of πt′′
(i) P (Bt′Ct′′) > 0,
(ii) P (At′ |Bt′Ct′′) = P (At′ |Ct′′).
In other words, an event genuinely causes some subsequent second event
if it raises the probability of this second event and if there is no prior
third event that would render the first two independent if conditioned on.
This independence test excludes earlier side effects from being analyzed
33Cf. [Williamson 2009, p. 189].
34Cf. [Williamson 2009, p. 191].
35Cf. [Williamson 2009, pp. 191 f.].
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as true causes. The same idea underlies the analysis of causation put
forward by econometrician and Nobel Prize winner Clive Granger in
1969, who argues for defining causes as events that are correlated with
later effect events only when the entire past history of the putative cause
up to its very occurrence is held fixed, i. e., when all variables prior to
the cause candidate are conditioned on.36
All these considerations open into the development of the concept of
Bayesian networks formulated by Judea Pearl in the 1980s as the basis
for automated inference.37 One of the protagonists in the field of proba-
bilistic accounts of causation is Wolfgang Spohn who like Suppes also
emphasizes the direction of time as a prerequisite crucial to his account.
Where Suppes in his reductionist approach can be seen as represent-
ing causal pluralism, since he does not stipulate which interpretation of
probability is to be preferred above others, Spohn makes the case for
the subjective interpretation of probability as personal degrees of belief.
Thus following the original intentions of Thomas Bayes he goes one step
further and characterizes the relation of causation in its core by stating
that “Bayesian nets are all there is to causal dependence”38 – in other
words, sufficiently rich Bayesian nets in causal interpretation together
with the causal Markov condition yield just the dependencies and in-
dependencies we also expect in scientific or everyday causal reasoning
and when interacting with our environment (see chapter 2 for a detailed
presentation of Bayes nets, the Markov condition, and their causal in-
terpretation).
All arguments for probabilistic accounts of causation face substantial
points of criticism. Nancy Cartwright makes out quite a list of crit-
ical observations about (more or less refined) purely correlation-based
causal analysis.39 Trying to get from probabilistic dependence to causal
dependence one should be wary:
What kinds of circumstances can be responsible for a probabilistic
dependence between A and B? Lots of things. The fact that A
causes B is among them: Causes produce their effects; they make
them happen. So, in the right kind of population we can expect that
there will be a higher frequency of the effect (E) when the cause (C)
36Cf. [Cartwright 2001, sect. 3].
37Cf. e. g. [Pearl 1982].
38This quotation refers to the title of [Spohn 2000].
39Cf. for this and the following [Cartwright 2004] and the detailed discussion in
[Cartwright 2001].
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is present than when it is absent; and conversely for preventatives.
With caveats.40
Among the issues Cartwright addresses is the fact that correlation
might be induced by common or correlated causes (or preventatives, re-
spectively). Moreover, two causes might also – due to the fact that they
jointly produce an effect – be correlated in populations where the effect
is strongly present (or absent, respectively), maybe because populations
are overstratified in the respective set-up of a study – i. e., in Bayes
net terminology, two otherwise causally unrelated variables are depen-
dent conditional on a common successor in collider structures. Thirdly,
certain variables may show the same time trend without being causally
related, at all. The prototypical example: The Venetian sea level rises
with the same tendency as does the bread price in London, although
neither actually causes the other nor would we try to attribute the cor-
relation to some latent common cause. Fourthly, one remark about the
assumption of stability (sometimes also ‘faithfulness’): The information
conveyed by Bayes nets is actually encoded in the absences of directed
edges through which pairwise (conditional) independence between two
variables is indicated. Especially when we try to build Bayes nets from
raw data, the assumption of stability tells us that if data does not signal
dependency between two variables, we have no reason to nevertheless
insert an edge between the two corresponding nodes in our Bayes net.
The underlying assumption is that it takes very precise values to cancel
correlation where there actually are (physical etc.) mechanisms at work,
and that such preciseness is rarely if ever found in imprecise disciplines
or in oftentimes necessarily inexact measurements. Still, the theoretical
possibility exists that, e. g., positive and negative effects of a single factor
neutralize, thereby obscuring causal influence. Cartwright illustrates
this point with Germund Hesslow’s canonical birth-control pill exam-
ple: “The pills are a positive cause of thrombosis. On the other hand,
they prevent pregnancy, which is itself a cause of thrombosis. Given the
right weights for the three processes, the net effect of the pills on the
frequency of thrombosis can be zero.”41 In this example it might not
only be the case that data does not show dependency where we would
normally suspect causal mechanisms at work, but it might moreover be
an important goal of medical research to achieve this very independence
and to delete dependency from data – still acknowledging the physical,
physiological etc. processes in nature.
40Cf. sect. 4, From probabilistic dependence to causality, in [Cartwright 2001].
41Cf. [Cartwright 2001, sect. 3].
14 Reasoning about causation
Jon Williamson extends Cartwright’s list in his critique of over-
simplistic applications of the Principle of Common Cause and its im-
plications. He points out once more that two positively or negatively
correlated events do not have to be related causally but may instead be
“related logically (e. g. where an assignment to A is logically complex
and logically implies an assignment to B), mathematically (e. g. mean
and variance variables for the same quantity are connected by a math-
ematical equation), or semantically (e. g. A and B are synonymous or
overlap in meaning), or are related by non-causal physical laws or by
domain constraints. In such cases there may be no common cause to
accompany the dependence, or if there is, the common cause may fail
fully to screen off A from B.”42 Nancy Cartwright sums up these
critical points in pragmatic fashion – rejecting the philosophical effort to
unify the representation of causal relations she says:
The advice from my course on methods in the social sciences is
better: “If you see a probabilistic dependence and are inclined to
infer a causal connection from it, think hard. Consider the other
possible reasons that that dependence might occur and eliminate
them one by one. And when you are all done, remember – your
conclusion is no more certain than your confidence that you have
eliminated all the possible alternatives.”43
Supposed opponent Judea Pearl agrees with Cartwright on the
fact that the shortcomings of a purely probabilistic reductionist approach
towards causal analysis prohibit at least direct application. He marks the
distinction between mere observation (or acts) represented in data and
knowledge about the impact of (hypothetical) intervention (or action)
which is not part of statistical models. Conditioning on certain variables
just switches the subpopulation and does not yield information about the
causal machinery at work.44 Obviously, a modification of the method is
necessary to also encode counterfactual knowledge.
1.6 Counterfactual analysis
One of the first references to the idea of characterizing causation in terms
of counterfactual conditionals dates back to as early as 1748, when David
Hume compactly analyzed a cause to be “an object followed by another,
42Cf. [Williamson 2009, p. 200].
43Cf. [Cartwright 2001, sect. 5].
44Cf. e. g. the section Actions, Acts, and Probabilities in [Pearl 2009, pp. 108 ff.].
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[...] where, if the first object had not been, the second never had ex-
isted.”45 Suzy throws a stone and shatters a window with it. Had she
not thrown the stone, the window would not have broken to pieces.
Obviously, this counterfactual analysis seems to capture much of our in-
tuition about causation. It ties the observed course of events – when
considering causal relations at token level – to the mechanisms that gov-
ern our world underneath the surface and are of more use to us than
mere listings of successive happenings because they contain hints at how
to manipulate the respective setting to achieve different outcomes. L. A.
Paul notices that “[i]n everyday life as well as in the empirical and so-
cial sciences, causes are identified by the determination of manipulation:
Cs are causes of Es if changing Cs changes the Es, that is, if we can
manipulate Es by manipulating Cs. In this way, experimental settings
are designed to test for the presence of causation by testing for the pres-
ence of counterfactual dependence.”46 In his seminal article Causation
(1973) David Lewis offers a detailed presentation of causal analysis on
the basis of counterfactual dependence together with a full-blown seman-
tics for evaluation.47 For him, counterfactual dependence between two
successive and suitably distinct events is sufficient for causation. But his
possible worlds semantics of counterfactuals does not yield transitivity
of counterfactual statements in contrast to our intuition that causation
should be characterized as transitive. Thus, causation cannot be simply
reduced to counterfactual dependence. In the following, three notori-
ous prima facie problematic cases shall be considered and possible fixes
thereof sketched in brief – namely the cases of side effects, pre-empted
potential causes, and overdetermined events.48
C
E
D
Fig. 1.1: D counts as side effect of E in this common cause fork.
45This is actually the second part of his famous twofold explication – see below,
chapter 2, and cf. [Hume 1748, Section VII].
46Cf. [Paul 2009, p. 166].
47Cf. [Lewis 1973b].
48Cf. for this and the following the extensive discussion in [Paul 2009, sects. 2–3].
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1. Side effects of common causes. The fork structure in fig. 1.1
represents the case where C simultaneously causes D and E. Now,
one would assume that D always occurs when E does. The reverse
does not hold, whatsoever. The counterfactual statement ‘if D had
not occurred, E would not have happened, either’ does not hold
if backtracking counterfactuals are forbidden, as is the case with
Lewis’ possible worlds semantics. Consequently, if D does not
occur one is not licensed to infer that C has not taken place either,
since C might have happened but at the same time failed to cause
E due to extraneous preventatives. So, basing the counterfactual
analysis of causation on non-backtracking conditionals yields the
expected results for common cause fork structures.
C′
C
E
D
C′
C
E
Fig. 1.2: C′ pre-empts the potential cause C in the case of early pre-emption
(left) and late pre-emption (right).
2. Early and late pre-emption. David Lewis also offers a solution
for the problem of pre-empted potential causes. The left “neuron
diagram” in fig. 1.2 depicts a situation where C potentially causes
E. But the causal chain from C to E is disrupted by the influ-
ence of C ′, the occurrence of which prevents C from being causally
relevant to E through the deactivation of intermediate event D (in-
dicated by the round arrowhead pointing from C ′ to D). Simple
counterfactual analysis yields that C ′ is no cause of E since if C ′
had not occurred, C would have triggered E – E does not coun-
terfactually depend on C ′ anymore. To deal with this problem,
Lewis extends causal dependence to a transitive relation (as the
ancestral of causal dependence) by defining the concept of a causal
chain.49 In Causation he sums up his counterfactual analysis of
the subject:
Let c, d, e, . . . be a finite sequence of actual particular events
such that d depends causally on c, e on d, and so on through-
out. Then this sequence is a causal chain. Finally, one event
49Cf. e. g. [Menzies 2009a, sect. 2.3].
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is a cause of another iff there exists a causal chain leading
from the first to the second.50
The so-called case of late pre-emption faces a different kind of prob-
lem. If the right diagram of fig. 1.2 is interpreted as a series of
events succeeding one another in time from left to right then event
C ′ prevents C from becoming causally effective by causing event
E earlier. To give an illustrative example: Suzy and Billy throw
stones to shatter a glass bottle. Suzy’s stone hits the bottle earlier
than Billy’s and thus can be counted as the cause of the breaking
of the bottle, whereas Billy’s stone must fail to break the bottle be-
cause it is already broken to pieces. In this case (potential) causal
efficacy of either event C or C ′ cannot be accounted for in terms of
counterfactual dependence or causal chains. One way to side-step
this problem is to introduce a fine-grained concept of events and to
make events fragile with respect to time.51 This makes counterfac-
tual dependence applicable again: Suzy’s throw caused the bottle
to break at time t1 – call this event Et1 . Had she not thrown the
stone, the bottle would have broken later, at time t2, as event Et2
brought about by Billy’s throw. Et1 would not have occurred either
in this case, thus validating the counterfactual ¬C ′ 2→ ¬Et1 .
52
The question remains, if this kind of fine-graining still captures
everyday causal talk, not to mention type-case utterances.
E
C
C′
Fig. 1.3: C and C′ overdetermine the event E in this collider structure.
3. Cases of overdetermination. A slightly modified variant of
the bottle shattering example can be used to illustrate the case
in which two events jointly overdetermine a later third event, as
sketched in the neuron diagram of fig. 1.3. Assume that Suzy (C ′)
50Cf. [Lewis 1973a, p. 563].
51Cf. [Menzies 2009a, sect. 4].
52The counterfactual formula in words: ‘If C′ did not occur, Et1 would not occur,
either’ (or the respective past tense form); see chapter 2 for an explication of the
truth conditions of counterfactuals.
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and Billy (C) throw their stones and hit the bottle at the exact
same time, causing it to break (E). Again, this situation cannot
be analyzed in accordance with our intuition if one relies on plain
counterfactual dependence. If either C or C ′ had not occurred, the
respective remaining event would have caused the bottle to break.
Resorting to temporally fragile interpretations of the situation does
not remedy things either, because – as the example goes – both
stones simultaneously hit the bottle. Of course it might be argued
that there are no genuine simultaneous events and that a sufficient
fine-graining of the physical description of the situation will always
ultimately yield a solution when drawing on the temporal fragility
of events or – going one step further – on an extension of fragility
to properties in general. So the interesting questions arise when
we allow for fine-grained overdetermination53 and ask ourselves
what the actual cause of a truly overdetermined event (also in the
fine-grained sense) really is. This sounds like a tough question
in such an abstract formulation, and, e. g., L. A. Paul finds it
noteworthy “how differently we feel about the clarity of cases of
fine-grained overdetermination versus that of cases of early and
late pre-emption. [. . . ] it just isn’t clear how each cause is bringing
about the effect all on its own, given that another cause is also
bringing about the effect all on its own and the causation is not
joint causation.”54
One further general problem counterfactual theories of causation face
is the charge of circularity. If the definition of causal dependence rests on
counterfactual dependence, the semantics of counterfactuals must avoid
relying on causal relations. If this is not possible, more has to be said
about the grounding of higher level on lower level causal claims or basic
causal assumptions (as do Woodward55 and Pearl56).
Although the counterfactual analysis seems to truly capture essential
features of our understanding of causal relations, refined approaches are
needed, obviously. E. g., Judea Pearl proposes directed structural equa-
tions and claims that these are actually expressions of counterfactual
53For a discussion of variants of fine-graining and overdetermination cf. [Paul 2009,
pp. 178 ff.].
54Cf. [Paul 2009, p. 180]; joint causation means that both causes are needed to
bring about the effect in the precise way it actually occurred.
55Cf. [Paul 2009, p. 172].
56Cf. [Halpern & Pearl 2005a, p. 849].
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knowledge.57 On a higher level he even defines how to interpret the
probability that an event X = x “was the cause” of an event Y = y in
terms of counterfactuals: P (Yx′ = y
′|X = x, Y = y) can be understood
in his framework as the probability of Y not being equal to y had X not
been x, given that X = x and Y = y are (observed) facts in the respec-
tive situation. Relative to his definition of probabilistic causal models,
Pearl lists the three steps necessary for counterfactual evaluation (in
corresponding twin networks): abduction, action (i. e., intervention), and
prediction.58
Another contribution to the ongoing discussion – especially for the
solution of cases of overdetermination – has been brought forward by
Christopher Hitchcock, who enhances structural representations of
test cases by introducing default and deviant values, thus emphasizing
our intuition that an event is more likely attributed causal efficacy if
it deviates from the normal course of events in a sufficiently significant
way.59 The semantics of normality nevertheless remains a point of con-
troversy, as does the semantics of counterfactuals in the possible worlds
presentation due to troublesome transfer into application, as, e. g., Judea
Pearl points out insistently.60
1.7 Ranking theory
Another critic of the counterfactual account of causation (especially as
presented by Lewis) calls its self-imposed claim of objectivity in ques-
tion. Wolfgang Spohn derives in his own approach causes from reasons
as subjective degrees of belief, thereby relativizing causation to an ob-
server or epistemic individual. He criticizes Lewis:
[T]he stance of the counterfactual theory towards the objectivity
issue is wanting, I find. The official doctrine is, of course, that
the counterfactual theory offers an objective account of causation;
this definitely counts in its favor. However, this objectivity gets ab-
sorbed in the notion of similarity on which Lewis’ semantics for
counterfactuals is based. [. . . ] I wonder whether such similarity
judgments are significantly better off in the end than, say, judg-
ments about beauty, and hence whether the semantics for coun-
terfactuals should not rather take an expressivist form like the
57Cf. [Pearl 2009] and a presentation of Pearl’s framework in chapter 2.
58Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 206], Theorem 7.1.7.
59Cf. e. g. [Hitchcock 2009a] and [Hitchcock 2007].
60Cf. Pearl’s reply to Lewis’ article Causation in [Pearl 2009, pp. 238 ff.].
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semantics of “beautiful”. The question is difficult to decide, and
I do not want to decide it here. The only point I want to make
is that the whole issue is clouded behind the objectivistic veil of
the counterfactual theory. It is clearer, I find, to jump right into
subjectivity [. . . ] 61
Consequently, Spohn bases his account of causal reasoning on weight-
ings of personal reasons in the form of ranking functions. Other than
purely qualitative representations of epistemic entities (or changes in
such entities, respectively) in the area of knowledge representation or
reasoning with uncertainty, ranking functions quantitatively represent
the epistemic state of a subject in terms of degrees of belief, but at the
same time induce a notion of yes-or-no belief complying with the con-
straints of rational reasoning (i. e., consistency and deductive closure).62
Only a very brief sketch of ranking theory shall be given here to sup-
port the following points. A belief function β measures the strength
of an agents subjective belief in proposition A, depending on whether
β(A) > 0 (belief in the truth of A), β(A) < 0 (belief in the falsity of
A), or β(A) = 0 (indifference as to whether A is true or false), with
β(A) ∈ Z ∪ {−∞,+∞}.63 Now, in this framework A is defined as a rea-
son for B, iff β(B|A) > β(B|A), i. e., (the occurrence or the perception
of) A strengthens the belief in B.64 Moreover, reasons are systematically
classified as additional, sufficient, necessary, or weak reasons, depending
on whether β(B|A) yields a value below or equal to 0 (in the cases of
A being a sufficient, necessary, or weak reason for B), whether β(B|A)
yields a value above or equal to 0 (in the case of A being an additional,
a sufficient, or necessary reason for B), and how these conditions are
combined.65 In a next step, causes are quite simply derived from the
definition of reasons: A is an (additional, sufficient, necessary, or weak)
direct (token or singular) cause of B iff (i) A is an (additional, sufficient,
necessary, or weak) reason for B, (ii) A and B actually obtain, and (iii)
A temporally strictly precedes B.66 Quite like Lewis, Wolfgang Spohn
goes on by defining a cause to be a proposition A that is connected to
another proposition B by a chain of direct causes. This is – in a nutshell
61Cf. [Spohn 2001, sect. 8].
62Cf. [Huber 2009, p. 1351].
63Cf. for this and the following e. g. [Spohn 2001].
64This is of course formulated relative to (i. e., conditional on) an agent’s given
doxastic state C, which is omitted here for purposes of compactness.
65Cf. [Spohn 2001, sect. 4], definition 5b.
66Cf. [Spohn 2001, sect. 5], definition 6.
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– all that is needed to follow Spohn’s comparison of how cases of overde-
termination can be treated in Lewis’ purely counterfactual account and
in his own ranking-theoretic analysis.
If numbers are distributed in accordance with our understanding of
the situation depicted in fig. 1.3, we could possibly come up with the
following tables showing concrete values for β(C|X ∩ Y ):67
β(C|·) B B
A 1 −1
A −1 −1
(a) A and B are joint
sufficient and joint nec-
essary causes
β(C|·) B B
A 1 0
A 0 −1
(b) A and B are joint
sufficient but not neces-
sary causes
β(C|·) B B
A 2 1
A 1 −1
(c) A and B are overde-
termining causes of C
Each table specifies the degree of belief β(C|X ∩ Y ) in C conditional on
X ∩ Y , where X ∈ {A,A} and Y ∈ {B,B}. Numerical values possible
change from one epistemic subject to another (under preservation of
necessity, sufficiency, or overdetermination if constrained correctly).
Case (a) represents the standard understanding of joint causes – both A
and B have to occur in order to bring about C, neither A nor B alone
suffice for that, given through β(C|A∩B) > 0 > β(C|A∩B) = β(C|A∩
B) = β(C|A∩B). Only the joint occurrence of A and B raises the belief
in C from a negative number (disbelief) to a positive (belief).
Spohn also considers case (b) an example of joint causation, obviously
not as definite as case (a) since, e. g., in the presence of A the occurrence
of B is (per definitionem) a sufficient contribution to C, but a necessary
one in the absence of A: β(C|A ∩B) > 0 = β(C|A ∩B) > β(C|A ∩B).
The occurrence of either A or B raises the belief in C from disbelief (< 0)
to indifference (= 0), but only the joint occurrence of A and B lifts the
degree of belief in C to a positive value.
Scheme (c) finally exhibits the case of overdetermining causes. Each of
A and B already suffices to produce C by raising the belief in C from
a negative to a positive degree and can be understood as an additional
contribution to C in the presence of the other, raising the degree of
67This example is taken from Spohn’s illustration of the problem of overdetermi-
nation in [Spohn 2001, sect. 7].
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belief in C even further, as specified in the ranking function β and given
through β(C|A∩B) > β(C|A∩B) = β(C|A∩B) > 0. The high degree
of belief in C can be interpreted as strong doubt in the fact that C would
obtain if neither of A or B actually occurred.
Wolfgang Spohn summarizes why ranking theory copes with the fine-
grained representation of causal intuitions much better than the coun-
terfactual approach:
[R]anking functions specify varying degrees of disbelief and thus
also of positive belief, whereas it does not make sense at all, in
counterfactual theories or elsewhere, to speak of varying degrees of
positive truth; nothing can be truer than true. Hence, nothing cor-
responding to scheme (c) is available to counterfactual theories.68
Nevertheless, justified questions appear on the scene as soon as one tries
to tie ranking theory to application, e. g., in implementations of belief
revision or automated reasoning. How does an epistemic agent obtain
those specific numerical values as initial degrees of belief? And if rank-
ing theory starts constructing singular causes from subjective reasons –
how, if at all, could any notion of objectivity be established?69 And
the computer science engineer might add: Isn’t there any more compact
way of representing and implementing degrees of belief and changes of
epistemic states than as plain listings of each and every ratio?
1.8 Agency, manipulation, intervention
Manipulationist theories of causation build upon our very basic intuition
that an effect can be brought about by an apt manipulation of the puta-
tive cause. In other words and cum grano salis, if an event C causes some
distinct event E, then a modification of C in some way will change the
outcome E correspondingly. And conversely, if by (if only hypothetical)
manipulation of an event C some subsequent event E were to present
itself differently (relative to the expected normal and unmanipulated
course of events), C causes E (even if in this counterfactual formulation
the manipulation were not actually to be performed). This idea has re-
ceived considerable attention in the recent literature on causal inference,
even in non-philosophical publications of medical research, econometrics,
68Cf. [Spohn 2001, sect. 7].
69Of course, Spohn does say more about the task of objectivizing ranking functions
e. g. in [Spohn 2001] and [Spohn 2009].
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sociology, even psychology and molecular-biology etc. because it maps
the quest for causes onto the practice of experimentation. Manipulation-
ist theories in this way go beyond the determination of mere regularities
in observed processes or the plain investigation of correlation, and intro-
duce the (virtual) capability of interaction into the test setting. This is
done differently in different flavors of manipulationist theories.70 Agency
theories in anthropomorphic fashion emphasize an agent’s freedom of ac-
tion involved in performing a manipulation of the respective situation.
The gap between (human) agency and causation is then bridged by the
notion of agent probability. The causal efficacy of an event C on E is
linked to C’s raising the agent probability of E, when this agent prob-
ability is interpreted as the probability that E would obtain if an agent
were to choose to realize C. Since in this formulation causation is broken
down into atomic building blocks of free acts, agency theories do avoid
circularity – they face a different problem, though, namely their very
limited scope of application. E. g., how is causal efficacy attributed to
friction of continental plates resulting in an earthquake? Surely we utter
causal claims about such geo-physical happenings with the same confi-
dence as we talk about someone’s throwing a stone as being the cause of
some bottle’s shattering.71
Judea Pearl72 or James Woodward73 draw on a different and more
general kind of manipulation. In their congeneric accounts of causation
the capability of interaction is given through hypothetical interventions
on variables in fixed causal models. Those variables are basically suitably
distinct events of interest that the designer of a causal model deems
to be worth considering and contributory to the understanding of the
respective situation. Causal models moreover – in essence – merely list
for each variable in the model its immediate predecessors, i. e., causally
interpreted, its direct causes (thus obeying the so-called causal Markov
condition if the resulting structure does not contain cycles of parenthood,
see below, definition 2.6.1). The underlying idea of both Pearl’s and
Woodward’s approach is modularity as a requirement for causal models
to be reliable sources of information and thus useful for explanation.
70Cf. for this and the following [Woodward 2009].
71See Woodward’s discussion of the earthquake example due to Menzies and
Price together with the potential but controversial solution via projection in [Wood-
ward 2009, pp. 238 ff.].
72Cf. [Pearl 1995] and for a more elaborate presentation [Pearl 2009] (the second
edition of his 2000 book).
73Cf. [Woodward 2003].
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Modularity accounts rest on the postulate that each link between two
variables represents a mechanism for the effect, which can vary modularly
and independently of mechanisms for any other variables in the causal
model.74 If those mechanisms are represented as individual equations,
the researcher can mathematically utilize them to learn about the effects
of interventions – as Pearl puts it:
In summary, intervention amounts to a surgery on equations
[. . . ] and causation means predicting the consequences of such
a surgery.75
Nevertheless, how such interventions are precisely implemented in
Pearl’s and Woodward’s account slightly varies in detail. Pearl
compactly defines atomic interventions as external deactivations of some
variable’s links to its causal parents (i. e., its direct causes) or analogously
as the deletion of the respective functional connection in the correspond-
ing structural model:
The simplest type of external intervention is one in which a single
variable, say [X], is forced to take on some fixed value [x]. Such
an intervention, which we call “atomic”, amounts to lifting [X]
from the influence of the old functional mechanism [linking the
value assignment of X to the values of its parents] and placing it
under the influence of a new mechanism that sets the value [x]
while keeping all other mechanisms unperturbed.76
As Woodward notes critically, this explication induces a definition of
cause that relies on certain mechanisms to remain unperturbed. If these
mechanisms are of causal character themselves, then Pearl has to de-
fend his definition against the charge of circularity. He indeed does sug-
gest a possible reading of interventions that avoids circularity in [Halpern
& Pearl 2005a]. (For a detailed presentation of Pearl’s account of cau-
sation see chapter 2.) Woodward follows a slightly different route by
introducing specific intervention variables into his framework and by con-
straining those variables in a suitable way. An intervention I on some
variable X is then defined relative to the putative effect Y in order to
characterize what it means for X to cause Y :77
74See [Cartwright 2004, pp. 807 ff.] for a critical discussion of the modularity
requirement.
75Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 417] – highlighting modified.
76Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 70].
77See Woodward’s presentation of the requirements of such Woodward-
Hitchcock interventions in [Woodward 2009, p. 247].
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1. I must be the only cause of X – i. e., the intervention must com-
pletely disrupt the causal relationship between X and its preceding
causes so that the value of X is entirely controlled by I (in other
words, the set of parents of X only contains I);
2. I must not directly causally influence Y via a route that does not
go through X;
3. I should not itself be caused by any cause that influences Y via a
route that does not go through X;
4. I must be probabilistically independent of any cause of Y that does
not lie on the causal route connecting X to Y .
In contrast to Pearl’s explication, it is not excluded that such an in-
tervention variable I is causally related to or probabilistically dependent
on other variables in the causal model, but it is specified exactly, which
variables I is required to be (causally and probabilistically) independent
of. And in contrast to agency theories, as Woodward emphasizes, a
“purely natural process, not involving human activity at any point, will
count as an intervention as long as it has the right causal and correla-
tional characteristics.”78
The pivotal idea of modular manipulationist accounts is the exploita-
tion of causal diagrams for reliable causal inference. The Bayes net
methodology provides the desired framework and readily extends causal
yes-or-no reasoning to an analysis of causal influence in terms of degrees
of belief. Mapping this approach onto the standard proceeding of a ran-
domized controlled clinical trial exemplifies the general applicability of
interventionist theories.
I
S1
C
S2
Fig. 1.4: Symptom S1 is lifted from the causal influence of cause C by means
of intervention I in a randomized controlled trial.
78Cf. [Woodward 2009, p. 247].
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Consider the situation depicted in figure 1.4 where some cause C (per-
haps some disease or some behavior detrimental to health) results in the
simultaneous occurrence of symptoms S1 and S2.
79 Arrows mark direct
causal influence. In order to discover the causal relationship between
C, S1, and S2, the test candidates (exhibiting characteristic c or ¬c in
the dichotomous case) are divided randomly into test groups (subpop-
ulations) where in one group symptom S1 is induced somehow and in
the other group prevented – according to the decision taken by setting
I. Now, if inducing or preventing symptom S1 were to bring about a
significant change in the measurement of symptom S2, we would be en-
titled to postulate some causal connection between both variables due
to the above explication of intervention. Randomization of test groups
nevertheless precisely amounts to lifting the variable S1 from the influ-
ence of variable C and cutting the connection (thereby cancelling the
correlation) between S1 and C (as indicated by the dashed arrow point-
ing from C to S1 in figure 1.4) and consequently between S1 and S2. S1
is therefore analyzed as not directly causally influencing S2.
The example makes obvious how tightly the principle of modularity is
connected with causal reasoning – without the assumption of modular
(and modularly separable) causal links the whole enterprise of random-
ization in our controlled clinical trial would have failed. Another inves-
tigation Woodward undertakes in the explication of his interventionist
account is centered about the question, what the nature of mechanisms
is in essence. He reminds the reader of his Making Things Happen (2003)
of “the absence of any consensus about the criteria that distinguish laws
from nonlaws and the difficulties this pose[s] for nomothetic accounts
of explanation”80 and discusses invariance as an intrinsic feature of the
generalizations required for causal inference, thereby strengthening the
modularity requirement:
The guiding idea is that invariance is the key feature a relationship
must possess if it is to count as causal or explanatory. Intuitively,
an invariant relationship remains stable or unchanged as various
other changes occur. Invariance, as I understand it, does not re-
quire exact or literal truth; I count a generalization as invariant
or stable across certain changes if it holds up to some appropri-
ate level of approximation across those changes. By contrast, a
generalization will “break down” or fail to be invariant across cer-
tain changes if it fails to hold, even approximately, under those
changes.81
79This illustration follows the motivational example in [Woodward 2009, sects. 2/5].
80Cf. [Woodward 2003, p. 239].
81Cf. [Woodward 2003, p. 239].
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Woodward goes on by bridging the gap between his theoretical claims
and (the practice of) explanation in the special sciences:
In contrast to the standard notion of lawfulness, invariance is
well-suited to capturing the distinctive characteristics of explana-
tory generalizations in the special sciences. [. . . ]
[A] generalization can be stable under a much narrower range of
changes and interventions than paradigmatic laws and yet still
count as invariant in a way that enables it to figure in explana-
tions.82
In her critical discussion, Nancy Cartwright acknowledges the ad-
vantages of invariance methods but also points out that these methods
require a great deal of antecedent causal assumptions or knowledge about
the causal influences at work, because what it means for some generaliza-
tion to be invariant or stable across certain changes of the right sort must
carefully be explicated when applying the method to individual causal
hypotheses. Due to these demanding requirements, Cartwright ar-
gues, invariance methods “are frequently of little use to us.”83 Another
reason for her to object to invariance methods is the fact that the sit-
uation under consideration must be of modular nature, which is – in
Cartwright’s eyes – only the case for a limited set of situations and
does not carry over to general application.84 Pearl refutes this argu-
ment sharply in [Pearl 2010] by claiming that formal structural systems
(e. g., as used in econometrics) are usually established on the basis of
the modularity assumption.85 Woodward (necessarily) bases his in-
terventionist notion of causation precisely on the modularity principle
and defines what it means for an event to be a direct cause of some
other subsequent event through combination of multiple interventions as
follows:
Definition 1.8.1 (Woodward’s Direct Cause)86
A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a direct cause of Y with
respect to some variable set V is that there be a possible intervention I
on X that will change Y (or the probability distribution of Y ) when all
other variables in V besides X and Y are held fixed at some value by
additional interventions that are independent of I.
82Cf. [Woodward 2003, p. 240].
83See Cartwright’s critical discussion in [Cartwright 2004, pp. 811 f.].
84Cf. [Cartwright 2004, pp. 807 ff.].
85Cf. [Pearl 2010, pp. 73 ff.].
86See definition (DC) in [Woodward 2009, p. 250].
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Using this definition as a starting point for further considerations, con-
ditions for X to be a contributing cause of Y are consequently built on
the notion of chains of direct causes. How Judea Pearl uses the notion
of intervention in his framework and how he ultimately arrives at the
concept of actual cause is presented in more detail in chapter 2.
1.9 Decisions to take
The brief presentation of manipulationist strategies concludes the sys-
tematic overview of the most prominent approaches towards the analysis
of causal claims. Obviously, the different approaches more or less differ
in their attempt to provide answers to a set of questions that are central
to the analysis of causation. The most important decisions one has to
take when setting out to trace the notion of causality in some way shall
be collected in the following catalogue.87
1. What are the relata of causal relations? Can objects or regions of
time-space be the cause of entities of the same kind? Or does any
causal talk of objects always have to be understood in terms of the
more fundamental concept of events, i. e., either as instantiations
of properties in objects at a given time (in the Kimian sense) or
as plain random variables (in a probability-theoretic sense) that
signify events by assuming one of at least two different values?
2. Does the causal analysis in the framework to be developed relate
single case entities (at token level) or does it ascribe meaning to
claims about generic causation (at type level)? If both cases are
treated in the framework – which one is prior to the other? Are
cases of singular causation as “the rain yesterday at noon caused
my driveway to get wet” to be understood as more fundamental
than cases of generic causation as “rain causes a street to get wet”
– or vice versa? And can one be derived from the other, e. g., by
some kind of induction principle?
3. Do causal claims relate entities at population level or at individ-
ual level? E. g., a certain approach might be able to deal well
with medical findings connecting some epidemic in a given group
with the presence of some virus but might fail to account for the
87This compilation expands the listings in [Williamson 2009, pp. 186 f.] and [Paul
2009, pp. 160–165].
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outbreak of a disease in a specific observed individual. The ex-
planatory power of a causal theory must be balanced well if it is
to deal with up-scaling or down-scaling of test settings.
4. Is the theory capable of explicating actual causation (maybe post
factum) or potential (possible, but maybe, e. g., pre-empted) cau-
sation? This question is obviously closely connected to the ques-
tion, if the theory can handle counterfactual intuitions and yield
answers to queries of the what-would-have-happened-if-things-had-
been-different kind (possibly by ascribing causal efficacy to factu-
ally void, disrupted, or prevented events).
5. What is causation grounded in ontologically? Is the theory to be
developed talking about some objective, physical notion of causa-
tion or about subjectively perceived or reconstructed mental cau-
sation within an (idealized) epistemic agent? And if both alter-
natives are not exclusive – how can knowledge about one side be
carried over to the other side? If the subjective notion is prior to
the objective one – how, if at all, is objectivization possible? More-
over, causal explanation clearly seems to be mind- and description-
dependent. Now, if causation itself is of epistemic nature – what
then is the difference between causal explanation and causation, if
there is one to be made out?
6. Does the suggested account explore causation conceptually or onto-
logically? In other words, does it present an analysis of how we gain
epistemic access to causal relations and how we internally structure
our experience of causal processes, or is the account attempting to
give an insight into what really is at the core of causation in the
world? And if a conceptual approach does not deny the metaphys-
ical existence of causal goings-on – how can the interconnection
between both be described?
7. Is the approach taking a descriptive or a prescriptive route, i. e.,
is the account offering an illuminative picture of our concept of
causation (via description) or is it prescriptively focusing on the
construction of an improved formulation – maybe in a technically
strongly constrained framework or for a certain branch of the spe-
cial sciences?
8. Is causation holistically treated as one monolithic concept such
that a technical description of causal relations can be applied to
any kind of causal claims, independent of research area or jargon?
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Or is ‘causation’ rather understood as a sort of cover term for the
description of an irreducible multifarious, yet family-like concep-
tion?
9. If causation is understood as a family of different concepts that
are best not reduced to allow for a better understanding of each
of the single concepts – then which of the concepts is analyzed by
the theory (if an analysis is attempted)? Is it the folk concept,
the scientific concept, or possibly even the concept of a special
branch of science? Does the theory approach causation from the
philosophical or epistemological perspective? And moreover, how
(if at all) are thought experiments, personal intuitions (as about
cases of causation by omission), causal talk as linguistic expression,
or special physical theories addressed?
10. Are causal relations themselves reduced to other non-causal more
fundamental entities or in a non-reductive approach seen as the ba-
sic building blocks of causal claims? What could be candidates for
more fundamental non-causal entities – powers, processes, mecha-
nisms? And to pose a question closely connected to the problem
of reducibility: How are the laws of physics to be understood and
how (if at all) are they allocated in the framework?
11. Another important question marks the distinction between, e. g.,
Pearl’s account of causation and Spohn’s ranking-theoretic ap-
proach: What role does time play for the identifiability of causes
and effects? Is time induced by the formal representation of cause-
effect relations? Is it at best compatible with the arrangement of
causally connected events? Or is it even seen as a necessary pre-
requirement that might ultimately go into the definiens of causal
relations? And one more notorious question a theory of causation
should be addressing: Is backward causation something worth con-
sidering, is it explicitly excluded from treatment or even denied by
the framework?
12. Does an account of causation refer to deterministic causal relations
or to probabilistic causation? And if it does talk about probabilistic
causal relations – in what sense are these causal relations proba-
bilistic, in a genuinely ontologically aleatoric sense or (in an epis-
temic sense) simply as a feature of our shortcoming to model sup-
posed deterministic processes in a deterministic way? And does the
framework allow for going back and forth between the deterministic
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and the probabilistic rendition if both are addressed (maybe with
one prior to the other)?
13. The final question is maybe one which is to be left to the evaluation
of the theory as it proves itself in practice (or does not). It will be
justified to ask, how applicable the theory finally turns out to be.
To what degree does the proposed definition of cause prove opera-
tionally effective? How well can the suggested account be coupled
with existing frameworks – especially when trying to embed causal
concepts in the special sciences? The answer to these questions will
obviously be related to the choice of the formal framework with its
notation and the mathematical tools therein.
In chapter 3 below these questions will be reconsidered and related
to an extension of the interventionist treatment of causation. It will be
argued that causation be understood as an epistemic concept in order to
illuminate certain disputed examples and controversial intuitions. Rea-
soning about causation will lead to the conclusion that a formal under-
standing of causal relations tells us more about the texture of reasoning
itself. Our knowledge is – as will be argued – efficiently structured by the
guiding principle of causality. It is such structured knowledge, mapped
onto patterns of unified causal and non-causal information, which ulti-
mately permits cognition causarum rerum.
Chapter 2
Causation and causality:
From Lewis to Pearl
Truth, or the connection
between cause and effect, alone
interests us. We are persuaded
that a thread runs through all
things; all worlds are strung on
it, as beads
Ralph Waldo Emerson,
Montaigne; or, the Skeptic
2.1 What is a theory of causation about?
Within the last forty years the literature about theories of causation
has increased immensely: Language analysts built new alliances with
computer scientists and computational linguists. From this very corner
probability theory was fueled, which bestowed upon philosophers the
possibility of thinking about probabilistic causality. Pearl himself is
a computer scientist and as such eager to offer effective tools aiding in
finding concrete solutions to concretely posed questions. He thus turns
on the purely metaphysical non-treatment of the concept of causation
and devises a causal-theoretic toolbox for economists, physicians, sociol-
ogists – in short: for all those on the hunt for causes. At the same time
he analyzes the prevalent situation with the following words:
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Ironically, we are witnessing one of the most bizarre circles in the
history of science: causality in search of a language and, simulta-
neously, speakers of that language in search of its meaning.1
A theory of causation – however furnished – ought to be instrumental
to the user and yield answers to queries like these, at least in agreement
with personal intuition:2
• Is X a cause of Y ?
• Is X a direct (respectively, an indirect) cause of Y ?
• Does the event X = x always cause the event Y = y?
• Is it possible that the event X = x causes Y = y?
Lewis and Pearl share common grounds in acknowledging that in
everyday language stating causes is our base of explanation and justifi-
cation, and that prediction of future events intrinsically and inextricably
rests on causal assumptions. The analytical approaches deviate from one
another, nonetheless.
2.2 Hume’s counterfactual dictum
David Lewis’ paper Causation in the Journal of Philosophy 1973 opens
with Hume’s famous twin definition from 1748:
We may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and
where all objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar
to the second. Or, in other words, where, if the first object had not
been, the second never had existed.3
The first part of this quote from David Hume’s An Enquiry About Hu-
man Understanding, Section VII, sums up, what the regularity analysis
of causation rests on. The mere uniform succession of events shall li-
cense the observer to identify an event occurring (or is it only being
observed?) before a second event as a genuine cause of this very second
event. Here and in what follows I will only talk about ordinary events
1Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 135] – a slight variation of his original formulation in [Pearl
2000a, p. 135].
2Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 222].
3Cf. [Hume 1748, Section VII].
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to follow Lewis’ own self-restriction: Lightning in a thunderstorm, bat-
tles between nations, chats amongst friends, etc. David Lewis formu-
lates various critical notes against this regularity analysis of causation,
thereby criticizing the advocates of probabilistic causality, who base their
theory on the very correlation between events or states. In particular,
any scenario exhibiting the regular succession of an event c (for cause)
and an event e (for effect) can be analyzed reversely, so that – following
Hume’s words – e counts as a genuine cause of c.4 This might possibly be
against the arrow of time if time itself is not explained “into” the theory.
Simultaneousness remains a tough case. Epiphenomena as echo of the
causal history of an event c cannot be distinguished from epiphenomena
of genuine effects e. And inefficacious pre-empted potential causes that
might well have had causal influence, if not being pre-empted, are not
even touched by the regularity analysis.
As an alternative, Lewis turns to Hume’s “other words”: “If the
cause c had not been, the effect e would not have occurred, either.”
This “had not – would not” analysis constitutes one piece of the jigsaw
of David Lewis’ grand agenda of analyzing counterfactual statements,
which culminates in his opus Counterfactuals, published in 1973, in the
same year as Causation. Lewis presses his point there:5
True, we do know that causation has something or other to do with
counterfactuals. We think of a cause as something that makes a
difference, and the difference it makes must be a difference from
what would have happened without it. Had it been absent, its effects
– some of them, at least, and usually all – would have been absent
as well.
Years later Judea Pearl will argue in the same direction.
As a sole spoiler, the meaning of counterfactual statements seems to
evade intuition at first sight. Lewis counters this the following way:
Why not take counterfactuals at face value: as statements about
possible alternatives to the actual situation, somewhat vaguely
specified, in which the actual laws may or may not remain intact?
Lewis does take counterfactuals at face value and designs an appa-
ratus for the evaluation of such statements in his book Counterfactuals.
4Cf. [Lewis 1973a, p. 557].
5For this and the following cf. [Lewis 1973a, p. 557].
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S1i
S2i
S3i
i
¬R
R
b
Fig. 2.1: Lewis’ possible worlds semantics, illustrated: Our actual world i,
concentrical spheres S1, S2, S3 of the same similarity to i with regions
in which R holds or does not, respectively.
2.3 A possible worlds semantics with similarity
“Possible alternatives” to the “actual situation” are understood by Lewis
as metaphysically existing possible alternative worlds, centered around
our actual world i in concentrical spheres according to their respective
degree of similarity to i. As a matter of fact, such considerations can
be made relatively to an arbitrary, distinguished world w. The spheres
around our actual world explicate the structure of the similarity rela-
tion:6
1. It ought to be a weak ordering of worlds, within which two worlds
may be on the same level being of same similarity with respect to
the center; and any pair of worlds must be commensurable in that
sense.
2. Our actual world ought to be the most similar to itself – more
similar than any world different from it.
3. Moreover, there may not exist a unique set of worlds that are most
similar but not equal to the actual world; in that sense the ordering
may be dense and admit worlds which are more and more similar
but never equal to i in an infinite regress. Claiming this, Lewis
disagrees with the initial ideas of Robert Stalnaker, who postu-
6Cf. [Lewis 1973a, p. 560] and [Weatherson 2009, section 3.2].
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lates a uniquely distinguished sphere of most similar worlds with
his Limit Assumption.
Any single of this possible worlds can be understood as an exhaustive
state description: If it is raining in our actual, world we find the claim R
to be true in the center i of our modeling. In some other world differing
from ours with respect to the weather we would encounter ¬R. Typically,
as the meaning of single claims like R or ¬R their respective worlds are
bundled to propositions, i. e., sets of possible worlds.
The counterfactual statement “If φ had occurred, ψ would have occurred
as well” may now be evaluated in possible worlds semantics:
φ 2→ ψ (2.1)
is true exactly if and only if there is no world in which φ ∧ ¬ψ holds
being closer to our actual world i than a world in which φ∧ψ holds. Or
in David Lewis’ own words:
[...] a counterfactual is nonvacuously true iff it takes less of a
departure from actuality to make the consequent true along with
the antecedent than it does to make the antecedent true without
the consequent.7
And in formal fashion:
i  φ 2→ ψ :⇐⇒ ¬hw(w  φ) j (2.2)hu(u  φ ∧ ψ k dv(v  φ ∧ ¬ψ =⇒ v >i u)),
for possible worlds w, u, v and the similarity relation ≤i with respect to
our actual world i. The truth of the second disjunct of (2.2) depends on
the existence of some possible world u satisfying φ∧ψ and being closer to
i than any φ∧¬ψ-worlds. This second disjunct is not formulated relative
to the φ∧ψ-worlds closest to i, because Lewis strictly rejects the Limit
Assumption, i. e., the assumption that for any specific proposition there
is a unique set of worlds closest to some fixed actual i. Instead, there
could be closer and closer worlds (or narrower and narrower spheres of
possible worlds, respectively) infinitesimally close to but never reaching
¬(φ ∧ ψ) in a limitless infinite regress of refinement – in contrast to,
e. g., Robert Stalnaker, who endorses the Limit Assumption in his
7Cf. [Lewis 1973a, p. 560].
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formulation of the truth conditions of counterfactuals.8 Moreover, in
the non-continuous finite and discrete case the truth of counterfactuals
can always be evaluated deploying the limit assumption, because for any
proposition the i-closest worlds can be made out uniquely.
i
φ
ψ
b
Fig. 2.2: φ 2→ ψ is true at i if and only if there is no φ ∧ ¬ψ-world that is
closer to our actual world i than a φ ∧ ψ-world.
Formula (2.2) can be rephrased in set-theoretic notation so that the
similarity relation ≤i with respect to the actual world i is represented
by the hierarchy of cumulative spheres i, where S
n
i =
⋃n
x=0 S
x
i :
i  φ 2→ ψ :⇐⇒
⋃
i ∩ JφK = ∅ j (2.3)hS ∈ i(S ∩ JφK 6= ∅ k S ∩ JφK ⊆ JψK),
where JφK := {u |u  φ} represents the worlds where φ holds (in other
words, the proposition φ). Analogously to (2.2), this formulation does
not postulate that there be the narrowest sphere S in which φ-worlds
can be found, but holds true if there is a sphere S, at all, so that the
φ-worlds within S are included in the set of ψ-worlds. If this is the case,
then it already holds for the sphere with the φ-world most similar to i,
since the similarity relation ≤i is represented in the cumulative hierarchy
of i.
8See e. g. [Weatherson 2009, sect. 3.2] for a comparison of Lewis’ and Stal-
naker’s differing truth conditions of counterfactuals and Lewis’ discussion of the
Limit Assumption in [Lewis 1973b, pp. 19 ff.].
From Lewis to Pearl 39
Two technical remarks shall once more illuminate potential border cases:9
1. If there is no world where the antecedent of the counterfactual
is evaluated with truth value 1, the counterfactual statement is
defined to still hold vacuously – this is due to the first disjuncts of
(2.2) or (2.3), respectively.
2. According to the formulations above, the counterfactual state-
ment also includes the non-counterfactual case, i. e., where the
antecedent φ already holds in our actual world. In this case the
counterfactual is true if and only if the mere material implication
with the same sub-statements holds true. Accordingly, ψ must also
hold in our actual world.
Lewis’ critics are particularly aiming at his similarity measure which
he ultimately employs to objectivize counterfactual statements: What
are the criteria for such a measure? Does one not need to consider, in
addition to a given reference world, a certain aspect in question, with
respect to which one can speak of greater or smaller similarity between
worlds? What is a manageable metric on this relation supposed to look
like? Is it not the case that any possible similarity assessment in the
very core rests on the subjective evaluation of one’s environment? And
how is the following example to be analyzed?10
Example
If Richard Nixon had pushed the button, there would have been nuclear
war.
Does a world with a sole dysfunctional button resemble our actual world
to a greater degree than an alternative world in which we are facing a nu-
clear catastrophe? Lewis allows insight into his conception in his paper
from 1979, Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow, in which he
equips the aspects of his similarity measure with priorities in imperative
manner:
1. It is of the first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse vio-
lations of law.
2. It is of the second importance to maximize the spatio-temporal
region throughout which perfect match of particular fact prevails.
9For this and the following cf. [Lewis 1973b, p. 16 ff.] and (in causal-theoretic
context) also [Lewis 1973a, p. 560 f.].
10For the following cf. [Weatherson 2009, sect. 3.3].
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3. It is of the third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple
violations of law.
4. It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of
particular fact, even in matters that concern us greatly.
With hindsight to this list of priorities, a world where all machinery
of modern warfare targeted at nuclear destruction failed would resem-
ble our actual world far less than the post-nuclear apocalypse. We are
certainly not having a hard time comparing worlds where logical neces-
sities are overridden, where the laws of physics are suspended, or where
extensive geographical restructuring affects the environment. The ques-
tion remains, if the proposed similarity measure over possible alternative
worlds is (i) natural, i. e., in accordance with our conceptualization, and
(ii) to be understood as operationally effective in any way.
2.4 From counterfactual dependence to veritable
causes
To be able to identify causal relationships between clusters (i. e., sets)
of events, David Lewis extends the counterfactual analysis to relation-
ships between families of propositions.11 Now, if each two elements from
these coupled sets of propositions are related counterfactually, we speak
of counterfactual dependence between the respective sets of propositions.
Typically, measuring processes as well as observation and control rou-
tines are characterized by counterfactual dependence between large fam-
ilies of alternatives: E. g., the family of alternative barometer readings
counterfactually depends on the family containing alternative values of
atmospheric pressure – under the assumption, the barometer works prop-
erly, is calibrated correctly, not perturbed etc.
Without much hesitation Lewis reduces causal dependence (in any case
between actual events such as lightning in a thunderstorm etc.) to coun-
terfactual dependence between the according propositions (i. e., sets of
possible worlds).
Hume’s counterfactual formulation – the second part of the twin defi-
nition – thus parallels Lewis’ definition of causal dependence between
two events, not of causation itself. This dependence holds relative to the
truth of the following pair of counterfactuals:
11For this and the following cf. [Lewis 1973a, p. 561 f.].
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(i) φ 2→ ψ and
(ii) ¬φ 2→ ¬ψ.
Causal dependence (or its extension to causal chains, i. e., chains of
events, where each event causally depends on the respective predeces-
sor) between two specific events entails causation, according to David
Lewis. The reverse direction must not be taken for granted: Causation
does not imply causal dependence, in general. Causation should be tran-
sitive if it is to capture our intuitions, while this does not apply to causal
dependence. Lewis be quoted here with his own example (illustrated in
figure 2.3):
[...] there can be causation without causal dependence. let c, d,
and e be three actual events such that d would not have occurred
without c and e would not have occurred without d. Then c is a
cause of e even if e would still have occurred (otherwise caused)
without c.
c
d
e
?
?
Fig. 2.3
“otherwise caused”? – The quote leaves the
reader wondering, since the scenario, as stated,
does not leave room for other causes, and the
twofold counterfactual analysis in the above
formulation expresses precisely the necessary
causal succession c A d A e. So, how can
Lewis’ words be understood? Firstly, the
example is not to be understood as a self-
contained story. It does not depict a closed
world situation with no potential external in-
fluence. The strand c A d A e is to be seen
as part of some metaphysically existing web of
causes and effects that we have access to via
reasoning and intuition. When we talk about
such scenarios we might very well agree on more causally influential en-
tities that we deem relevant, e. g., for explanation. c remains a potential
(but void) cause of an actually occurring event e, even if c is prevented or
pre-empted by other obtaining circumstances. Secondly, Lewis strictly
rejects the possibility of backtracking counterfactuals. Knowledge about
the consequent does not tell us anything about the antecedent. This pre-
cisely reflects the idea that the actual cause of an event may emerge from
the abundance of potential cause candidates and override other (maybe
standard) causes. c and e do stand in the relation of causation, even if c
did not take part in bringing about e. Judea Pearl will make explicit
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what it means for an event to be caused by unforeseen circumstances –
relative to a fixed set of event variables in a (probabilistic) causal model.
Lewis’ cause candidate miracles (which ultimately unfold the concentri-
cal structure of the possible worlds semantics) are replaced in Pearl’s
framework by the breaking of the closed world assumption qua interven-
tions in formal systems.
Lewis’ Causation finally deals with the analysis of epiphenomena
and pre-empted, potential causes to cover more intricate cases and to
trace our reasoning and intuitions within the counterfactual framework.12
Until 1986 a total of six Postscripts are drafted by Lewis to address vari-
ous aspects that obviously seem to him to be explained in too little detail
in Causation. Causal dependence is therein replaced by quasi-dependence
to facilitate the analysis of special border cases of pre-emption. In his
later 2000 paper, Causation As Influence, he even discards this approach
altogether again – this time in favor of a completely new theory which
takes causation to be some gradual influence of causes on potential ef-
fects.
2.5 Pearl’s reply to Hume
When examining Hume’s opening quote Judea Pearl utterly agrees
with David Lewis: Regularity analysis must fall short.13 In modern
terminology: Correlation does not suffice to identify causes and effects.
Part two of Hume’s quote, his rephrasing in “other words” to clothe
causal analysis in counterfactual fashion, cannot be an equivalent pre-
sentation of the problem for Pearl’s taste: Correlations are based on
observations, while deciphering counterfactual statements seems to be a
virtual exercise of the mind. Pearl decisively refrains from such reduc-
tionist approaches and strongly campaigns for admitting natural causal
assumptions in one’s reasoning – he answers Hume and Lewis (and
thinkers of the same direction like John S. Mill) directly:
[. . . ] [D]iscerning the truth of counterfactuals requires generating
and examining possible alternatives to the actual situation as well
as testing whether certain propositions hold in those alternatives
– a mental task of nonnegligible proportions. Nonetheless, Hume
[. . . ] and Lewis apparently believed that going through this mental
exercise is simpler than intuiting directly on whether it was A that
12Cf. [Lewis 1973a, pp. 565 ff.].
13For this and the following cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 238].
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caused B. How can this be done? What mental representation
allows humans to process counterfactuals so swiftly and reliably,
and what logic governs that process so as to maintain uniform
standards of coherence and plausibility?
Moreover, Pearl makes out some inherent circularity in the similarity
relation over possible worlds as proposed by Lewis: When assessing
varying deviations from actuality in accordance with the above men-
tioned weighting, one cannot simply apply arbitrary principles – they
must in any way at least conform with our conception of causal laws.14
The nuclear first strike lies just on one causal line with Nixon’s decision
to push the fateful button. Less resistance is offered here to this causal
flow than in a world with a deficient mediating button.
To evade such a circle, Judea Pearl turns to concrete identifiable, invari-
ant single mechanisms for the comparison of two alternative situations.
These single mechanisms may well be resting on causal assumptions,
which nevertheless only become relevant locally within exact confines.
2.6 Pearl’s agenda
In his book Causality (2000, and extended in the second edition 2009)
Pearl explicates the philosophical and technical fundament of his ap-
proach towards modeling causal relationships. Although the notion of
causality almost conveys something like lawlike necessity, as Pearl
stresses on the first pages of his book, and the notion of probability
rather seems to imply uncertainty and lack of regularity, various good
reasons point in the direction of a fruitful exploration of the probabilis-
tic treatment of causation.15 With this probabilistic approach Pearl
follows thinkers like Hans Reichenbach, I. J. Good, and in particular
Patrick Suppes who illustrated the foundation of this agenda on prob-
abilistic maxims exemplarily: By giving reasons like “you will fail the
course because of your laziness” we know very well, that the antecedent
(the laziness) makes the consequent (failing the course) more probable,
but surely not absolute certain. A language of causality should capture
such an intuition, in any way. Another protagonist be mentioned here:
In the 1980s Wolfgang Spohn developed his ranking functions on prob-
abilistic fundaments as well.
14Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 239].
15For this and the following cf. [Pearl 2009, chapter 1].
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Pearl avails himself of methods he finds among statisticians, who
had successfully offered observations and measured data in compact form
to various disciplines for years. In the following I want to present the
keystones of the technical background in due brevity.
To recover information about observable dependences from raw data one
may make use of probabilistic models, represented by joint probability
functions. A probabilistic model is an encoding of information that per-
mits us to compute the probability of every well-formed sentence S in
accordance with the Kolmogorov Axioms.16 S can here be seen as one
specific event, in particular an elementary event to which all the random
variables under consideration contribute a certain value. In the case of a
dichotomous variable A, the contribution to the conjunction S will either
be a or ¬a.
P
A
P (A,B = ¬b) = P (B = ¬b)
¬a ∧ b
a ∧ b
¬a ∧ ¬ba ∧ ¬b
Fig. 2.4: The joint probability function
over A and B assigns mass to
possible worlds.
A joint probability function pro-
vides exactly the required assign-
ment of probabilities to elemen-
tary events. This can be inter-
preted as an assignment of mass
(or weight) to a universe of possi-
ble worlds representing these ele-
mentary events, i. e., a set of dis-
joint formulae. Figure 2.4 displays
an example: A universe of four
possible worlds represents a set of
four disjoint formulae, namely the combinatorial permutations of possi-
ble values (a, ¬a, b, ¬b) of the dichotomous (random) variables A and B.
The size of the different worlds (i. e., the diameter of the circles in this
geometric interpretation) is then viewed as mass or weight attributed
to those worlds by the joint probability function. Any other desired
quantity may be calculated using this information: The marginal proba-
bility P (B = ¬b) is simply the combined mass of all worlds in which ¬b
holds (as shown in figure 2.4) – regardless of the other circumstances in
these worlds. Whenever a joint distribution function P over n random
variables X1, . . . ,Xn is available, it is possible to perform a factorial de-
composition of P (x1, . . . , xn)
17 in accordance with the general form
16Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 6] or below, pp. 137 ff.
17In this notation, x1, . . . , xn represent specific values of the variables X1, . . . ,Xn.
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P (A,B) = P (A |B)P (B). (2.4)
Iterated application of (2.4) permits the decomposition of P (·) as a prod-
uct of n conditional distributions:18
P (x1, . . . , xn) =
∏
j
P (xj |x1, . . . , xj−1). (2.5)
In so-called Bayes nets independences between random variables may
be presented clearly and compactly. In this context, random variables
actually are measurable functions from a probability space in a measur-
able observation space, or in other words: Random variables, taken as
functions, relate concrete (sets of) outcomes of a random experiment to
the mathematical representation of these outcomes, e. g., on a discrete
scale. The days of the week for example would be assigned the inte-
gers between 0 and 6.19 We always expect independence between two
variables – intuitively speaking – if we do not expect the value of one
variable to influence the value of the second variable (to be exact, we are
examining the changing of values). In general, we would not expect the
occurrence of the event Rain, or No Rain, to have any influence on the
day of the week, and vice versa.
A Bayes net can be defined as a tuple consisting of a directed acyclic
graph G and a set of random variables V which are represented in the
graph as nodes. The directed edges (arrows) in the graph G encode pre-
cisely the available knowledge about conditional independences between
the represented variables – in accordance with their joint probability dis-
tribution. For any two independent variables in the Bayes net it can be
stated that the probability of the first variable conditional on the second
variable already equals the mere a priori probability of the first variable
alone, formally:
A ⊥ B ⇐⇒ P (A |B) = P (A). (2.6)
Here, limiting the sample space to certain B outcomes (e. g., Wednes-
day as one day of the week) has no effect on the probability of certain
A outcomes (e. g., the occurrence of rain). The mathematical form of
conditional dependence is given by the famous Bayes Theorem:
P (A |B) =
P (B |A) · P (A)
P (B)
. (2.7)
18Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 14] – equation (1.30).
19For a specification of the notion of random variable see below, pp. 137 ff.
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In particular, a Bayes net satisfies the Markov property: Every vari-
able X is, conditional on its parent variables PAX , i. e., parent nodes in
the graph G, independent of all its non-descendants. Referring back to
Equation (2.5) we can define the concept of Markovian parents:
Definition 2.6.1 (Markovian Parents)20
Let V = {X1, . . . ,Xn} be an ordered set of variables, and let P (v) be the
joint probability distribution on these variables. A set of variables PAj
is said to be Markovian Parents of Xj if PAj is a minimal set of prede-
cessors of Xj that renders Xj independent of all its other predecessors.
In other words, PAj is any subset of {X1, . . . ,Xn} satisfying
P (xj |paj) = P (xj |x1, . . . , xj−1) (2.8)
and such that no proper subset of PAj satisfies 2.8.
21
Put in prose: Direct parent nodes screen off their child nodes. And
already interpreted causally: Direct causes screen off their effects from
potentially perturbing predecessors.
The concept of Markovian Parents can easily be understood within a
graph-theoretical framework – namely by applying it to the parents of a
node in a (directed) graph. Pearl concludes that a necessary condition
for a DAG G to be a Bayesian network of probability distribution P
is for P to admit the product decomposition dictated by G, as given
in definition 2.6.122 (i. e., linking parent nodes in the graph to random
variables which will be Markovian parents to those random variables
linked to the child nodes of the aforementioned parent nodes). This
leads to the definition of Markov Compatibility :
Definition 2.6.2 (Markov Compatibility)23
If a probability function P admits the factorization of definition 2.6.1
relative to a DAG G, we say that G represents P , that G and P are
compatible, or that P is Markov relative to G.
As the philosophical foundation for the mapping of concrete situ-
ations to such Bayesian nets Thomas Bayes’ very own interpretation
of probabilistic quantities may be called on. In his works probabilities
20In [Pearl 2009, p. 14]: definition 1.2.1.
21As Pearl adds: Lowercase symbols (e. g., xj , paj) denote particular realizations
of the corresponding variables (e. g., Xj , PAj).
22Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 16].
23In [Pearl 2009, p. 16]: definition 1.2.2.
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are not understood frequentistically, but rather as subjective degrees
of personal convictions – degrees of belief. Developing efficient, graph
based algorithms in the early 1980s Pearl coins the term ‘Belief Prop-
agation,’ the transfer of more or less solid convictions with respect to
certain possible facts, i. e., realization of variables, respectively, induced
by correlation in the underlying probability distribution and represented
by the directed edges in the graph. A short remark in parentheses: Wolf-
gang Spohn for example carries this line of thought further by stating
that causation lies in the eye of the beholder.24
When establishing his framework, Judea Pearl emphasizes directed
acyclic graphs as a powerful means for the analysis of complex causal
relations. As he states, the role of graphs in probabilistic and statistical
modeling is threefold:25
1. they provide convenient means of expressing substantive assump-
tions;
2. they facilitate economical representations of joint probability func-
tions; and
3. they facilitate efficient inferences from observations.
A directed acyclic graphs answering queries about conditional indepen-
dences may not necessarily be interpreted as reflecting causal relation-
ships between variables right away. In most cases an alternative graph
with a different ordering of the variables under consideration, i. e., nodes,
respectively, may be constructed for the very same list of independence
statements. Lightning and thunder with a reversible arrow in the graph-
ical interpretation is a prototypical example. Nevertheless, there obvi-
ously exists a certain preference for a variable ordering when modeling
even complex situations, as Pearl notes. He calls on Reichenbach’s
famous dictum from 1956, his Common Cause Principle, which may be
applied to Markovian net structures if these are interpreted causally: “No
correlation without causation.” 26 – In other words: If two variables are
probabilistically dependent, either one variable exerts causal influence
on the second, or there exists a third variable as a common cause of the
first-mentioned (thereby indirectly dependent) variables.
24Cf. Spohn: Ranking Theory (forthcoming – 2009, p. 422).
25Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 13].
26Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 30].
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Certainly, the most salient ingredient in Pearl’s analysis of causa-
tion on probabilistic foundations ultimately are deterministic functions
determining the value of each variable in the modeling by taking as argu-
ments merely the values of the parent nodes together with some potential
exogenous and stochastic influence. These autonomous mechanisms are
to be understood as asymmetric assignments; as a list of structural equa-
tions they describe the skeleton of a causally interpreted graph:
xi = fi(pai, ui), with i = 1, . . . , n; (2.9)
put in prose: The value x of the ith variable X is determined by a
uniquely assigned equation fi, that takes as arguments the set of parent
variables of the ith variable together with a stochastic, uniquely assigned,
non-observed disturbance quantity, which does not appear in the mod-
eling as measured variable.
Advocating these deterministic mechanisms Pearl picks up what he
grants the developers of the Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) frame-
work: the directed nature of value assignment by structural equations
with causal intension. That this intension seems to be suppressed from
theory and practice and forgotten altogether Pearl does not get tired
of pointing out.
To sharpen the contrast with Lewis once again, it shall be reminded
that, in opposition to Pearl’s structural approach with deterministic
causal mechanisms, Lewis also speaks of intrinsically uncertain effects,
in general, and writes in the supplemental Postscript B to Causation
under the title “Chancy Causation” the following:27
[. . . ] I certainly do not think that causation requires determin-
ism. (Hence I regard “causality” as a naughty word, since it is
ambiguous between “causation” and “determinism.”)
The reader wonders, on what scale “causation” and “determinism” might
mark the extremes. David Lewis goes on in the same passage:
Events that happen by chance may nevertheless be caused. In-
deed, it seems likely that most actual causation is of this sort.
Whether that is or not, plenty of people do think that our world is
chancy; and chancy enough so that most things that happen had
some chance, immediately beforehand, of not happening.
27Cf. [Lewis 1986b, p. 175].
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Pearl does not have to discern uncertain causation and determinis-
tic processes in his conceptualization: Causal mechanisms as structural
equations represent just those invariant causal laws, while the causal
flow may well be “diverted” in concrete cases by (i) exogenous, i. e., non-
observed and unmodeled influences or by (ii) intentional calibration of
these very deterministic mechanisms for the comparison of alternative
settings.
To complement technical conceptualities with intuitions, I will
present a compact standard example as illustration in the following.28
X4
X2 X3
X1
X5
Season
Sprinkler Rain
Pavement wet
Pavement slippery
X′4
X′2 X
′
3
X′5
Sprinkler Car wash
Pavement wet
Pavement slippery
Fig. 2.5: Example of a Bayes net with five variables – on the right a modified
variant without superstructure.
Figure 2.5 shows the graph of a Bayesian network representing depen-
dencies among the variables X1 through X5 in compact form. X1 stands
as sole four-valued variable for the season of the year, X2 stores whether
it is raining or not, and X3 whether the sprinkler in the front yard is
switched on or off. The node X4 represents the question, if the pavement
is wet, X5 the subsequent question, if the pavement is slippery in addi-
tion. The variables X2 through X5 are dichotomic variables and assume
the values ‘true’ or ‘false’.
The situation depicted by the left graph might be found in a typical
Californian suburb where people switch on their sprinklers in the front
yard to water the lawn during the hot and dry summer months and leave
the sprinkler off to save water in the winter time when the chance of rain
every once in a while is not too bad. Either way, if it rains or if the
sprinkler is on, the curb separating the front yard from the street gets
28This example is taken from [Pearl 2009, pp. 21 ff.].
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wet. As a consequence, the thin film of dust and dirt on the pavement
turns into some slippery slide. The ecologically aware residents moreover
base their decision (whether to switch the sprinkler on or not) on the
current season of the year and their experience, that tells them if rain
is rather likely to occur in that season or rather unlikely: The sprinkler
will certainly be switched on during the hot and dry summer months,
maybe operated by an automatic timer for convenience.
The information expressed by the left graph can be read off the edges
in the graph, the absent (possible) edges, and the chosen arrow direc-
tions conveying knowledge or assumptions about dependencies among
the variables. In accordance with the Markov property parent nodes as
direct causes screen off their children from the influence of any non-
descendants. E. g., whether the pavement gets slippery in the end (i. e.,
whether X5 takes the value ‘true’) does not depend on the influence of
any variable not mediated by X4 – neither the occurrence of rain nor
the running sprinkler directly cause the pavement to become slippery
but first influence the wetness of the ground which in turn entails the
slipperiness of the pavement.
Figure 2.5 does not display any exogenous, non-observed confounders
influencing each variable distinctly independently. Each variable X is
paired with a respective variable U (for “unobserved”) with the same
lower index. The invariant causal mechanisms underlying the modeling
of our scenario can now be listed as functions:
x1 = u1 (2.10)
x2 = f2(x1, u2)
x3 = f3(x1, u3)
x4 = f4(x2, x3, u4)
x5 = f5(x4, u5)
x1 is assigned a value only from outside the model. The value of x2
is derived from evaluating x1 and exogenous influences, as well as the
value of x3, and so forth.
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The nonlinear functions f2 through f5 can now be specified as follows:
x2 = [(X1 = spring) ∨ (X1 = summer) ∨ u2] ∧ ¬u
′
2, (2.11)
x3 = [(X1 = fall) ∨ (X1 = winter) ∨ u3] ∧ ¬u
′
3,
x4 = (x2 ∨ x3 ∨ u4) ∧ ¬u
′
4,
x5 = (x4 ∨ u5) ∧ ¬u
′
5,
with xi on the right side representing the assignment of the truth value
1 to the respective variable Xi. The u values stand for potentially con-
tributive or also preventative, exogenous, i. e., unmodeled influences. x2
becomes true if it is spring or summer or if some unexpected influence
u2 contributes positively, as long as no unexpected influence ¬u
′
2 com-
pletely prevents the assignment of truth value 1 to x2. u4 in the third
line marks some potential additional (but unmodeled) influence causing
the pavement to be wet – e. g., some burst water pipe – while ¬u′4 as ob-
structive antagonist might stand for some plastic cover on the pavement
not considered during modeling phase.
In contrast to purely probabilistic models in the form of joint prob-
ability distributions, Bayesian networks with structural equations may
readily be enriched by additional influences, i. e., further variables. As
when inserting a new component into a schematic circuit diagram, the
effects of such a modification can be understood quite easily, precisely
because it takes place locally and behaves clearly directionally. Some
plastic cover on the pavement may be integrated into the model as local
attachment of nodes and edges to the graph and as update of specific
lines in the list of equations. Such an augmentation can be understood
as “zooming in” on the scenario.
Certain settings may be analyzed in quite complex structures. To enable
the analyst to read off from the graph which variable influences which
other variable, Pearl offers a graphical criterion fit for this task: the so-
called d-separation criterion for directed graphs. Applying this tool one
may determine if the flow of information along the paths in the diagram
is blocked possibly, or – interpreted a different way – if the transfer of
degrees of belief along a certain path works or does not. And expressed
in the terminology of Bayesian networks: Whenever a joint probability
function P and a DAG G are Markov compatible in accordance with def-
inition 2.6.2, one should be able to read off the graph the conditional
independencies embedded in the probabilistic model represented by P .
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To facilitate easy access to this information, Pearl gives a precise defi-
nition of his graphical criterion.
Definition 2.6.3 (d-Separation)29
What it means for a path (or analogously for two distinct nodes, respec-
tively) to be d-separated by a set of nodes can be explicated on the basis
of the pair of notions activated–deactivated as follows:
1. A path p (i. e., a sequence of links) is said to be deactivated (or
blocked) by a set of nodes Z iff p contains a chain i A m A j or
a fork iB m A j where the middle node m is an element of Z.
2. If a path p is not deactivated in the first place it is said to be
activated by a set of nodes Z iff it contains at least one inverted
fork (also called collider) i A mB j such that the middle node m
of each collider in p (or a descendant of such an m) is in Z.30
Consequently, a set of nodes Z is said to d-separate two nodes X and Y
iff every path from X to Y is inactive: either deactivated by the choice
of Z or not activated.
The ‘d ’ in ‘d-separation’ denotes directional, which is the reason for the
twofold formulation of definition 2.6.3. It makes a significant difference
how the arrows along the path under consideration are directed. Choos-
ing a set of nodes Z can be understood as fixing one’s knowledge about
the elements of Z or as gaining information about specific realizations
of the Z variables. The d-separation test in a graph thereby tells the
researcher if he ought to change his beliefs regarding the realization of a
variable Y in case a third variable X has changed, given the background
knowledge about the variables in Z. In general, Pearl speaks of two
sets of nodes X and Y being d-separated by the set of nodes Z – since
these sets of nodes can be seen as complex variables as well, it will be
sufficient to consider single nodes in the following for brevity.31 What
it means for a probability distribution compatible with the DAG G that
two nodes (or sets of nodes) X and Y are d-separated in G is spelled out
in formal fashion in appendix B, which restates Pearl’s formulation of
the implications of d-separation.
29
Pearl gives a slightly different formulation of the d -separation criterion with
def. 1.2.3 in [Pearl 2009, pp. 16 f.], yet another variant in [Geiger et al. 1990, pp.
513 f.], and a very compact presentation in [Pearl 1995, p. 671].
30It is important to note here that, once a path has been deactivated by an appro-
priate choice of Z, it cannot be activated by any set of nodes.
31If ‘X’ and ‘Y ’ denote sets of nodes, a third set of nodes Z is said to d -separate
X from Y iff Z blocks every path from X to Y . Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 17].
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The Californian front yard shall be consulted for illustration once
more. Looking at the left graph of figure 2.5 we can see clearly what
Pearl means by blocking paths (cf. part 1 of definition 2.6.3): The set
{X1} blocks the path X2 B X1 A X3. X1, which encodes the season
of the year, acts as a balance between the status of the sprinkler (X2)
and the occurrence of rain (X3) in our modeling intention – whenever
the season provides rain, the sprinkler will remain switched off, and vice
versa. If one does not know anything about the value of X1 (season), it is
still possible to know the value of X2 (sprinkler) by learning the value of
X3 (rain), since Rain=off makes Sprinkler=on more likely, and – again
– vice versa. This knowledge is simply derived from the knowledge of
the causal mechanisms at work (which in this case yield some kind of
negative correlation between X2 and X3). Now, if one gains knowledge
about the actual value of X1 (i. e., which season it is), X2 and X3 become
independent of each other: Knowing it is hot and dry summer, learning
that the sprinkler is off would not change our belief in the amount of
rain, namely that there is no rain at all. We would rather find some
other exceptional explanation for the sprinkler being off, e. g., that it
is broken.32 What has just been applied to forks (paths of the pattern
i B m A j) is also applicable to simple chains (paths of the pattern
iA mA j) in the graph (e. g., the path X1 A X3 A X4).
In the case of inverted forks (or colliders), part 2 of definition 2.6.3
applies. The only collider in the left graph of figure 2.5 can be found
in the path X2 A X4 B X3. For reasons of clarity, this structure is
replicated in the right graph of figure 2.5, freed from the superstruction
of X2 B X1 A X3. The situation in this graph is similar to the above
sketched: A running sprinkler in the front yard leads to wet pavement,
just as the house owner washing his car in the driveway in front of the
garage. Either way, the pavement gets wet, again, and turns into a
slippery slide posing danger to passer-bys.
It is important to note here that the status of the sprinkler is completely
independent of any car wash possibly taking place in the driveway – X ′2
and X ′3 are d-separated if we do not condition on anything (i. e., know
nothing about X ′4, which encodes the wetness of the pavement). In other
words: If we do not know the actual value of X ′4 (is the pavement wet
32Conditional independence is symmetrical, so if we know it is hot and dry sum-
mer, learning that it is raining would not change our belief in the status of the sprin-
kler, which is switched on during the summer as an unalterable rule in the situation
sketched above – for example by an automatic timer.
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or not? ), learning the value of X ′3 (e. g., someone is washing the car in
front of the garage) does not change our belief in X ′2 (the status of the
sprinkler) or – to be a bit more precise – does not change our degrees
of belief in the different possible values X ′2 can assume (expressed by
the unconditional probability distribution P (X ′2)). The missing edge
between X ′2 and X
′
3 is a consequence of our modeling intention: E. g.,
the car owner would not switch off the sprinkler because he is washing
the car (maybe because he has put the sprinkler close to the driveway
and would not want himself to get sprinkled) – resulting in the absence
of the path X ′2 B X ′3. Neither does our modeling intention tell us that
the status of the sprinkler somehow influences the decision of the house
owner to wash his car or not – resulting in the absence of the path
X ′2 A X ′3.
Nevertheless, once we know the value of X ′4 (i. e., condition on the value
of X ′4), the variables X
′
2 and X
′
3 become conditionally dependent on each
other, and the path X ′2 A X ′4 B X ′3 is not d-separated any more. In
other words, once we know the value of X ′4, learning the value of X
′
3
would change our belief in the different possible values of X ′2 – and vice
versa.
With his book Causality Judea Pearl is pleading for the use of
graphs on the hunt for causal influences and efficient causes. He pro-
motes those graphs as a mathematical means of precise notation in which
complex relationships can be presented compactly and easily accessibly
to the user of any discipline. In the second, extended edition of Causality
Pearl emphasizes his standpoint in poetic manner:
As X-rays are to the surgeon,
graphs are for causation.33
2.7 From modeling to model
A graph as in figure 2.5 together with explicit functional and determin-
istic mechanisms exemplifies the analysis of situations as undertaken by
economists, by sociologists, by epidemiologists, or diagnostic physicians.
Joint probability distributions assigning degrees of belief (in Bayesian
interpretation) to any possible combination of atomic outcomes as dis-
joint elementary events may serve as the basis for such a kind of study.
A network may then be generated algorithmically to (graphically) dis-
play all conditional dependencies, however, not necessarily uniquely in
33Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 331].
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most cases. A characteristic momentum in the modeling phase is the
embedding of natural causal assumptions which cannot be derived from
the mere collection of data. These causal assumptions originate either in
the expertise of the modeler or in rather robust basic intuitions: When
posing the question, in which direction to point an arrow between two
nodes representing the age of a person and secondly her susceptibility
to a certain disease, we would prefer the arrow to be rooted in the age
node without much dispute. Obviously, this decision is grounded in quite
basal assumptions about stability and continuity of certain processes in
our world.34
To extend the rather informal notion of modeling to the formal con-
cept of model in the model-theoretic sense, I want to reproduce Pearl’s
definition of a causal model at this point. It certainly has to go beyond
the concept of model in probability theory.35 There, a joint probability
function over the variables under consideration yields a truth value for
any proposition. E. g., the proposition “the probability for event A to
occur is greater than 12 ” is assigned the truth value 1 or 0 – depending
on the state of facts. Now, a causal model should be able to encode
the truth value of statements about causal relationships. This includes
sentences like
• “B occurred because of A,”
• “A may cause B,”
• “B will occur if we bring about A,”
• and counterfactual observations like “B would have been different
were it not for A.”
Obviously, such statements cannot be evaluated in standard propo-
sitional logic or any probability calculus, because they talk about – as
Judea Pearl puts it – changes in the outer world and not about chang-
ing convictions regarding a closed static world. Thus, causal models are
meant to provide information about possible external changes – they do
that by explicitly representing structural mechanisms, which are to be
modified through external alterations. More about that in the next step,
but firstly on to the definition of a causal model.
34For this cf. Pearl’s analysis of Simpson’s Paradox in [Pearl 2009, pp. 177 f.].
35For this and the following cf. [Pearl 2009, pp. 202 f.].
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Definition 2.7.1 (Pearl’s Causal Model)36
A causal model is a triple
M = 〈U, V, F 〉
where:
(i) U is a set of background variables (also called exogenous∗), that
are determined by factors outside the model;
(ii) V is a set {V1, V2, . . . , Vn} of variables, called endogenous, that are
determined by variables in the model – that is, variables in U ∪ V ;
and
(iii) F is a set of functions {f1, f2, . . . , fn} such that each fi is a map-
ping from (the respective domains of) Ui∪PAi to Vi, where Ui ⊆ U
and PAi ⊆ V \Vi and the entire set F forms a mapping from U to
V . In other words, each fi in
vi = fi(pai, ui), i = 1, . . . , n,
assigns a value to Vi that depends on (the values of) a select set
of variables in V ∪ U , and the entire set F has a unique solution
V (u).∗∗,∗∗∗
Pearl’s respective footnotes shall be added for completeness in the fol-
lowing:
* [2 in Pearl’s def.] We will try to refrain from using the term “exogenous”
in referring to background conditions, because this term has acquired more
refined technical connotations [. . . ]. The term “predetermined” is used in the
econometric literature.
** [3 in Pearl’s def.] The choice of PAi (connoting parents) is not arbitrary, but
expresses the modeller’s understanding of which variables Nature must consult
before deciding the value of Vi.
*** [4 in Pearl’s def.] Uniqueness is ensured in recursive (i. e., acyclic) systems.
Halpern [Axiomatizing causal reasoning. In G. F. Cooper and S. Moral, edi-
tors, Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, pages 202-210. Morgan Kaufmann,
San Francisco, CA, 1998 ] allows multiple solutions in nonrecursive systems.
Pearl’s definition of a causal model, though formal and compact,
comes with some loose ends, which are tightened in Appendix A (p. 137)
by giving the formal mathematical definition of a random variable as
36Cf. def. 7.1.1 in [Pearl 2009, p. 203], footnotes given below with changed index
symbols. Also see Pearl’s preliminary def. 2.2.2, [Pearl 2009, p. 44] where a causal
model is defined as a pair M = 〈D,ΘD〉 consisting of a causal structure D (which
is a directed acyclic graph connecting a set of nodes V ) and a set of parameters ΘD
that specify the functional value assignment of each of the nodes in V .
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function of the outcome of a stochastic experiment. With these def-
initions at hand, we may revisit Pearl’s definition of F , the set of
deterministic mechanisms in the causal model. When looking at the
sprinkler example, again, we can pick out one element of F , perhaps
f4, which is associated with the variable X4 representing the answer
to the question, if the pavement is wet or not. X4 is assigned its
value x4 by feeding the values of its parent variables (in the Marko-
vian sense) along with the stochastic influence u4 into the correspond-
ing function f4: X4 = f4(x2, x3, u4). Each variable, seen as a func-
tion, has its own domain such that X4 is actually assigned its value by
f4(X2(ω2),X3(ω3), U4(χ4)) with ω2 ∈ Ω2 = Dom(X2) = {rain,no rain},
ω3 ∈ Ω3 = Dom(X3) = {sprinkler on, sprinkler off}, and undescribed
χ3 ∈ Dom(U3), which is not specified in any more detail. After all,
any exogenous influence is an unmodeled influence, by choice of design
– Dom(U3) might therefore contain plastic covers, burst water pipes,
shattered coffee mugs, etc. For reasons of clarity, here and in the def-
inition below we combine all potential exogenous influences on X4 into
one complex variable U4 (containing both positively contributing and
preventative external factors).37 Summing things up: The deterministic
mechanisms fi take as arguments elements of the respective ranges of
the parent variables (and the one complex exogenous variable), seen as
functions.
Part (iii) of definition 2.7.1 can now be supported with the following
formulation of causal mechanisms:
Definition 2.7.2 (Causal Mechanisms)38
F is a set of causal mechanisms for V , i. e., n functions {f1, f2, . . . , fn}
(determining the value of each variable Vi in V ) such that
vi = fi(pai, ui)
39
with
F = {fi | fi :
(
∏
k
Ran(PAik)
)
× Ran(Ui)→ Ran(Vi)},
where 1 ≤ i ≤ |V | and for every i: 1 ≤ k ≤ |PAi|, Ui ∈ U (possibly
combining multiple contributing and/or preventing disturbance factors
into one complex variable), and PAi ⊆ V \{Vi}. The entire set F forms
a mapping from U to V with a unique solution.
37This is possible w. l. o. g., since all external factors satisfy the Markov property by
definition, i. e., they are influencing the associated variables distinctly independently.
38The formulation given here is in agreement with the definition of the concept of
structural model with deterministic functions in [Halpern & Pearl 2005a, p. 847].
39The boldface pai collects for each variable Vi the values of its parent variables.
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Example
Consider the random variable V4 with the associated set of parents
PA4 = {V1, V2, V3} and the complex variable U4 as an exogenous un-
modeled factor. V4 is assigned its value by the function
f4 : Ran(PA41)×Ran(PA42)×Ran(PA43)×Ran(PA44)×Ran(U4)→ Σ4,
where Σ4 is the set of possible realizations (possible values) of V4.
The concrete value is now assigned nonlinearly by
v4 = f4(pa41 ,pa42 ,pa43 ,pa44 , u4).
Every causal model can be coupled with a directed graph in which
each variable of the model is represented by a node. The concrete func-
tional and above all autonomous mechanisms are abstracted from in this
causal graph by means of directed edges. Arrows from the parent nodes
to the child nodes mirror the set of functions F . The specification of all
nonlinear assignments is stored in the structural model itself.
2.8 Triggering causes, bringing about effects
Whether an event may be called a cause of a second event, obviously
depends on how the influence of the associated first variable on the sec-
ond variable behaves. In particular, one node in the diagram should be
seen as a cause of a second node if assigning a specific value to the first
node evokes a difference in the evaluation of the second one (in the vo-
cabulary of Bayesian networks). Pearl’s approach thus centers around
the notion of causal effect. Such a causal effect may be tested in analogy
with a controlled experiment in the laboratory: The scenario is manip-
ulated locally, certain conditions of the setting are modified and fixed in
such a manner that occurring changes in the values of observed variables
can be measured. Now, quite in agreement with this procedure, in the
causal model the value of a specific structural function will be modified
and fixed, thereby cutting the links between the respective variables and
their parents. As a formal expression of this intervention, of this manip-
ulation from outside, Pearl introduces a new operator which does not
become effective within a model but precisely converts one causal model
into a second. The so-called do(·)-operator, which may very well be read
imperatively, thus induces a transformation of the model under consider-
ation, unambiguously. In doing so, it explicitly breaks the Closed World
Assumption, on which in particular probabilistic models rest.
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A causal effect can now be expressed as probabilistic quantity which may
be calculated from a probability distribution upon transformation:
Definition 2.8.1 (Pearl’s Causal Effect)40
Given two disjoint sets of variables, X and Y , the causal effect of X on
Y , denoted either as P (y | x̂) or as P (y | do(x)), is a function from X
to the space of probability distributions on Y . For each realization x of
X, P (y | x̂) gives the probability of Y = y induced by deleting from the
structural causal model all equations corresponding to variables in X and
substituting X = x in the remaining equations.
This definition precisely expresses that the variable X does not depend
functionally on any other variables any more. It will be assigned its value
from outside by an intervention external to the model. This process of
assigning is not encoded in the model itself, but is part of just such a
transformation symbolized by the do(·)-operator.
Our Californian sprinkler example may be consulted for illustration,
once more. The notion of external intervention becomes more transpar-
ent if one sets out to examine the causal influence of the sprinkler on the
slipperiness of the pavement: In our list of structural equations (2.10)
the value of the random variable X2 is set to ‘switched on’, i. e., ‘true’.
The corresponding equation thus becomes inoperative, and the value x2
in the equation for X4 will as well be fixed to ‘true’. Any possible alter-
native for the value of X5 is eliminated – it shall be remarked here, that
is was certainly possible for X5 to assume alternative values before the
intervention, i. e., ‘true’ or ‘false’. The unblocked causal flow from X2 to
X5 now ultimately brings about the actual slipperiness of the pavement,
of course modulo obstructive exogenous influences as plastic covers and
such.
In the corresponding graph the modification of the structural equations
becomes evident if for any variable the elimination of functional depen-
dencies, graphically interpreted, means the elimination of influent edges.
In the sprinkler example this means in particular that the transfer of
degrees of personal belief between X1 and X2 becomes blocked. Before
the intervention the modeling traces the mere observation of the setting.
As soon as the running sprinkler is observed, one can infer with great
certainty that is is summer or spring, due to the underlying positive cor-
relation of X1 and X2. The dry seasons are finally responsible for the
sprinkler being switched on, as was our modeling intention.
40Cf. def. 3.2.1 in [Pearl 2009, p. 70].
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X4
X2 X3
X1
X5
Season
do(Sprinkler = on) Rain
Pavement wet
Pavement slippery
Fig. 2.6: The sprinkler is “switched on by intervention” – applying do(·) trans-
forms the graph and breaks the link between X1 and X2.
An intervention external to the model can be understood as deliberate
manipulation of the setting, not influenced by any conditions within
the model. In the transformed model one cannot infer the dry season
from the observation of the running sprinkler anymore. This deliberate
manipulation of X2 does not depend on the value of the variable X1, in
particular, which is marked by eliminating the connecting arrow: The
sprinkler may now be switched on and off in all seasons virtually if the
causal connection with the slipperiness of the pavement is to be tested.
On the basis of these structural local modifications, together with de-
pendence tests and quantitative comparison, Pearl establishes the fine-
grained formal representation of statements about causes, direct causes,
indirect causes, and potential causes.41 In short: The variable X is a
cause of Y in this framework if (given the values of all background vari-
ables) there exist two possible values x and x′ such that the choice of a
value for X (either in favor of x or in favor of x′) makes a difference in
the evaluation of the variable Y .
David Lewis shall be consulted once more for comparison: To de-
termine in his possible worlds semantics counterfactually if an event P
was causally responsible for a second event Q to occur, one had to stride
through a metaphysically existent similarity space with great mental
effort to test for metaphysically existent alternative worlds of various
41Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 222].
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similarity distance, whether the statements ¬P and ¬Q describe the re-
spective settings there correctly – or not. Even when restricting ourselves
to dichotomous variables, i. e., bivalent logic, respectively, depending on
the number of propositional constants we only obtain a semi-decidable
procedure for the identification of causes in the worst case, since we uni-
versally quantify over possible worlds.
i
¬p
b
b
w
¬q?
P = p
Q = q
i
do(P = ¬p)
Q = ¬q?
w
Fig. 2.7: On the search for alternative testing environments for Q moving from
the setting i to the setting w – as proposed by Lewis (on the left)
and Pearl (on the right).
In direct comparison: When moving away from the actual world i
along the similarity relation in Lewis’ framework, we have to check in
the closest ¬p worlds w, if we also find ¬q to hold there. When model-
ing generic relationships in the actual world i in Pearl’s formalism, we
obtain a graph G mirroring the mere observation of correlations. The
transition to an alternative world w where ¬p is to be determined can
be achieved qua intervention by means of the do(·)-operator: The vari-
able P is set to ‘false’, influent edges are eliminated. The question is
now, whether the assignment of the P value also leads to a measurable
difference in the evaluation of the variable Q. If the causal effect of P
on Q in the model is identifiable (and Pearl gives algorithmic criteria
for determining if it is or not), then it can be calculated uniquely and
efficiently on the basis of the stable functional mechanisms. Identify-
ing causes in Pearl’s formalism can thus be understood both as natural
and operationally effective at the same time, because the invariant mech-
anisms represent intuitively obvious basal assumptions, and because the
external interventions are limited to local surgeries of the graph.
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2.9 Computing observational data for causal in-
ference
Making automated learning as efficient as possible is one of the chief goals
of computer scientists and has driven research in the field of artificial in-
telligence. Several algorithms for inductive automated construction of
Bayes nets from observational data have been developed and refined to
achieve computational tractability. Typically, learning of Bayesian net-
works is divided into two tasks: (i) learning of the underlying (graphical)
structure of the net, i. e., its topology, and (ii) determining the condi-
tional probabilities for each node (which can be represented in CPT’s –
conditional probability tables).42
Causal inference is ultimately permitted by the stable skeleton of a causal
model – its structure. Now, if we are given an arbitrary joint probability
distribution over a fixed set of variables V and want to derive directed
arrows from raw data, we need to have some benchmark to be able to
compare different topologies with one another. The joint probability
distribution, understood as the vector of masses that are assigned to
all different possible worlds (with size |V |2, in case all variables are di-
chotomous), will serve as benchmark which each distribution induced by
a Bayes net structure candidate can consequently be measured against.
Different distance measures have been suggested for this task. The differ-
ence between two joint probability vectors can be determined by using
the Euclidian distance, thus summing up the squares of the distances
of all vector components, i. e., the weight differences between each two
corresponding possible worlds:
dE(x, y) =
√
∑
i(xi − yi)
2, (2.12)
where x, y are vectors (in our case, of masses of possible worlds). Alter-
natively, the information-theoretic Kullback-Leibler divergence returns
the weighted sum of the distances between the logarithms of each two
corresponding masses:
dKL(x, y) =
∑
i
yi(log2 yi − log2 xi), (2.13)
again with the vectors x, y as above. Further refinements introduce
weighting factors into the distance measure to, e. g., rank thinner net-
works above denser ones in accordance with the demand for minimal
42Cf. for this and the following [Ertel 2009, pp. 219ff.].
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structures.43 Finally, creating an efficient algorithm for the search of the
fittest Bayes net topology amounts to a minimization problem for which
good heuristics are needed.
Example
Wolfgang Ertel considers the complete probabilistic model a meteorol-
ogist might use to predict the amount of rainfall in the afternoon, solely
projected from the weather conditions in the morning of the respective
day.44
Sky Bar Rain P (Sky ,Bar ,Rain)
clear rising dry 0.40
clear rising rain 0.07
clear falling dry 0.08
clear falling rain 0.10
cloudy rising dry 0.09
cloudy rising rain 0.11
cloudy falling dry 0.03
cloudy falling rain 0.12
Table 2.1: The complete probabilistic model for the prediction of rainfall
(Rain) in the afternoon, based on the weather conditions in the
morning, if it is cloudy or clear (Sky), and whether the barometer
rises or falls (Bar ).
Table 2.1 displays the masses of all eight possible worlds, combinatorially
listing the joint probabilities for the sky (Sky) to be clear or cloudy, the
barometer (Bar) to rise or fall, and for rainfall (Rain) to occur or not.
Since we want to compare vectors, the joint probability of the variables
Sky, Bar , and Rain can now be presented as an 8-tuple:
P = 〈0.40, 0.07, 0.08, 0.10, 0.09, 0.11, 0.03, 0.12〉 (2.14)
Making this vector explicit now allows us to compare the following struc-
tures with one another:
43Cf. e. g. [Ertel 2009, pp. 221 f.]; if N is the graphical structure of a Bayes net
candidate to be measured against some joint probability distribution P given in the
form of vector of masses, then N is ranked by f(N) = size(N) + w · dKL(PN ,P),
where PN is the joint probability distribution induced by the graph N , size(N) is
the number of entries in N ’s CPT’s, and w is some additional weighting factor that
needs to be adjusted manually to balance the criteria of size and vector distance.
44Cf. [Ertel 2009, p. 175 and pp. 220 f.].
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(a) Sky A Rain B Bar and
(b) Sky A Bar A Rain,
with the corresponding joint probability vectors Pa,Pb. In the following,
the computation of the distance between Pa and P shall be carried out
in detail before Pa and Pb are compared in order to find the minimum
distance vector (with respect to P).
Step 1: Calculate the marginal probabilities. The a priori prob-
abilities of the orphan variables Sky and Bar can be read off table 2.1
directly by summing up the probabilities of equal variable assignments:
P (Sky = clear) = 0.65 and P (Bar = rising) = 0.67. Of course, in the
dichotomous case P (X = ¬x) is given by 1− P (X = x).
Step 2: Generate the CPT’s for all inner variables. This is
done by determining for each non-orphan variable X the ratio of each of
the probabilities for X = x conditional on X’s parent variables, i. e., the
variables represented by its parent nodes in the graph. In the example this
is only the variable Rain, for which the following table can be calculated:
Sky Bar P (Rain = dry |Sky ,Bar )
clear rising 0.85
clear falling 0.44
cloudy rising 0.45
cloudy falling 0.2
Here, e. g., the first line is calculated from table 2.1 straightforwardly:
P (Rain = dry |Sky ,Bar ) (2.15)
=
P (Rain = dry,Sky = clear,Bar = rising)
P (Sky = clear,Bar = rising)
=
0.40
0.40 + 0.07
= 0.85
Step 3: Generate the mass vector. In accordance with the rule
of iterated factorial decomposition (equation 2.5) and the independence
condition stated in the definition of Markovian parents (equation 2.8 in
definition 2.6.1), the mass vector induced by topology (a) can now be built
up by listing the masses of all possible worlds, generated combinatorially.
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E. g., the first entry is calculated as follows:
P (Sky = clear,Bar = rising,Rain = dry) (2.16)
= P (Rain = dry |Sky = clear,Bar = rising) ·
P (Sky = clear) · P (Bar = rising)
= 0.85 · 0.65 · 0.67 = 0.37
This is repeated analogously for all other possible worlds, finally resulting
in the vector
Pa = 〈0.37, 0.065, 0.095, 0.12, 0.11, 0.13, 0.023, 0.092〉. (2.17)
Step 4: Measure the vector distance. Application of the measures
above yields the distances
dE(Pa,P) = 0.0029 and
dKL(Pa,P) = 0.017.
Step 5: Find the minimum distance vector. The above steps did
only trace the procedure for Bayes net candidate (a). Of course, every
conceivable alternative structure should be treated analogously. If steps
1–4 were to be performed for topology (b), the respective distances would
be
dE(Pb,P) = 0.014 and
dKL(Pb,P) = 0.09.
Since both measures mark Pa as the vector closer to P than Pb, Bayes
net structure (a) is considered to fit the data better than (b).45
Nevertheless, the task of finding the minimum distance vector faces
problems of complexity. The search space, i. e., the number of possible
DAG structures for a given set of variables V , super-exponentially grows
with the number of variables |V |. Efficient and plausible heuristics are
needed to limit the search space before minimization is performed. Er-
tel suggests that one way of regaining computational tractability is to
45It is important to note that if an additional arrow Sky A Rain were to be inserted
into (b), thereby rendering the graph fully connected, the resulting graph (c) would
yield distance dE(Pc,P) = 0, because in this uninformative presentation any two
variables are dependent.
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pick out those graphs that suit our basic causal assumptions, in the first
place. If V1, . . . , Vn is a causal ordering of the variables in V , only those
graphs would be considered that contain directed edges 〈Vi, Vj〉 with
i < j.46 Since we precisely want to infer the set of potential causal struc-
tures merely from raw observational data, the latter suggestion seems to
counteract our primary goals. Quite different from the metric approach,
Thomas Verma and Judea Pearl constructively develop an algorithm
for the generation of marked patterns from stable probability distributions
(over observed variables), i. e., classes of observationally equivalent latent
structures that are compatible with given data:
An autonomous intelligent system attempting to build a workable
model of its environment cannot rely exclusively on preprogrammed
causal knowledge; rather it must be able to translate direct obser-
vations to cause-and-effect relationships. However, given that sta-
tistical analysis is driven by covariation, not causation, and as-
suming that the bulk of human knowledge derives from passive
observations, we must still identify the clues that prompt people
to perceive causal relationships in the data. We must also find a
computational model that emulates this perception.47
In Pearl’s formulation of the algorithm for induced causation, re-
ducing computational complexity through manual selection of poten-
tial structural candidates (and perhaps erroneously dropping relevant
graphs) is traded for the task of (if only partly) directing the edges in
the limited set of graphs the algorithm finally returns.
Some notions must be clarified before the algorithm can be stated.
What the algorithm will return is a class of observationally equivalent la-
tent causal structures, i. e., a set of DAGs over observed and unobserved
(latent) variables. Pearl adds the postulate of structure preference:
One latent structure L is to be preferred to another one, L′, if and only
if the observed part of the DAG of the latter can mimic the observed
part of the first. This amounts to saying that L should be favored if
by tweaking the precise specifications of all the functional mechanisms
of L′ (represented by the edges in the graph of L′) the joint probability
distribution over the observed variables of L can be reproduced exactly.
46A causal ordering of the variables V1, . . . , Vn can be understood as satisfying
certain constraints – e. g., if time is considered constitutive of causation, there cannot
be two variables Vi, Vj with i < j and Vj <temp Vi, where <temp indicates strict
temporal precedence.
47Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 42].
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Succinctly, referring to the principle of Occams’s razor Pearl claims
that “following standard norms of scientific induction, it is reasonable to
rule out any theory for which we find a simpler, less elaborate theory
that is equally consistent with the data [. . . ]. Theories that survive that
process are called minimal.”48 Consequently, minimality is defined rela-
tive to a class L of latent structures such that a structure L is minimal
with respect to L if and only if there is no other structure L′ strictly
preferred to L.49 Then of course, as in the metric approach, the gen-
erated structure must fit the data, i. e., it must be consistent with the
given distribution P̂ over the observed variables. In other words, for a
structure L to be consistent with observational data P̂ there must be
a specification of the functional mechanisms in L that induces a joint
probability distribution (over all observed variables) equal to P̂ .50 With
these notions at hand we can explicate what inferred causation means:
Definition 2.9.1 (Pearl’s Inferred Causation)51
Given P̂ , a variable C has a causal influence on variable E if and only if
there exists a directed path from C to E in every minimal latent structure
consistent with P̂ .
Pearl adds that he makes “no claims that this definition is guaranteed
to always identify stable physical mechanisms in Nature. It identifies the
mechanisms we can plausibly infer from nonexperimental data; moreover,
it guarantees that any alternative mechanism will be less trustworthy
than the one inferred because the alternative would require more con-
trived, hindsighted adjustment of parameters (i. e., functions) to fit the
data.”52
Nevertheless, theoretically we are not guaranteed that nonexperimen-
tal data will always be minimal in the sense that it has only one unique
minimal causal structure (modulo d-separation equivalence). The addi-
tional assumption of stability tells us that given data P̂ is usually highly
unlikely to hide probabilistic dependencies by precise cancelling. Stabil-
ity thus implies that the list of independencies embedded in P̂ remains
the same even if the specification of individual functional mechanisms
48Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 45].
49As above, we definitely want to rule out the maximal case, i. e., the fully connected
graph that could mimic the behavior of any probabilistic model if the parameters
(functional mechanisms) are tweaked the right way.
50Cf. [Pearl 2009, pp. 45 f.] for the precise definitions of latent structure, structure
preference, minimality, and consistency.
51Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 46], definition 2.3.6.
52Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 47].
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changes.53 Of course, when we decide to allow for latent variables in the
structure, a stable input distribution P̂ will not yield a unique minimal
DAG, because – if not restricted by neighboring edges – the correlation of
two variables can be due to either direct causal influence (either way) or
an unknown common cause (a hidden, latent common parent variable).
Accordingly, the IC* algorithm cumulatively enhances the structure to
be built up by adding individual arrowheads step by step (possibly re-
turning bidirectional edges). The output of IC* is then a marked pattern
with four types of edges (explained below), representing the class of ob-
servationally equivalent minimal latent structures consistent with the
data.
Pearl’s IC* Algorithm
(Inductive Causation with Latent Variables)54
Input: P̂ , a stable distribution (with respect to some latent structure).
Output: core(P̂ ), a marked pattern.
1. For each pair of variables a and b, search for
a set Sab such that (a ⊥ b |Sab) holds in P̂ .
If there is no such Sab, place an undirected
link between the two variables a n b.
2. For each pair of nonadjacent variables a and b
with a common neighbor c, check if c ∈ Sab.
If it is, then continue .
If it is not , then add arrowheads pointing
at c (i.e., aA c B b).
3. In the partially directed graph that results ,
add (recursively) as many arrowheads as
possible , and mark as many edges as possible
according to the following two rules:
R1: For each pair of nonadjacent nodes a
and b with a common neighbor c, if the
link between a and c has an arrowhead
into c and if the link between c and b
has no arrowhead into c, then add an
arrowhead on the link between c and b
pointing at b and mark that link to
obtain c
∗A b.
53Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 48] for the definition of stability.
54Cf. for this and the subsequently given characteristics of the resulting edges [Pearl
2009, pp. 52 f.].
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R2: if a and b are adjacent and there is
a directed path (composed strictly of
marked ∗-links) from a to b, then add an
arrowhead pointing toward b on the link
between a and b.
The resulting edges are divided into four groups:
1. a marked arrow a
∗A b, signifying a directed path from a to b in
the underlying model (hinting at genuine causation);
2. an unmarked arrow aA b, signifying either a directed path from a
to b or a latent common cause aB L A b in the underlying model
(thereby denoting potential causation);
3. a bidirected edge a BA b, signifying some latent common cause
aB LA b in the underlying model (spurious association); and
4. an undirected edge a n b, standing for either a B b or a A b or
aB LA b in the underlying model.
Rule R1 basically fixes the direction of an otherwise undirected edge
avoiding the introduction of an additional v-structure (which would im-
ply an additional independence). Rule R2 fixes the direction of an oth-
erwise undirected edge according to the requirement of acyclicity (which
would be violated if the respective edge were oriented the other way).
a
b c
d
e
(a)
a
b c
d
e
(b)
a
b c
d
e
(c)
∗
a
b c
d
e
(d)
Fig. 2.8: Graph (a) displays the underlying actual structure encoded by a stable
input distribution P̂ , (b) and (c) show the intermediate output of the
IC* algorithm after working steps 1 and 2, finally resulting in (d)
upon step 3.
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Figure 2.8 illustrates the working steps of the algorithm. Consider
(a) to be the underlying actual structure of our nonexperimental data
P̂ . (b) displays the intermediate output of the algorithm after step 1,
(c) the introduction of v-structures in step 2, and (d) the output of IC*,
a marked pattern with inserted arrowheads and starred links.
a
b c
d
e
(a)
a
b c
d
e
(b)
a
b c
d
e
(c)
a
b c
d
e
(d)
Fig. 2.9: The set of latent structures observationally equivalent to graph (2.8a),
specifying the ambivalently marked edges of graph (2.8d).
Combinatorially spelling out the class of observationally equivalent la-
tent structures amounts to drawing the four graphs depicted in figure
2.9. These graphs all have the same v-structures in common, namely the
sole one collider node bA dB c. Also, the directed link dA e is present
in each and every latent structure, introduced by virtue of rule R1 which
directs edges in one way if the other direction were to introduce addi-
tional v-structures into the graph (not derived from the independencies
in P̂ ).55 The superstructure bn an c is then spelled out in all four pos-
sible variants such that no new v-structure emerges.56 Now, to be able
to read the causal relation between two certain variables off the resulting
graph, some suitably chosen intervention variable Z must serve as hypo-
thetical control knob – just as with structural manipulations, with the
only difference “that the variable Z, acting as a virtual control, must be
identified within the data itself, as if Nature had performed the experi-
ment.”57 Pearl states that in this respect the IC* algorithm even leads
to the discovery of such control variables within the observational data.
The notions of potential cause and genuine cause are accordingly defined
with respect to such control variables and moreover depend on the avail-
55The introduction of additional v-structures would generate additional indepen-
dencies that are not in the data but could be read off the graph.
56Note that the double-headed arrow combinatorially cycles the upper diamond
once to produce the set of markov-equivalent structures in figure 2.9.
57Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 54].
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able contexts encoded in the probability distributions, i. e., on how two
test variables X and Y behave if surrounding variables are conditioned
on.
Definition 2.9.2 (Pearl’s Potential Cause)58
A variable X has a potential causal influence on another variable Y (that
is inferable from P̂ ) if the following conditions hold.
1. X and Y are dependent in every context.
2. There exists a variable Z and a context S such that
(i) X and Z are independent given S (i. e., X ⊥ Z |S) and
(ii) Z and Y are dependent given S (i. e., Z 6⊥ Y |S).
In the sense of definition 2.9.2, variable b can be identified as a potential
cause of d in figure 2.8a if Z = c represents the virtual control variable
(with respect to d) conditional on the context S = {a}. In other words,
the putative cause variable and the hypothetical control variable must be
independent in some context – if a were missing altogether in the graph,
it would even suffice to specify S = ∅. Nevertheless, b only qualifies as a
potential cause of d, because – as displayed in figure 2.9 – the respective
link between b and d can as well be realized as double-headed arrow,
representing a possible common cause structure (e. g., as in figure 2.9a).
Thus, b cannot be analyzed as being a genuine cause of d, i. e., as being
linked to d by unambiguously directed edges, respectively.
Definition 2.9.3 (Pearl’s Genuine Cause)59
A variable X has a genuine causal influence on another variable Y if
there exists a variable Z such that either:
1. X and Y are dependent in any context and there exists a context
S satisfying
(i) Z is a potential cause of X,
(ii) Z and Y are dependent given S (i. e., Z 6⊥ Y |S), and
(iii) Z and Y are independent given S ∪X (i. e., Z ⊥ Y |S ∪X);
or
2. X and Y are in the transitive closure of the relation defined in
criterion 1.
58Cf. definition 2.7.1 in [Pearl 2009, p. 55].
59Cf. definition 2.7.2 in [Pearl 2009, p. 55].
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In the sense of definition 2.9.3, variable d in figure 2.8a is analyzed as
genuinely causally influencing e. This time, we can take as control vari-
able either of b, c, both being potential causes of d. No variables are
needed to fill the context: S = ∅. d and e are linked by a (if only one-
link) chain of unambiguously directed edges. In a way, the test for the
existence of some control variable Z is utilized in both definitions above
to determine the direction of the “causal flow,” just as what interventions
as structural manipulations are devised for. In case two variables X and
Y are dependent in some context (as a weakening of potential cause),
but no direction of the causal relation can be made out by use of virtual
controls, Pearl states one further definition: True spurious association
can only be attributed to the existence of common causes.60
Now, in contrast with Ertel’s suggestion to pick out the graphs that
fit our causal intuitions before metrically computing some input distri-
bution P̂ , in Pearl’s approach the selection of potential working candi-
dates amongst possible structures is put off till after P̂ has been processed
by IC*. The output class of observationally equivalent latent structures
might be evaluated against the backdrop of expert causal knowledge or
basal everyday assumptions. Once the output class is restricted further
and further, the marked pattern returned by IC* may be a helpful guide
in designing possible test scenarios for the falsification of chosen arrow
heads (through indication of potential further variables that could be
taken into consideration, e. g., additional exogenous common causes).
2.10 About the identifiability of effects in causal
models
If a set of observational data (e. g., in the form of a joint probability
function) is available to the empirically based causal analyst who wants
to evaluate the causal influence of one observed variable X on a distinct
second, correlated variable Y , he is best advised to firstly exclude that
the assessed correlation is actually induced by other factors than the
potential causal influence to be examined. So-called spurious correlation
between X and Y is generated by confounding factors Z influencing both
X and Y at the same time, confounding our analysis, and ultimately
biasing the estimate of the influence under consideration. This goes
under ‘confounding bias’ in the respective literature.61
60Cf. definition 2.7.3 (Spurious Association) in [Pearl 2009, pp. 55 f.].
61Cf. for this and the following [Pearl 2009, pp. 182 f.].
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As an example from econometrics, consider Okun’s law which maps
the relationship between unemployment and economic growth within
national economy and postulates in compact manner linear dependence
(which is one of the reasons for the law being so popular). Misinter-
preting this dependence one might state: One necessary requirement for
decreasing unemployment is strong economic growth. Critics of Okun’s
law point to the fact that long-term variances of other parameters equally
important within national economy (as productivity, working time, job
offers) tend to significantly confound the direct relationship between the
examined quantities unemployment and economic growth. These addi-
tional parameters, however, do not occur in the formulation of the law.
To speak of cause, effect, causal relation, or causal influence in either
direction would certainly overstrain Okun’s law.
In his book Causality (2000/2009) Pearl makes out why the concept
of confounding goes largely unheeded in statistics course books:
As simple as this concept is, it has resisted formal treatment for
decades, and for good reason: The very notions of “effect” and “in-
fluence” – relative to which “spurious association” must be defined
– have resisted mathematical formulation. The empirical defini-
tion of effect as an association that would prevail in a controlled
randomized experiment cannot easily be expressed in the standard
language of probability theory, because that theory deals with static
conditions and does not permit us to predict, even from a full spec-
ification of a population density function, what relationships would
prevail if conditions were to change – say, from observational to
controlled studies. Such predictions require extra information in
the form of causal or counterfactual assumptions, which are not
discernible from density functions [. . . ] 62
Density functions, i. e., probabilistic descriptions, precisely talk about
closed worlds and fixed environmental conditions, whereas in the frame-
work of structural causal models the do(·)-operator serves as an effi-
cient tool for the virtual inspection of dependencies in alternative test
scenarios.
Now, as soon as the researcher – merely on the basis of given non-
experimental and purely observational data – sets out to model a certain
situation, building a causal graph G and putting together the list of func-
tional relationships renders it possible to examine, whether the causal
62Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 183].
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influence of one factor X on another one, Y , can be uniquely estimated,
at all – always, of course, within the scope of his modeling. Pearl
explicates the central idea behind this in his definition of identifiability :
Definition 2.10.1 (Pearl’s Identifiability of Causal Effects)63
The causal effect of X on Y is said to be identifiable if the quantity
P (y | do(x)) can be computed uniquely from any positive distribution of
the observed variables that is compatible with G.
Especially when there exist latent variables in the model potentially
causally influencing both X and Y at the same time (if only indirectly),
a quantitative estimate within the model must be adjusted by means of
other observed concomitant variables to exclude confounding bias and
spurious correlation. How is a set of variables fit for this task to be
found?
To efficiently accomplish the search for a suitable variable set, Judea
Pearl formulates two criteria applicable again to the graph of a causal
model. Making use of the so-called back-door and front-door criterion
enables the researcher to easily identify from the diagram the set of nodes
Z (of course representing the corresponding variables in the probability
distribution compatible with G) with which confounding influences can
be subtracted out. This adjustment is achieved by suitably summing
up the potential values of all variables in Z. The two criteria shall be
presented in due brevity in the following:
Definition 2.10.2 (Pearl’s Back-Door Criterion)64
A set of nodes Z satisfies the back-door criterion relative to an ordered
pair of nodes 〈Xi,Xj〉 in a DAG G if:
(i) no node in Z is a descendant of Xi; and
(ii) Z blocks every path between Xi and Xj that contains an arrow
pointing towards Xi.
Analogously, Z satisfies the back-door criterion relative to two disjoint
sets of variables 〈X,Y 〉 if Z satisfies the back-door criterion relative to
any pair 〈Xi,Xj〉 with Xi ∈ X and Xj ∈ Y .
63Cf. definition 4 in [Pearl 1995, p. 674], slightly adjusted here to maintain consis-
tent notation.
64Definition 3.3.1 in [Pearl 2009, p. 79].
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Such a set Z accordingly d-separates all paths that would leave open a
back-door into Xi for some possible confounding factor – hence the name
of the criterion. In the miniature example given in the left graph of figure
2.10 the direct influence of variable Xi on variable Xj shall be assessed
– obviously along the path Xi A X6 A Xj . Employing the d-separation
criterion, potential confounders outside the path Xi A X6 A Xj can be
made out, i. e., variables that – within the causal diagram – influence
both Xi and Xj simultaneously when wiggled qua modification. The
back-door criterion now identifies the minimal sets {X3,X4}, or {X4,X5}
alternatively, as sufficient for screening off spurious influences. X4 alone
would not do the job, because although – according to the definition
of the d-separation criterion – the path Xi B X4 A Xj would become
blocked by conditioning on X4, quite on the contrary X4 opens the flow
of information along the outer path via X1 and X2 as the collider node
in this v-structure.
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
X6
Xi
Xj
U (Unobserved)
Xi XjZ
Fig. 2.10: In the left diagram the effect of Xi on Xj can be estimated con-
sistently by means of adjusting for the variable pairs {X3, X4} or
{X4, X5}; the right diagram illustrates adjustment for Z by apply-
ing the front-door criterion.
Now, the front-door criterion takes care of those cases in which pos-
sible back-door paths run through unobserved variables, which are of
course not apt for being a candidate set Z possibly screening off spuri-
ous correlation in computation – unobserved variables cannot be adjusted
for. Pearl’s graphical solution:
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Definition 2.10.3 (Pearl’s Front-Door Criterion)65
A set of nodes Z satisfies the front-door criterion relative to an ordered
pair of nodes 〈Xi,Xj〉 in a DAG G if:
(i) Z blocks all directed paths from Xi to Xj ;
(ii) there are no unblocked back-door paths from Xi to Z; and
(iii) all back-door paths from Z to Xj are blocked by Xi.
Here, conditions (i) through (iii) precisely indicate such sets of nodes me-
diating the (otherwise unconfounded) influence of some Xi on some Xj .
Warm-up Exercises (X) Intra-game Proprioception Injury (Outcome)
Team Motivation,
Aggression
Neuromuscular
Fatigue
Contact Sport
Tissue
WeaknessPrevious
Injury
Pre-game
Proprioception
Fitness Level Connective Tissue
Disorder
Coach Genetics
Fig. 2.11: A complex causal diagram illustrating the effect of warm-up exercises
X on an athlete’s susceptibility to injury Y (taken from [Shrier &
Platt 2008, figure 2]).
A more complex example from medical practice, illustrated in figure
2.11, relates potential factors contributing to or preventing some athlete’s
susceptibility to injury while exercising the respective sport.66 The effect
of warming up before the game (represented by X) on the danger of
injury (the outcome, Y ) is to be tested. The mediating variable intra-
game proprioception measures the athlete’s balance and muscle control.
In the upper part of the diagram the coach influences team motivation
and aggression during the game which in turn makes an earlier injury
more probable, just as participating in warm-up exercises. Coach and
65Definition 3.3.3 in [Pearl 2009, p. 82].
66Cf. for this and the following the presentation of this example case in [Shrier &
Platt 2008].
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genetic predisposition together contribute to the athlete’s fitness level,
and so forth. The question (in the center of the graph), if the respective
game falls under the category of contact sport or not, also influences the
probability of a previous injury independently of team motivation.
The influence of warm-up exercises on potential injury is obviously con-
founded by a multitude of factors. Application of the back-door crite-
rion facilitates the search for a set of nodes Z which helps adjusting
confounding factors: Those variables measuring neuromuscular fatigue
and possible tissue weakness are jointly sufficient for screening off spuri-
ous influences because they intercept all back-door paths from X to the
putative outcome Y . The path running through the question, if contact
sport or not, is inactive without conditioning anyways, since it contains
a collider node – an inverted fork. Previous injury is thus to be excluded
from the adjusting set of variables Z, because gaining knowledge about
previous injuries precisely opens a back-door again, thereby establish-
ing indirect dependence between warm-up exercises and susceptibility to
injury. Pearl’s graphical criteria facilitate the identification of con-
founders and adjusting variables even in this rather complex example
from medical practice.
Now, in case the effect of some variable on a second variable turns
out to be identifiable in a given causal model, Pearl offers a set of
rules, sound and complete, for the reduction of probabilistic expressions
containing the do(·)-operator to expressions without it. The so-called
do-calculus enables the researcher to estimate post-intervention quanti-
ties merely from non-experimental, observational distributions. For the
case that a set of variables screening off some causal flow from spurious
influences can be made out – either by employing the back-door criterion
or the front-door criterion – Pearl moreover presents two formulae for
adjustment in [Pearl 1995], also restated in [Pearl 2009, pp. 79 ff.]. The
following two respective theorems shall be given for the sake of complete-
ness and conclude this section before the concept of token causation will
be examined more closely below:
Theorem 2.10.4 (Pearl’s Back-Door Adjustment)67
If a set of variables Z satisfies the back-door criterion relative to 〈X,Y 〉,
then the causal effect of X on Y is identifiable and is given by the formula
P (y | do(x)) =
∑
z
P (y |x, z)P (z). (2.18)
67Theorem 3.3.2 in [Pearl 2009, pp. 79 f.].
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Theorem 2.10.5 (Pearl’s Front-Door Adjustment)68
If a set of variables Z satisfies the front-door criterion relative to 〈X,Y 〉
and if P (x, z) > 0, then the causal effect of X on Y is identifiable and
is given by the formula
P (y | do(x)) =
∑
z
P (z |x)
∑
x′
P (y |x′, z)P (x′). (2.19)
2.11 Singular causation and the actual cause
To let the protagonists of this discussion appear once more on stage
together, or to at least present their approaches in a certain concord,
we take up the notion of singular causation as discussed by Pearl in
Causality. So we are not talking about generic analysis as in “rain causes
the street to get wet,” but deal with situations on token level. As an ex-
ample we look at the administering of some medication in a controlled
clinical study.69 When evaluating the collected data statically, it turns
out that the medication neither affects the recovery of the patients posi-
tively nor negatively – on average. Furthermore, we pick out one specific
patient who was administered the medication and fully recovered subse-
quently. Now, a causal model ought to be able to answer in particular,
whether the patient’s recovery occurred due to the treatment, despite
the treatment, or completely regardlessly of the treatment. An answer
cannot be given if only observational data is available, since the patient
was never tested without administering the medication – probabilities
under deviant conditions cannot be compared.
Pearl points out clearly that in such cases on token level the solution
lies solely in the counterfactual analysis of the problem: “What would
the probability of recovery have been if the medication had not been
administered?” This counterfactual formulation precisely implies the
deviation from observed data. The desired value can be calculated from
an alternative model in which the counterfactual antecedent is virtually
forced to be true. This very task is achieved by the do(·)-operator in
structural causal models.
To give an example: We want to learn if the intervention ¬p would have
brought about ¬q if in fact we already know that both p as well as q have
68Theorem 3.3.4 in [Pearl 2009, p. 83].
69This example is taken from [Pearl 2009, pp. 33 f.].
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occurred factually. The effect of an intervention can indeed be identified
contra and moreover post factum in the methodological triple jump along
the lines of natural reasoning:70
1. Abduction: Having observed p and q, i. e., our factual evidence,
we infer the explanation (i. e., a hypothesis or a state of the world)
going backwards (or upwards) in the network.
2. Action: In the context of this fixed environment we perform the
local surgery ¬p by intervening in the structural model (thereby
transforming the graph).
3. Prediction: The autonomous mechanisms of the structural causal
model now allow for predicting the value assignment of Q (if the
causal effect of P on Q is identifiable, at all).
Performing steps 1 through 3 basically amounts to traversing the causal
network twice – once upwards to determine the values of all exogenous
variables and then downwards again after transforming the network by
clipping all arrows pointing towards P (thereby lifting P from the in-
fluence of its direct causes). Letting the context information propagate
through the network again, we are ultimately able to read off the graph
the counterfactually predicted value of Q.71
The scheme above unifies the essential features of Pearl’s agenda
once more, which are conceptually and methodologically sorted out again
by Christopher Hitchcock, who writes in his article Causal Modelling
in the Oxford Handbook of Causation :
There is an important pragmatic difference between counterfactuals
and interventions: we are typically interested in knowing the truth
values of counterfactuals after the fact, whereas we are usually
interested in evaluating the consequences of potential interventions
before they are carried out.72
Interventions by use of the do(·)-operator precisely allow for such hypo-
thetical tests in virtual, alternative experimental designs. But, if the
70Cf. for this and the following [Pearl 2009, p. 37 and pp. 205 ff.].
71This procedure is presented by Pearl in twin networks, where going upwards
and (after transforming the model) going downwards through the same graph is in-
terpreted as stepping sideways into the almost identical copy of the original graph
where all edges directed into Q are clipped.
72Cf. [Hitchcock 2009a, p. 303].
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do(·)-operator, in externally bringing about Lewis’ “small miracles,”
stands in close methodological vicinity to Lewis’ similarity relation, and
if Pearl accuses Lewis of circularly taking some immanent notion of
causation for granted when comparing two worlds with respect to their
similarity to a third, must Pearl not defend himself against his own
allegations, as well? – Does he not also analyze complex causal relation-
ships by evaluating basal natural assumptions, which themselves convey
causal meaning, and do so necessarily, as Pearl stresses? I would like
to give the floor to Pearl himself, who formulates the following in the
2005 paper Causes and Explanations together with collaborator Joseph
Halpern:
It may seem strange that we are trying to understand causality
using causal models, which clearly already encode causal relation-
ships. Our reasoning is not circular. Our aim is not to reduce
causation to noncausal concepts but to interpret questions about
causes of specific events in fully specified scenarios in terms of
generic causal knowledge such as what we obtain from the equa-
tions of physics. The causal models encode background knowledge
about the tendency of certain event types to cause other event types
(such as the fact that lightning can cause forest fires). We use the
models to determine the causes of single (or token) events, such
as whether it was arson that caused the fire of 10 June 2000, given
what is known or assumed about that particular fire.73
Grounding causal analysis in such basal causal assumptions can in the
thus explicated sense rightfully be called fruitful because it admits uti-
lizing the introduced notions and methods constructively. Certainly,
emphasizing truly deterministic causal mechanisms much rather brings
acuteness into causal analysis than drawing the researcher over the no-
tional fringes of naughtiness.
Utilizing our understanding of the mechanisms at work to learn about
hypothetical alternative situations is one direction of posing questions
about token causation – we might also look the other way and employ
the specification of a causal model to learn which of the actually observed
occurrences is the true cause of another distinct observed event. In other
words: How can we find out, if some realized putative cause candidate is
indeed responsible for having brought about some observed other event,
maybe even post factum? To be able to deal with this sort of token (or
singular) causal reasoning, Pearl advances in two steps: Firstly, our
73Cf. [Halpern & Pearl 2005a, p. 849].
From Lewis to Pearl 81
understanding of the situation, i. e., the parameterization of the model
(or the specification of the functional deterministic mechanisms), is cou-
pled with some fixed context – the given (vector of) circumstances #„u .
Secondly, by ultimately quantifying over possible value assignments to
subsets of the observed variables in V an active causal process is carved
out, thereby marking the minimal set of contributory causes
#„
X of the
token event Y = y under consideration, in a sense in virtual comparison
with different configurations of the model – different qua intervention.
#„
U
# „
W
#„
X
#„
Z
Y
V
Fig. 2.12: The idea behind Pearl’s definition of the actual cause, illustrated as
relations between subnets of the causal model M .
#„
U = #„u indicates
the obtaining circumstances, the observed variables are partitioned
such that V =
# „
W ∪
#„
Z with
#„
Z signifying the active causal process
relating
#„
X = #„x and Y = y, where
#„
X ∪ {Y } ⊆
#„
Z .
Figure 2.12 illustrates the idea behind Pearl’s definition of the ac-
tual cause (definition 2.11.1 below), relating subnets of the causal model
in Venn-like presentation: The variables in the causal model M are as-
signed their values according to some specification of the context
#„
U = #„u .
The tuple 〈M, #„u 〉 especially induces the unique assignment of values to
the n-ary vector
#„
X, the total cause, aggregating all variables X1, . . . ,Xn
as contributory causes of the event Y = y. Finally, the vector
#„
Z (as-
suming the corresponding observed values
#„
z∗) can be understood as the
active causal process in M under the obtaining circumstances #„u . It turns
out that the definition of
#„
Z picks out (in addition to
#„
X and Y ) just the
variables mediating between
#„
X and Y on the paths directed from the
variables in
#„
X to Y .74
74Cf. Pearl’s remarks in [Halpern & Pearl 2005a, p. 854].
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Definition 2.11.1 (Pearl’s Actual Cause)75
#„
X = #„x is an actual cause of Y = y in 〈M, #„u 〉 if the following three
conditions hold:
1. 〈M, #„u 〉  (
#„
X = #„x ) k (Y = y), that is, both #„X = #„x and Y = y are
true in the actual world.
2. There exists a partition {
#„
Z,
# „
W} of V with
#„
X ⊆
#„
Z and some setting
#„
x′ and
#„
w′ of the variables in
#„
X and
# „
W such that if the fixed context
#„u induces the value assignment
#„
z∗ for the variables in
#„
Z , i. e., if
〈M, #„u 〉  (
#„
Z =
#„
z∗), then both of the following conditions hold:
(a) The intervention 〈
#„
X,
# „
W 〉 ← 〈
#„
x′,
#„
w′〉 (assigning non-actual
values to
#„
X and
# „
W ) changes Y = y from true to false in
the model, i. e., 〈M, #„u 〉 6 (Y = y) (in the accordingly trans-
formed model).76
(b) 〈M, #„u 〉  (Y = y) under any possible interventional assign-
ment 〈
#   „
W ′,
# „
Z ′〉 ← 〈
#„
w′,
#„
z∗〉 for all subsets
#   „
W ′ of
# „
W and all
subsets
# „
Z ′ of
#„
Z , as long as
#„
X is kept at its current value #„x ,
i. e.,
#„
X ← #„x ; in other words, setting any subset of variables
in
# „
W to their values in
#„
w′ should have no effect on Y , as long
as
#„
X is kept at its current value #„x , even if all the variables
in an arbitrary subset of
#„
Z are set to their original values in
the context #„u .
3.
#„
X is minimal, i. e., no subset of
#„
X satisfies conditions 1 and 2.77
In the definition of the actual cause, condition 1 simply says that we
are dealing with token causation – cause and effect actually occur in the
causal model M (with a full specification of the functional mechanisms)
if the context #„u is given. Section 2 of the definition postulates a parti-
tioning of the observed variables V into those variables (
#„
Z) involved in
the causal process connecting
#„
X to Y and those variables (
# „
W ) irrelevant
75Cf. Pearl’s presentation in [Halpern & Pearl 2005a, p. 853] (definition 3.1 and
refinements in sect. 5) and Spohn’s discussion thereof in [Spohn 2010, sect. 2]; the
formulation given here differs slightly from Pearl’s to maintain consistency with
previously introduced conventions.
76The notation p
#„
X ← #„xq symbolizes the transformation of the model by iterative
application of the do(·)-operator (as introduced above) for each variable in the n-
ary vector
#„
X , thereby pruning the respective graph of the model and modifying all
structural equations in accordance with do(X1 = x1), do(X2 = x2), . . . , do(Xn = xn).
77As Pearl adds: “Minimality ensures that only those elements of the conjunction
#„
X = #„x that are essential for changing Y = y in 2(a) are considered part of the cause;
inessential elements are pruned.” – cf. [Halpern & Pearl 2005a, p. 853].
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for the observed effect Y . Condition 2(a) says that changing the values
of
#„
X also renders the event Y = y inactive. Condition 2(a) also allows
for changing the values of
# „
W (the variables seen as irrelevant for bring-
ing about Y = y), since they might sustain the effect, thereby masking
the influence of
#„
X on Y which we are after. On the other hand, it is to
be excluded that only the assignment of #„w to
# „
W is responsible for the
event Y = y, so condition 2(b) tightens things again by postulating that
only the actual observed values of
#„
X succeed in bringing about the effect
Y = y: Arbitrary subsets of the irrelevant variables in
# „
W may assume
arbitrary non-actual values
#„
w′. Y = y will still be observed if only
#„
X is
set to its actual observed value #„x . Pearl points out that setting
#„
X to
#„x necessarily entails the assignment
#„
Z =
#„
z∗, since
#„
Z contains the very
variables mediating between
#„
X and Y – the active causal process.
It is important to note one thing here: If our causal model at hand
is narrow in the sense that it only consists of the active causal process
alone, the analysis is done without hassle – no ambiguities arise. For
example, if the model is a simple chain, then the (total) cause of some
event Y = y is simply the variable X corresponding to the single par-
ent node of Y , which is minimal in the sense of condition 3 above. If,
nevertheless, the model is enriched arbitrarily by adding supposedly ir-
relevant information (about potential causal relations), things might get
muddled. This especially shows in cases of causation by omission where
some effect is produced by some specific event not being realized, and
where it is this specific event that the researcher wants to single out and
test for potential causation and not any other potential cause candidates
that did not get realized either. Consider the following example, taken
from [Halpern & Pearl 2005a, p. 871 (example 5.3)] (referring to an
unpublished text by Hall and Paul):
Suppose Suzy goes away on vacation, leaving her favorite plant in
the hands of Billy, who has promised to water it. Billy fails to
do so. The plant dies – but would not have, had Billy watered it.
. . .Billy’s failure to water the plant caused its death. But Vladimir
Putin also failed to water Suzy’s plant. And, had he done so, it
would not have died. Why do we also not count his omission as a
cause of the plant’s death?
Halpern and Pearl make two suggestions: (i) Slim down the model
and do away with the endogenous variable Putin.waters.the.plant. This
would leave the analyst with only Billy’s failure as potential cause can-
didate. (ii) If the richer structure is to be preserved, do not check all
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variable assignments for the putatively irrelevant variable set
# „
W . For-
mally this amounts to defining extended causal models by adding sets
of allowable settings E of the endogenous variables. In the case of the
above example, our modeling intuition tells us that the variable setting
Putin.waters.the.plant = 1 is to be excluded from the respective set of
allowable settings E . That is, we are not considering Putin’s failure to
water the plant as true cause, as relevant for the situation, as informa-
tive when mentioned in discussion, etc. Both strategies are of pragmatic
nature but necessary if Pearl’s causal analysis is to be implemented es-
pecially in contexts where (neglected) responsibility is to be determined
or guilt is to be assessed. It seems as if Pearl were loosening his own
rigorous framework at this point again. But he answers:
Are we giving ourselves too much flexibility here? We believe not.
It is up to a modeler to defend her choice of model. A model
which does not allow us to consider Putin watering the plant can
be defended in the obvious way: that it is a scenario too ridiculous
to consider.78
Ultimately – and summing up Pearl’s explications – this means that
the task of discerning causes (especially singular ones for explanatory
purposes) comes down to enriching bare structures by adding non-causal
knowledge and to model-relatively querying lower-level basal relations
upon limiting possible settings (i. e., upon marking worlds to consider).
These facets will be picked up again, exploited, and expanded further in
chapter 3 now.
78Cf. [Halpern & Pearl 2005a, p. 871].
Chapter 3
Causality as epistemic
principle of knowledge
organization
as [resemblance, contiguity,
causation] are the only ties of
our thoughts, they are really to
us the cement of the universe
David Hume, An Abstract of a
“Treatise of Human Nature”
When Judea Pearl takes a stand on the ontic (metaphysical) status
of causation in his book Causality, he clearly localizes causal relationships
on the objective (physical) side of the pair ontological versus epistemic
(doxastic):1
[. . . ] causal relationships are ontological, describing objective phys-
ical constraints in our world, whereas probabilistic relationships
are epistemic, reflecting what we know or believe about the world.
Therefore, causal relationships should remain unaltered as long as
no change has taken place in the environment, even when our
knowledge about the environment undergoes changes.2
Nevertheless, as becomes obvious from his comments on possible, allow-
able settings of the variables in the causal model at hand (or on ways of
1Compare chapter 1, sect. 1.9, for a list of decisions to take in the process of
devising a theory of causation.
2Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 25].
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slimming down causal models), it is the modeler’s choice which comes be-
fore the assessment of causes and their effects (within the chosen frame):
Causal inference remains model-relative in Pearl’s framework, after all.
Still, the holistic and monolithic path followed by an account of causa-
tion on the basis of hypothetical, possible interventions seems (i) to be
very attractive to various (at least empirical) disciplines that build upon
the practice of experimentation and (ii) to correspond very well with our
intuitions, summed up in the observation – or rather in the postulate –
“wiggling the cause affects the effect – and not vice versa.” But on what
ontological grounds can this claim be understood and made exploitable
fruitfully, if a purely physically objective interpretation faces criticism?
3.1 The total system and the modality of inter-
ventions
One way of answering the question, where causation is to be localized
metaphysically, is to simply deny the existence of such a relation, as
Bertrand Russell does in his often-quoted seminal inquiry On the No-
tion of Cause (1913):
[. . . ] the reason why physics has ceased to look for causes is that, in
fact, there are no such things. The law of causality, I believe, like
much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone
age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously
supposed to do no harm.3
Examining what we mean by saying that one event causes a second event,
Russell finds that mature science has withdrawn from the business of
marking off suitable events and has rather settled on specifying variables
and their corresponding measurement methods for the analysis of func-
tional dependencies instead of causal relations.4 Russell must arrive
at his concluding judgment – he bases his argument on the existence of
actual events and physical processes. The analysis of everyday language
3Cf. [Russell 1913, p. 1].
4Cf. for this and the following [Dowe 2009, pp 214 f.]. There (p. 215), Phil Dowe
briefly comments on this finding:
Russell simply makes the point that [science] focuses on functional rela-
tions between variables, a focus far removed from the kind of common-
sense events that we take to be causes and effects.
Quite contrary to that, Pearl in his framework introduces events as random variables
and causal relations as deterministic functional relations between those variables,
aiming at a close connection with intuitive reasoning.
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with widely defined events (stated by expressions such as ‘some person’s
hitting the billiard ball’) ultimately yields the result that there are no
real regular causes, since any event can be intercepted by way of excep-
tion and rendered void in its bringing about the effect (in this case, the
billiard ball falling in some pocket) – there can always be unmentioned
further preventative circumstances complicating our attribution of causal
efficacy. On the other hand, going narrow trivially eliminates the con-
cept of cause, too, as Russell argues. As soon as any cause-effect pair
of events is described in all its pertaining details, saying that one event
causes the other becomes trivially true, since this case of regularity only
has one instance. Talk of causation can thus be exchanged for talk of
determination without losing any inherent meaning.
Now, if one wants to stick to the Bayes net account of determinis-
tic causation with interventions (going from types to tokens), there is
no other option than to agree with Lord Russell: Any causal model
in Pearl’s sense relies on an agreement about the context, i. e., on
the choice of variables that are to be excluded from modeling as ceteris
paribus conditions. Violation of one of these silent (in principle infinitely
many) conditions may render the whole model useless. As a consequence,
no causal model thus construed will suffice to hold for all thinkable cases
of application – for any causal model there is always a model closer to ob-
jective physical reality (by outward augmentation or zooming in).5 On
the other hand, strengthening the narrow description of events would
ultimately result in infinitely narrow, point-like instantiations of certain
features (following Kim’s explication) such that the full Bayes net thus
conceived would become infinitely dense, ultimately losing its property
of being a network altogether, thus not being modifiable by structural lo-
cal surgeries in Pearl’s sense for testing causal directionality anymore.6
J. L. Mackie arrives at a similar conclusion in his examination of causal
priority.7 Basing his argumentation on the ontological interpretation of
causation he admits that, if one assumes total determinism, there is no
way to find out about the direction of causation anymore – any specific
event is apt for the explanation (or prediction) of any other event, since
5To avoid entering any vicious circle here, closer simply means taking more events
into account – in a way, fine-graining the model.
6This remark basically combines both points made by Russell: Going narrow
and storing all potentially relevant information in the model amounts to storing
all information in the model (in dense arrangement). Consequently, what Nancy
Cartwright in [Cartwright 2001, sect. 3a] calls “God’s big Bayes net” in reference
to what Wolfgang Spohn in [Spohn 2000, p. 11] calls the “all-embracive Bayesian
net” cannot be a net structure anymore.
7Cf. for this and the following [Mackie 1980, pp. 189 ff.].
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any two events in this system (or realizations of two distinct variables,
respectively) are related in strict manner:
If you have too much causation, it destroys one of its own most
characteristic features. Every event is equally fixed from eternity
with every other, and there is no room left for any preferred direc-
tion of causing.8
Moreover, assuming total determinism in the total system (along
with Laplace, Einstein, or modern deterministic interpretations of
quantum mechanics) finally makes Pearl’s interventionist account of
causation inapplicable altogether. If there is nothing external to the
system anymore, even the possibility of thinking external interventions
becomes inaccessible if those manipulations are to have any meaning
at all (perhaps some counterpart in some possible world – to stay in
the laboratory picture; but alternative possible worlds would have to be
completely incompatible and incomparable with the actual world at all
times, since Lewis’ “small miracles” are excluded if total determinism is
postulated).
Does the hunt for causes stop here? Russell judges that the law of
causality is only erroneously supposed to do no harm – he must admit,
after all, that causal talk obviously does convey meaning. Pursuing to
carve out the unifying content might thus still turn out to be fruitful in
the end.
3.2 Subnets for epistemic subjects
When Wolfgang Spohn ponders the metaphysical status of causal depen-
dence, he finally arrives at the conclusion (also heading his paper from
2000) that “Bayesian Nets Are All There Is To Causal Dependence”:
So far, I have only introduced two distinct graph-theoretical rep-
resentations: one of causal dependence between variables and one
of conditional probabilistic dependence. However, the core observa-
tion of each probabilistic theory of causation is that there is a close
8Cf. [Mackie 1980, p. 191]. Note that Mackie puts forward a variant of an
interventionist (or at least agentive) account of causation. He makes this explicit
with his first rendition of causal priority in [Mackie 1980, p. 190]:
A first approximation to an analysis of ‘X was causally prior to Y ’, where
X and Y are individual events, is ‘It would have been possible for an agent
to prevent Y by (directly or indirectly) preventing, or failing to bring about
or to do, X’ [. . . ].
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connection between causal and probabilistic dependence, that the
two representations indeed coincide, i.e. that each causal graph is
a Bayesian net. Thereby, the Markov and the minimality condition
turn into the causal Markov and the causal minimality condition.9
As in Pearl’s framework sketched above, some variable’s Markovian
parents can consequently be interpreted as the direct causes of the event
represented by this variable. Spohn goes on by exploiting this:
[D]irect causal dependence is obviously frame-relative [. . . ]. The
relativization would be acceptable, if it concerned only the direct/
indirect distinction: what appears to be a direct causal dependency
within a coarse-grained frame may well unfold into a longer causal
chain within a more fine-grained frame. [. . . ] It’s worse, however.
The whole notion of causal dependence is frame-relative according
to [its] definition: where there appears to be a direct or an indi-
rect causal dependency within a coarse-grained frame, there may
be none within a more fine-grained frame, and vice versa.10
An answer to the question what guidelines we have for building net
structures of causal models that truly reflect ‘real causation’ might not
be feasible, after all, Spohn concedes:
In the final analysis it is the all-embracive Bayesian net repre-
senting the whole of reality which decides about how the causal
dependencies actually are. Of course, we are bound to have only a
partial group of this all-embracive Bayesian net.11
If this seems to be a necessary shortcoming of representing causal de-
pendencies in suitably confined Bayesian nets, why not understand it
as an essential feature of causal reasoning in the first place? The in-
terventionist account of causation even requires the net structures of
causal models to correspond to subsystems of the total system – expert
knowledge or common sense tells us how to carve out sufficiently open
and at the same time sufficiently closed subnets of our (directly or indi-
rectly) perceived surroundings. Open to allow for hypothetical external
interventions and closed to mark off the variables under consideration
from those assigned merely exceptional influence as in the laboratory
picture.12 Deciding upon the set of variables considered illuminating for
9Cf. [Spohn 2000, p. 5].
10Cf. [Spohn 2000, p. 7].
11Cf. [Spohn 2000, p. 11]. Also see footnote 6 of this chapter for a critical remark
on the term ‘all-embracive Bayesian net.’
12Judea Pearl comments on the origins and ramifications of breaking the ‘closed
world assumption’ in greater depth in sect. 7.5 of [Pearl 2009].
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the analysis to be conducted is obviously a subjective (sometimes highly
pragmatic) process that may differ from one epistemic agent to the next
even if performed in compliance with rational standards. The struc-
ture of each agent’s causal graph largely depends upon prior knowledge
and intensional aspects to be emphasized. Interpreting the arrows in
such causal graphs as conveying causal meaning ultimately amounts to
accepting an epistemic account of causation, the proponents of which an-
alyze causality “neither in terms of physical probabilities nor in terms of
physical mechanisms, but in terms of an agent’s epistemic state”, as Jon
Williamson summarizes in [Williamson 2009, p. 204]. Williamson
marks the core of such an epistemic theory of causation:
[T]he proponent of the epistemic theory holds that [‘A causes B’]
says something about rational belief.13
One of the salient advantages of the epistemic approach is the straight-
forward justification of causal talk across different levels (macro–meso–
micro) and various domains of discourse, as Williamson continues:
Heterogeneity of mechanisms across the sciences is no problem
because the causal relation is not analysed in terms of those
[discipline-specific] mechanisms but in terms of rational belief, an
account that is not specific to particular sciences.14
Interventions remain relative to the formulation of the mechanisms under
consideration as in Pearl’s original conception. But interpreting the
structure represented in a causal model as informant about an agent’s
epistemic state now allows for reconsidering the key concepts of a causal
theory (now formulated in epistemic terms):
• Causation can be understood as an epistemic relation between rep-
resentations of real events.
• Causality becomes a principle of organizing knowledge efficiently
for explanation, prediction, and instruction.
Following these suggestions, the Bayesian networks at the core of each
causal model need not be interpreted anymore as representing intercon-
nected laws of physics (on some macro level) but may be re-interpreted as
storing relational knowledge, which in turn enables us to augment causal
models to generic structures of learning and communication targeted at
consistent causal inference.
13Cf. [Williamson 2009, p. 206] where Jon Williamson refers back to Ernst
Mach, who writes in The Science of Mechanics (1883) that “Cause and effect [. . . ]
are things of thought, having an economical office” (p. 485).
14Cf. [Williamson 2009, p. 206].
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3.3 Organizing Data in causal knowledge pat-
terns
One of the criticisms the purely probabilistic account of causation has
to acknowledge is the charge of reducing causal relations to probabilistic
ones where there may be no grounds for this simplistic transition, as
summed up by Williamson:
[P]robabilistic dependencies may be attributable to other kinds of
relationships between the variables. A and B may be dependent not
because they are causally related but because they are related logi-
cally (e.g. where an assignment to A is logically complex and logi-
cally implies an assignment to B), mathematically (e. g. mean and
variance variables for the same quantity are connected by a mathe-
matical equation), or semantically (e. g. A and B are synonymous
or overlap in meaning), or are related by non-causal physical laws
or by domain constraints. [. . . ] To take a simple example, if a log-
ically implies b then P (b | a) = 1 while P (b) may well be less than
1. In such a case variables A and B (where A takes assignments
a and ¬a and B takes assignments b and ¬b) are probabilistically
dependent; however it is rarely plausible to say that A causes B or
vice versa, or that they have a common cause.15
The embedding of these relations has not been available so far, since
the arrows in the graphical portion of Pearl’s causal models had to be
interpreted causally, the network structure had to thoroughly obey the
causal Markov condition, and all events represented by random variables
had to be sufficiently distinct to allow for causal inference at all. Nev-
ertheless, I want to argue here that the way we infer causal knowledge
from more basic assumptions relies to a large extent also on non-causal
knowledge (of the sort referred to by Williamson above), which quite
substantially helps arranging and connecting subnet structures of ac-
tual causal purport. Amongst the most important relations serving this
purpose are node connections representing deterministic, non-directional
knowledge, i. e., links that strictly correlate certain variables and along
which information may be transferred instantaneously. These find no
place in the Bayes net causal models defined above (especially if those
are understood as sub-portions of the all-embracive net built on physical
laws), but they can be introduced in the epistemically interpreted vari-
ant of those very causal models as carefully restricted augmentations.
Of course, a new type of edge is necessary for representing this idea,
since directed edges are already reserved for directional, asymmetrical
15Cf. [Williamson 2009, p. 200].
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causal knowledge. So-called epistemic contours (ECs) shall enrich the
graphical part of Pearl’s causal models – however, integrating these
epistemic contours into Bayes net causal graphs turns these graphs into
semi-DAGs with undirected subnets, so-called EC cliques:
Definition 3.3.1 (EC Clique)
An EC clique is a subnet in a semi-DAG (of a causal knowledge pat-
tern as defined below) that is exclusively connected by undirected edges
(representing epistemic contours). EC cliques are defined as transitively
closed under the EC relation.
This new kind of edge bars causal inference in the above Bayes net frame-
work. The desideratum remains, namely the unification of causal and
non-causal knowledge in structures that allow consistent computation of
causal claims. This leads to the formulation of causal knowledge patterns
(CKPs) targeted at facilitating the prediction of future events, the ex-
planation of past events, and the choice of suitable actions for efficient
achievement of intended goals on the basis of causal and non-causal data.
Gaps between levels of abstraction or even between different disciplines
can be bridged by making knowledge explicit in CKPs:
Definition 3.3.2 (Causal Knowledge Pattern)
A causal knowledge pattern is a quadruple
K = 〈U, V, F,C〉
such that M = 〈U, V, F 〉 is a causal model16 where
(i) U is a set background variables ( exogenous variables), that are set
from outside the model;
(ii) V is a set {V1, V2, . . . , Vn} of n endogenous variables, that are de-
termined by variables in the model – i. e., by variables in U ∪ V ;
(iii) F is a set of causal mechanisms for V , i. e., n functions
{f1, f2, . . . , fn} (determining the value of each variable Vi in V )
such that
vi = fi(pai, ui)
17
with
fi :
(
∏
k Ran(PAik)
)
× Ran(Ui)→ Ran(Vi) (1 ≤ i ≤ |V |),
16Also see definition 2.7.1 of causal model on p. 56.
17The boldface pai collects for each variable Vi the values of its parent variables in
a list of length |PAi|, i. e., pai := pa1, pa2, . . . , pa |PAi|.
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where for every i: 1 ≤ k ≤ |PAi|, Ui ∈ U (possibly combining
multiple contributing and/or preventative disturbance factors into
one complex variable), and PAi ⊆ V \{Vi}.
18
(iv) C is a set of epistemic contours, i. e., a set of 1-1 functions ci,j
such that
1. 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n k i 6= j,
2. ci,j : Ran(Vi) −→ Ran(Vj),
3. di, j, k(ci,j ∈ C k cj,k ∈ C ⇒ ci,k ∈ C),
4. di, j(ci,j ∈ C ⇒ cj,i ∈ C), and
5. cj,i = c
−1
i,j .
Clause 3 says that the set of functions C is euclidean, while 4 and
5 define C to be closed under inversion.19
(v) A variable X being connected to a second variable Y by an epis-
temic contour but possessing no causal mechanisms (i. e., influent
arrows in the semi-DAG) is treated like an endogenous variable
(since its value is determined by the value of Y ) with one excep-
tion: If no variable in X’s EC clique receives its value through a
causal mechanism (but only via epistemic contours), all variables
in X’s EC clique are said to be simultaneously exogenous. One
single variable in this EC clique receiving its value from outside
conditions suffices to determine the values of all other variables in
the EC clique.
The graph DK of a causal knowledge pattern K can be understood
as an augmentation of the graph DM pertaining to the causal model
M = 〈U, V, F 〉, which in turn is a sub-structure of K . The set C
of deterministic epistemic contours is represented in the graph DK as
undirected edges: The pair of contours {ci,j , cj,i} is graphically rendered
as the undirected edge connecting the node with the label Vi to the
node with the label Vj. Such an undirected edge will in the following
also simply be called contour – although it actually represents a pair of
underlying inter-definable functions – since the edge in the graph sym-
metrically represents both corresponding functions, and context always
disambiguates what is formally referred to.
18Also see the definition of causal mechanisms, 2.7.2, on p. 57.
19Clauses 3–5 of def. 3.3.2 are listed here w. l. o. g., since all c ∈ C are 1-1 functions;
especially 3 can be loosened to much rather express the potential expansion of C.
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Now, epistemic contours thus defined satisfy the very desiderata
listed above. They represent non-directional knowledge, thereby being
capable of bridging different frameworks of description (maybe vertically
on different levels or horizontally in different disciplines). Epistemic con-
tours deterministically transfer knowledge by virtue of their definition as
bijective functions – in a way marking variables that cannot be decou-
pled, i. e., variables that cannot be modified separately. In particular,
epistemic contours are not to be deactivated by interventions, which re-
main defined only for directed edges (i. e., only for causal mechanisms).
An epistemic contour ci,j between two variables marks these variables as
dependent but not connected causally – a third common cause can be
excluded, because intervening on either variable directly (and simulta-
neously, i. e., at the same stage of computation) changes the value of the
other variable as well. In other words, Vi and Vj are bound intrinsically
in such a way that there exists no suitable intervention to detect the
direction of any “causal flow.”
X1 X2
X3 X4
Y
c3,4
X1 X2
X3 X4
Y
c3,4
do(X3 = x3) x4 = c3,4(x3)
y = fY (x4)
Fig. 3.1: Intervening on the variable X3 lifts it from the (causal) influence of
variables X1 and X2 but does not clip the link between X3 and X4.
Consider the left graph of figure 3.1 where two directed acyclic sub-
nets X1 A X3 B X2 and X4 A Y are connected by the epistemic
contour c3,4 (in the graphical part of the model also denoted by the
name ‘c4,3’). Now, the intervention on the variable X3 is expressed in
the graph by removing the arrows connecting X3 to its parents X1 and
X2 but upholding the link between X3 and X4. This epistemic contour
represents deterministic transfer of knowledge and does its job as soon as
the intervention do(X3 = x3) (i. e., the assignment of the value x3 to the
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variable X3) is performed. X4 receives its value x4 through the function
c3,4 and subsequently passes its value on to the causal mechanism fY
which takes c3,4(x3) as the only argument and uniquely computes the
outcome y. This example illustrates with the structure X3 n X4 what
it means to be an EC clique, as defined above in def. 3.3.1. To allow for
consistent inference from causal knowledge patterns, the formulation of
suitable restrictions on the construction and the manipulation of these
structures is in order.
3.4 Causal knowledge patterns:
design and manipulation
The demand for acyclicity
Just as with the directed acyclic graphical part of Pearl’s causal mod-
els, consistent inference of causal claims from causal knowledge patterns
crucially relies on these structures being acyclic as well.
X1
X2
X3
c1,3
X1
X2
X3
Fig. 3.2: The a-collapsibility criterion, illustrated: The left graphDK , the semi-
DAG of the causal knowledge pattern K , is collapsed to the right
graph, which fails the test for acyclicity in this example.
The left graph of figure 3.2 shall serve as a motivation for the follow-
ing considerations. Three variables are arranged in such a way that there
is a causal chain X1 A X2 A X3 and a shortcut X1 n X3 representing
the epistemic contour c1,3. In this example, the causal directedness of
X1 A X2 A X3 is rendered void by the existence of c1,3: Intervening on
X3 should make it independent of all its predecessors, but it does not.
Knowledge about X3 propagates “backwards” over to X1, since the epis-
temic contour c1,3 does not get trimmed by the intervention performed.
This way, intervening on either X2 or X3 influences the respective other
variable and makes this pattern useless for causal analysis.
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Now, The graphical criterion of a-collapsibility (with the ‘a’ denoting
‘acyclic’) tells the causal modeler if the pattern at hand is a proper causal
knowledge pattern allowing for consistently inferring causal claims in
accordance with intuition and background information.
Definition 3.4.1 (a-Collapsibility of Causal Knowledge Pat-
terns)
A causal knowledge pattern K is called a-collapsible if pulling together all
nodes of each EC clique in the semi-DAG DK into one single compound
node per clique while leaving intact all arrows pointing at or rooting in
any of the unified nodes (thereby removing all undirected edges) results
in a (directed) acyclic graph.
The right graph of figure 3.2 of our example above shows the col-
lapsed version of the left graph. Nodes X1 and X3 of the EC clique
X1 n X3 are pulled together into the compound node X1,3 while all
arrows connecting X1 and X3 to other nodes in the graph (in this case
only X2) are left intact, i. e., simply redirected into or out of the newly
established compound node. The resulting graph nevertheless fails the
test for acyclicity, since it cannot be defined recursively with X2 and
X1,3 being each other’s parent nodes simultaneously. Hence, the original
graph DK is analyzed as not a-collapsible, which would in any case be
demanded of a suitably designed causal knowledge pattern.
Causal effects in epistemically equivalent causal knowledge
patterns
What it means to be a cause in the framework of causal knowledge pat-
terns is carried over directly from the interventionist account of causation
based on Bayes net causal models where a cause is an event which, when
intervened on, brings about corresponding change in its effects. Inter-
ventions in causal knowledge patterns ultimately test for the direction
of the causal flow, too – epistemically interpreted and not necessarily
“push-and-pull.” In this epistemic account of causation epistemic con-
tours pass on information both ways – stably, deterministically, and not
interruptibly. Epistemic contours themselves, though, mark non-causal
relations but may nevertheless represent portions of paths that are said
to be causal. If a causal effect is identifiable, at all, it can be computed
uniquely within causal knowledge patterns (upon limiting possible set-
tings). Pearl’s concept of the identifiability of an effect, however, relies
on the notion of d-separation, which is not defined for the semi-DAGs of
causal knowledge patterns, yet. The extension of Pearl’s criterion (as
given in definition 2.6.3 on page 52) is straightforward, nonetheless.
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Definition 3.4.2 (d-Separation for Causal Knowledge Patterns)
A path in the semi-DAG DK of the causal knowledge pattern K (i. e.,
a sequence of nodes either connected by directed or undirected edges) is
called d-separated if it is not active in accordance with the d-separation
criterion for DAGs when epistemic contours are treated as null transi-
tions in the detection of chains, forks, or colliders.
X1 X2 X3 X4
Z1 Z2
Y
c
Fig. 3.3: d -separation in the semi-DAG DK of the causal knowledge pattern
K . The epistemic contour along Z1 n Z2 (labeled c without indices,
since it is the only one) presents a null transition for the detection of
forks, chains, and collider structures.
Example (d-Separation in causal knowledge patterns)
Consider the semi-DAG in figure 3.3. The epistemic contour along
Z1 n Z2 presents a null transition for the application of the d-separation
criterion in accordance with definition 3.4.2. Now, applying the criterion
yields for example the following independencies (dependencies, respec-
tively):
1. (X1 ⊥ X4 |∅), since (by virtue of the skipped null transition) the
virtual compound node Z1,2 acts as a collider, blocking the flow of
information along X1 A Z1 n Z2 B X4;
2. (X1 6⊥ X4 |Y ), since Y is a descendant node of the compound
collider Z1,2;
3. (X1 ⊥ Y |Z2), since the value of Z2 determines the value of Z1
and the compound node Z1,2 blocks the flow of information along
the chain X1 A Z1 n Z2 A Y ;
4. (X4 ⊥ Y |Z1), even if Z1 is not situated on the path X4 A Z2 A Y .
Nevertheless, the value of Z1 determines the value of Z2, thereby
d-separating X4 and Y .
98 Causality as epistemic principle
This example shows in particular, that for the independencies that
can be read off the graph it does not make any difference if the node
representing the variable Y is connected to Z1 or to Z2, i. e., Z2 A Y
can be exchanged for Z1 A Y in the semi-DAG above without loss of
information if fY is suitably reformulated (taking the value of Z1 as
argument) or exchanged for f ′Y := fY ◦ c→.
20 This observation shall be
summed up in the principle of epistemic equivalence of causal knowledge
patterns:
Definition 3.4.3 (Principle of Epistemic Equivalence of Causal
Knowledge Patterns)
Two causal knowledge patterns K1 and K2 are called epistemically equiv-
alent if both possess the same variables and the same epistemic contours
but in the graphical part possibly differ in the set of directed edges pointing
towards or rooted in nodes of an EC clique in such a way that
1. for all nodes pointing towards a node of the EC clique the arrow
tail is the same for both CKPs, while the anchor of the head may
differ;
2. for all nodes rooted in a node of the EC clique the arrow head is
the same for both CKPs, while the anchor of the tail may differ;
3. all nodes of this EC clique assume the same values in both CKPs if
the parents of these nodes assume the same values in both CKPs;
4. all nodes that are children of nodes of this EC clique assume the
same values in both CKPs if the nodes of this very EC clique assume
the same values in both CKPs.
The principle of epistemic equivalence basically states that two causal
knowledge patterns might convey the same information even if they ex-
hibit structural differences in the arrows docked onto EC cliques. In other
words, inferring causal knowledge from CKPs is insensitive to along what
paths information is fed into and propagated onward from EC cliques
(and what the formulation of the associated causal mechanisms may be),
as long as the unified sets of predecessor and successor nodes of each EC
clique remain untouched. The very general formulation of the principle
of epistemic equivalence emphasizes that not all combinatorially possi-
ble restructurings of a given CKP K (i. e., permutations of parent–child
relations directly neighboring EC cliques) generate CKPs epistemically
20Since the epistemic contour c does not possess any indices, c→ indicates one
function of the pair of epistemic contours c→/c← with c→ : Ran(Z1)→ Ran(Z2).
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equivalent to K . E. g., if a node Xi of some EC clique within K acts
as a collider node, i. e., Xi is a child of more than one parent node in
PAi, and the causal mechanism fi acts like a logical OR switch, then all
CKPs epistemically equivalent to K where one of the arrows pointing
at Xi is redirected to point towards Xj have all arrows originally taking
part in the causal mechanism fi redirected to Xj (i. e., fj takes over all
the arguments of fi). Nonlinear belief propagation in accordance with
the mechanism of the OR switch cannot be ensured in any other way.
Docking arrows onto EC cliques
Just as when choosing suitable variables for embedding into causal mod-
els within Pearl’s framework, the choice of how to dock influent arrows
onto EC cliques is ultimately left to the causal analyst, too. As long
as there is only one arrow pointing towards one of the nodes of a spe-
cific EC clique, the answer to the question, where to anchor the arrow
head, boils down to the precise formulation of the causal mechanism that
corresponds to this very single influent arrow. With the intended cases
of application in mind this decision is made naturally in general, since
if, e. g., different nodes of an EC clique represent observed events for-
mulated in languages of different disciplines, a single influent arrow will
be anchored to the node of the same language as the pertaining causal
mechanism. In general, this principle extends to multiple arrows enter-
ing an EC clique “from above” and analogously to one or more arrows
rooted in an EC clique and pointing towards other nodes “below.”
One more word about the Markovian assumption and the integration
of epistemic contours is in order here: Figure 3.1 exhibits the structure
{X1,X2} A X3 n X4 where X4 is treated as an endogenous variable in
accordance with definition 3.3.2, i. e., it receives its value by assignment
through c3,4 with the value of X3 as its only argument. X3, however,
does not comply with the Markov assumption in that its value is set by
f3 and by c4,3 at the same time. This does not pose a problem here –
X3 can not be assigned incompatible values, since X4’s value is not set
before X3’s when the system of equations for the network is solved step
by step. This is always the case with EC cliques that are set by one sole
path “from above.”
A causal knowledge pattern behaves differently, though, in the case of
multiple arrows entering one and the same EC clique. Now, one variable
might be assigned contradictory values at the same time, i. e., it might be
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set through a causal path “from above” and additionally receive incom-
patible information via an epistemic contour. E. g., the variable Z1 in
figure 3.3 contradicts the Markovian assumption in exactly this way: z1
is calculated by drawing on the pertaining causal mechanism fZ1 , which
only takes the obtaining values of Z1’s parents as its arguments. This
assignment by fZ1 might be contradicted by the equation for the 1-1
relation c← setting Z1 by computing Z2. The contradiction, formally:
(i) Let fZ1(x1, x2) = min(x1, x2) and fZ2(x3, x4) = max(x3, x4);
(ii) let c← = c→ = id;
(iii) let x1 = x2 = x3 = 0 and x4 = 1
with X1, . . . ,X4 ∈ {0, 1} dichotomous variables;
(iv) z1 = fZ1(0, 0) = min(0, 0) = 0
} 
(v) z2 = fZ2(0, 1) = max(0, 1) = 1⇒ z1 = c←(z2) = id(1) = 1
This contradiction arises, since {X1,X2} and {X3,X4} are independent
in the first place, which can be verified by the extended criterion of
d-separation for causal knowledge patterns – the mechanisms fZ1 and
fZ2 might, e. g., represent independent experimental designs indepen-
dently resulting in and accounting for two strictly correlated observed
phenomena (e. g., measured or labeled differently) if the experiments are
actually performed. In other words, each causal history entering an epis-
temic contour supports one possible explanation of the occurrence de-
scribed by this very epistemic contour. Explanation is understood here
as the act of post factum singling out a set of variables of the causal
knowledge pattern K and naming the obtaining values to answer the
question “Why did x occur?” or singling out a sub-pattern of DK (and
naming the corresponding variables’ values) to answer the question “How
was x produced?”21
Now, the establishment of the epistemic contour c is only justified in the
first place if there is the possibility of assigning values to the exogenous
variables X1, . . . ,X4 such that the system of equations for the causal
knowledge pattern can be solved consistently, at all. One distinguished
case, the non-interventional consistent initial situation, will be marked
by default assignment as the default case. The basic assumption beneath
21Note that the notion of explanation is in this sense always relative to a causal
knowledge pattern K which might either be induced by the question itself or made
explicit in the answer.
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this is that the default of the epistemic contour under consideration has
corresponding defaults in all its exogenous predecessor variables coupled
in marking this situation.22 Of course, what the default value of an EC
clique is, differs from one context to another. It is a highly intensional
concept, after all. But so is the concept of causal analysis in causal
knowledge patterns with epistemic contours. The concept of default
does not have to remain obscure, though – on the contrary, its integra-
tion contributes to the computability and to the applicability of causal
knowledge patterns. Christopher Hitchcock, who makes the point that
occurrences deviating from normality are much rather attributed causal
efficacy than those following the normal course of events,23 be quoted
here for an elaborate view on what defaults and deviants essentially are:
As the name suggests, the default value of a variable is the one
that we would expect in the absence of any information about in-
tervening causes. More specifically, there are certain states of a
system that are self-sustaining, that will persist in the absence of
any causes other than the presence of the state itself: the default
assumption is that a system, once it is in such a state, will persist
in such a state. Theory – either scientific or folk – informs us
which states are self-sustaining in this way. For example, New-
tonian physics tells us that an object’s velocity is self-sustaining,
whereas its acceleration is not. Thus the default is that the object
will maintain the same velocity. The default may depend upon the
level of analysis. Consider, for example, a variable whose values
represent the state of an individual – alive or dead. It is a plausible
principle of folk biology that an individual will remain alive unless
something causes her to die, hence it would treat ‘alive’ as the
default value of the variable. But from the perspective of a phys-
iologist, remaining alive requires an amazing effort on the part of
complex, delicate systems, as well as interactions with the environ-
ment; hence death might be viewed as the default state. Perhaps
a case could be made for allowing only genuine laws of nature to
determine default values of variables, but if we disallow folk theo-
ries, we are not likely to arrive at a theory that accords with folk
intuitions. Note also that the default value of a variable may not
be an intrinsic feature of the state that is represented. That is, we
could have two individuals in the very same state, while one is in
a deviant state and the other in a default state.24
22Turning this assumption upside down means that if any of the EC clique’s vari-
ables is assigned a deviant value through its pertaining causal mechanism, this specific
variable must have at least one exogenous predecessor exhibiting an efficacious deviant
value, too – either observed or set by intervention.
23See Hitchcock’s considerations on this issue in [Hitchcock 2009a].
24Cf. [Hitchcock 2007, p. 506] – quoted here without footnotes.
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The following considerations shall make explicit under what circum-
stances a causal knowledge pattern is of use to the causal researcher in
need of explanation, what restrictions are required of such a pattern if it
is to be used for prediction, and how information transfer via epistemic
contours can promote cross-framework counterfactual reasoning.
Maintaining consistency in the observational case
The following refers w. l. o. g. to causal knowledge patterns with one epis-
temic contour for the sake of simplicity. Observation will always yield
consistent results if there is only one common orphan predecessor node
for all nodes in an EC clique – the epistemic contour would not be jus-
tified otherwise, it makes explicit precisely this feature of the causal
knowledge pattern under consideration.25 Consider the left graph of fig-
ure 3.4 where observingX2 = x2 will feed the initial value into the system
of equations represented by DK , which will then take care of consistent
propagation of belief to X1 and X3.
X1
X2
X3
c1,3
x1 = f1(x2) = c3,1(x3) x3 = f3(x2) = c1,3(x1)
X1
X2
X3
c1,3
x2 = f2(x1, x3) = f2(x1, c1,3(x1))
Fig. 3.4: If the semi-DAG DK of a causal knowledge pattern K is to be used for
consistent causal inference, restrictions on analysis and intervention
by the do(·)-operation apply.
If the set of orphan predecessor nodes of a certain EC clique consists
of more than one node, though, these nodes are self-evidently d-separated
and their paths into the EC clique semantically independent in general.
Nevertheless, in accordance with the explications above, there has to
be some default situation that renders solving the system of equations
25Note that this is the only case where the orphan predecessor nodes of the EC
clique under consideration are (trivially) non-d -separated. Nevertheless, if hidden
disturbances are not excluded from the analysis, these would (at least partly) have
to be analyzed as dependent.
Causality as epistemic principle 103
consistent and entails compatible values in the 1-1 assignment within the
EC clique, thereby licensing the integration of the epistemic contour in
the first place. Consider for example the graph DK in figure 3.3 with the
numerical example (given on page 100). The default situation is marked
by the assignment of 0 to the variables within the EC clique Z1 n Z2
and can be predicted from the observation that the EC clique’s orphan
predecessors’ values are all 0, too, where 0 values might in turn be the
presumed defaults of all the exogenous variables. Nevertheless, if only
X4 were observed as assuming 1, solving the system of equations for the
causal knowledge pattern would yield inconsistent assignments. Still,
the deviant observation X4 = 1 would be attributed causal efficacy since
it stirs the stable equilibrium of the self-sustaining default situation. If
observing solely the sub-pattern through which X4 = 1 enters the EC
clique leads to a unique prediction of Z1 and Z2, this sub-pattern would
be drawn on in explaining the effect (i. e., the change in Z1 and Z2),
whereas other paths rooting in variables that persevere in default state
would be dismissed as irrelevant. This concept is summed up in the
following definition of explanatory dominance.
Definition 3.4.4 (Principle of Explanatory Dominance)
A set of variables Z1 in a certain EC clique connecting the set of variables
C is said to weakly explanatorily dominate the set of variables Z2 ⊆
C\Z1 in world ω iff Z1’s variables
(i) all show compatible values (relative to the epistemic contours),
(ii) exhibit a value incompatible with at least one of the values in Z2,
(iii) and at least one of their orphan predecessors shows a deviant value
with effective influence on Z1 (i. e., were it set to a different value,
at least one variable in Z1 would be assigned differently, too).
26
Moreover, Z1 is said to strictly explanatorily dominate the set Z2 iff, in
addition to (i)–(iii), Z2’s orphan predecessors (excluding such on paths
through the epistemic contour itself) only assume default values.27If Z1
is the maximal set strictly explanatorily dominating the set C\Z1, the
causal history of any of the variables in Z1 may support explanation
of the obtaining values of Z1, while all other histories are marked as
irrelevant.
26This condition neglects deviants whose influence is absorbed or overridden by
specific causal mechanisms, but attributes relevance to multiple deviants that would
be efficacious if they did not cancel each other precisely.
27This ensures with the explications above that Z2 also receives its default value and
that it does not receive this default value from multiple exogenous deviants cancelling
each other precisely.
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The principle of explanatory dominance thus draws on background
knowledge about defaults and deviants to support (predictive) deter-
mination of the values of EC clique variables. While the weak version
simply says that if Z1 dominates Z2, Z2 cannot be used as assignment
target, the strict version implies that Z1 in fact is a good candidate
for providing the desired value (and marks Z2’s history as irrelevant for
explanation in case C is partitioned by Z1 and Z2). Graphically, the im-
plications of this principle may be expressed in the semi-DAG by pruning
all irrelevant causal histories’ entry links into the EC clique. In the case
of our example above (observing X4 = 1 in the causal knowledge pattern
represented by figure 3.3), the singleton {Z2} would be said to strictly
explanatorily dominate (as the maximal set with this property) the set
{Z1}, since the deviant observation in X4 would be drawn on for explain-
ing the changed value of Z2, while the causal mechanism fZ1 would be
denied explanatory power – graphically expressed by pruning X1 A Z1
and X2 A Z1 (which makes Z1 an endogenous variable receiving its value
only from c←(z2) and dismisses the critical inconsistent case addressed
and barred by the Markov assumption/restriction in the first place).
Finally, if more than one of the exogenous predecessor variables of a cer-
tain EC clique exhibit deviant values (in some observed world ω), the
respective causal knowledge pattern only retains its value for prediction
and explanation in case the EC clique variables with deviant exogenous
predecessors receive compatible values. If this compatibility is not en-
sured, the causal knowledge pattern becomes useless for causal inference
(in ω) – none of the deviating causal histories of the respective EC clique
will be preferred above the others, and no recommendation for suitable
(graphical) restructuring can be read off the data at hand to possibly re-
establish the Markov condition (adjusted for semi-DAGs as explicated
above). This might lead to dismissing (or refining) the considered causal
knowledge pattern, ultimately, since the course of events ω calls for an
analysis differently structured (in more detail, respectively).
Interventions in causal histories of EC cliques and multiple
revisions in the graph28
Consider the left semi-DAG in figure 3.4 where node X2 is connected to
the EC clique X1 n X3 by the superstructure X1 B X2 A X3 such that
both variables X1 and X3 receive their values from the corresponding
28I am especially thankful to Manfred Schramm for helpful advice on how to pin
down the ideas in this section.
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causal mechanisms each of which only compute the value of X2 for this
task:
x1 = f1(x2) = c3,1(x3)
x3 = f3(x2) = c1,3(x1)
Now, if X3 were to be intervened on atomically, the local surgery remov-
ing the directed edge X2 A X3 should amount to lifting X3 from the
influence of X2 – but without further refinement it does not: The mod-
ification of the structural equations only renders the causal mechanism
for X3 void, but it leaves the deterministic epistemic contour intact such
that X3 might now be assigned its value by two contradicting equations.
X3 is still influenced indirectly by X2 in virtue of the epistemic contour
c1,3 along which the “flow of information” remains unblocked. To be able
to answer the question “What is the causal effect of doing x on some
epistemic contour?”, the influence of setting the variable X to the value
x on the variables in the respective EC clique must be uniquely com-
putable. In other words, determining the values of the variables in some
EC clique upon performing do(X = x) requires that
(i) the effect of doing X = x on the variables in this very EC clique
is identifiable, and
(ii) the affected variables in the EC clique (i. e., those with X as a
predecessor) are not explanatorily dominated by any set of vari-
ables that are not affected (such a dominating set would be any
set of variables whose orphan predecessors contain deviants possi-
bly leading to deviant values in the EC clique).
Pearl’s criterion of the identifiability of causal effects (see defini-
tion 2.10.1) must consequently be extended suitably to be applicable to
epistemic contours in causal knowledge patterns, too.
Definition 3.4.5 (Identifiability of Causal Effects on Epistemic
Contours)
The effect of the intervention do(X = x) on some EC clique is said to
be identifiable iff every variable in the EC clique that has X amongst its
predecessors becomes (in the graphical representation) d-separated from
PAX upon removing all links from PAX into X.
This criterion rules out the case of mixed influence – observational
and interventional at the same time – on variables in the respective
EC clique. If any path from deviant observation into the EC clique is
interrupted by the intervention, then this manipulation, hypothetically
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performed, may account for change in the EC clique. The values affected
by the intervention will now determine the values of all other variables
in this EC clique according to the following considerations, which shall
be split up into three cases, namely
A. direct interventions on EC clique variables,
B. single interventions above EC cliques, and
C. arbitrary compound interventions.
Case A. Direct interventions on EC clique variables. Any two
variables connected by an EC clique are strictly dependent, i. e., espe-
cially in the case of an EC clique of simultaneously exogenous variables
it becomes obvious that the Markov assumption of mutual independence
is overridden (locally for these variables) but can in principle be regained
by postulating that setting one variable in this EC clique sets all variables
in this EC clique in accordance with the pertaining epistemic contours.29
In the case of inner epistemic contours, whatever the causal mechanisms
may be for each of the entry points into a specific EC clique, setting one
variable effectively means that the complete EC clique is lifted from the
influence of the joint set of parents of all its variables. One variable could
not be set to the desired value if some other causal mechanism were to
interfere, but if the structural surgery is carried out and the assignment
performed, this must mean that no other influence overrides this inter-
vention. Graphically, intervening on one variable within an EC clique
cuts all links into this very EC clique, which receives its compatible val-
ues from the single do(·)-affected variable. Applying this principle to
the example above, intervening in the left graph of figure 3.4 by doing
X3 = x3 will not only remove X2 A X3 but also cut out X2 A X1. The
value of X1 is consequently assigned by c3,1(x3) after setting X3 to x3.
Compound interventions, if directly performed on EC cliques, are of
course required to not oppose each other. The following example shall
give an illustration of how causal inference would be rendered impossible
if such opposing interventions were not ruled out. After that, the special
case of ladder structures will be discussed in a second example below.
29Observing incompatible values in simultaneously exogenous EC clique variables
contradicts the CKP design in the first place and would naturally lead to dismissing
this structure.
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Example (Opposing interventions on EC clique variables)
Consider the pair of epistemic contours ci,j/cj,i represented in the semi-
DAG DK of the causal knowledge pattern K as the undirected edge c in
the structure Xi
cn Xj . This minimal EC clique is associated with the
pair of mutual assignments
xi = cj,i(xj) and
xj = ci,j(xi).
Setting either variable to a constant value by external intervention si-
multaneously determines the value of the second variable in accordance
with the system of equations above. Intervening on both variables at the
same time by joint manipulation causes trouble (in general) if the inter-
ventions are performed independently, since Xi and Xj might be assigned
values that are not compatible with the epistemic contour ci,j anymore
(and cj,i, respectively), as in the following situation where the two di-
chotomous variables Xi (taking distinct values xi or x
′
i) and Xj (taking
distinct values xj or x
′
j) are set simultaneously.
(i) ci,j = {〈xi, xj〉, 〈x
′
i, x
′
j〉}
(ii) cj,i = c
−1
i,j
(iii) Simultaneous manipulations (compound intervention):
do(Xi = xi) and do(Xj = x
′
j)
(iv) with do(Xi = xi): Xj assumes ci,j(xi) = xj
} 
(v) with do(Xj = x
′
j): Xi assumes cj,i(x
′
j) = x
′
i
Lines (iv) and (v) make the contradiction obvious: Setting the variables
in opposition to each other (‘opposed’ relative to ci,j/cj,i) makes the epis-
temic system collapse and renders further consistent inference impossible.
If hypothetical compound interventions are to be performed, at all, they
have to be performed in mutual dependence, i. e., by (systematically or
pragmatically) suitable restrictions embedded in the intuitions on which
the epistemic contours are formulated in the first place.30
Example (Intervening in ladder structures)
Consider the left diagram of figure 3.5, which exhibits a ladder struc-
ture, possibly connecting two frameworks of description with epistemic
30This is quite in analogy with the systematical and mathematical constraint in
Pearl’s causal models that no variable can be intervened on by multiple interventions
setting opposing values simultaneously.
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contours bridging corresponding atomic events in both systems (frame-
work A and B) along the development over time – the causal chains
X1 A X3 A X5 and X2 A X4 A X6 are multiply connected in this
graph. At each stage of the system’s development knowledge may be ex-
changed both ways.31 The causal histories on each side of the ladder are
(on a higher level) as tightly connected as their components. Now, in-
tervening on X2 by setting it to x2 should yield the same course of the
world as simply observing X2 = x2. X2 is an exogenous variable, after all
(which also means that X1 and X2 are simultaneously exogenous). The
value of X1 must only be computed by drawing on c2,1, in other words,
doing x2 also determines x1 and lifts both variables from the influence
of any potential latent background variable. If X4 is to be intervened on,
however, merely pruning the link X2 A X4 will not suffice for lifting X4
from the influence of X2, since the path X2 n X1 A X3 n X4 remains
unblocked. Again, X3 and X4 are marked as variables that cannot be de-
coupled and are only to be modified simultaneously. Consequently, doing
x4 must also lift X3 from the influence of its parent variables (X1 in this
case) and set X3 to c4,3(x4).
Case B. Single interventions above EC cliques. If the influence
of some variable to be intervened on on a specific EC clique is mediated
by causal mechanisms (i. e., by directed edges in the graph), then causal
reasoning can only be carried out non-paradoxically in case that (i) the
effect (on the EC clique) to be made out is identifiable and (ii) the value
brought about in the affected EC clique variables is not explanatorily
dominated by any set of non-affected variables in the same EC clique.
Example (Testing effects on EC cliques with independent histories)
Consider the middle diagram of figure 3.5 where the EC clique X5 n X6
is influenced along two separate causal histories that are purposely not
linked by further epistemic contours (e. g., between X1 and X2). These
strands might represent two alternative causal paths, e. g., two different
experimental designs producing strictly correlated observations X5 and
X6 (by actively deviating from the passive default situations in X1 or
X2). X5 n X6 acts like a logical OR: Intervening on X3 will remove
the directed edge X1 A X3 and virtually decouple the causal histories of
X5 and X6 (for X2 assuming its default value) by graphically removing
the entry link X4 A X6 (whose pertaining causal history – default in
character – can be called irrelevant in the sense of def. 3.4.4).
31The epistemic contours depicted in the graph of figure 3.5 are labeled with the
name of only one of the functions they represent – c1,2 also signifies c2,1 in accordance
with definition 3.3.2 above.
Causality as epistemic principle 109
X1
X3
X5
X2
X4
X6
c1,2
c3,4
c5,6
X1 X2
X3 X4
X5 X6
c5,6
X1
X2 X3
X4 X5
c4,5
Fig. 3.5: In ladder structures (illustrated in the left graph) information is ex-
changed between both chains at each stage. The middle and the right
graph show examples of differently structured causal histories leading
up to X4 and X5.
Example (Testing effects on EC cliques with converging histories)
The right diagram of figure 3.5 shows an epistemic contour X4 n X5
whose variables’ causal histories converge in X1. Now, intervening on
X1 does not pose any problem for the value assignment to X4 and X5,
since the formulation of the systems of equations for each causal history
warrants consistent outcomes. Intervening on X3, however, cuts the link
X1 A X3 and might result in contradicting (incompatible) value assign-
ments to X4 and X5, because X4 is still potentially influenced by X1 as
well. The effect of setting X3 to x3 is not identifiable in accordance with
definition 3.4.5 above: Pruning X1 A X3 does not lift X4 from the in-
fluence of PA3 (X3’s parents), and X3 is at the same time an element of
the set of X4’s predecessors.
32
Intervening on X2, however, will result in removing the edges X1 A X2
and X3 A X2 simultaneously such that the effect of do(X2 = x2) on the
EC clique X4 n X5 is analyzed as identifiable. Now, if X1 exhibits its
default value, X5 will also, and the set {X5} will consequently not ex-
planatorily dominate the set {X4} of variables affected by doing x2. The
causal history of X5 will be rendered void by removing the edge X3 A X5
32This analysis is analogous to applying Pearl’s criterion for the identifiability
of causal effects (see definition 2.10.1) together with the back-door criterion (see
definition 2.10.2) in Bayes net causal models without undirected edges; the analogy
can be seen directly when X4 and X5 are pulled together into a compound node.
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(thereby re-establishing the extended Markov restriction for world ω with
X1 at its default value and attributing explanatory power to X4 with its
pertaining history).
Case C. Arbitrary compound interventions. Performing multiple
interventions simultaneously can be done by securing the above condi-
tions (i. e., identifiability and non-dominatedness) under the additionally
imposed restriction that – as in the case of intervening on EC cliques di-
rectly – arbitrary interventions must not lead to opposing values within
the same EC clique, i. e., the set of affected variables in some specific
EC clique may only show compatible values upon intervening. Then, as
before, all remaining causal histories (if they do not produce a set of ex-
planatorily dominating variables) may be deactivated by removing their
entry links to the EC clique under consideration. Again, this ensures
consistent causal inference and explicates graphically what decoupling
experimental designs means.
In conclusion, all the above cases show how consistent inference from type
causal structures becomes partly relativized to token causal findings in
that the default situations mark certain subsets of possible worlds (i. e.,
courses of events) and thereby facilitate prediction, explanation, and –
ultimately – compact formulation of target-oriented strategy even in the
case of independent alternative causal histories.
From epistemic contours onwards
When considering edges directed away from EC cliques, things stand
differently. The right diagram of figure 3.4 shows the situation where
information from the EC clique is jointly used for the computation of
X2’s value x2. In this case, X2 seems to be jointly causally influenced
by both of its parents, and intervening on X2 correctly lifts it from the
influence of its parents, but the formulation of the causal mechanism
pertaining to X2 can be reduced in the following manner:
x2 = f2(x1, x3)
= f2(x1, c1,3(x1)) = f
′
2(x1)
= f2(c3,1(x3), x3) = f
′′
2 (x3)
This shows that one of the arrows pointing towards X2 is superfluous for
the propagation of knowledge, i. e., this piece of structural information
does not give us any additional computational information we did not
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have before. The value of X2 can be calculated from one of the nodes
within the EC clique alone. Since all epistemic contours are just as
stable and autonomous as the causal mechanisms in the causal knowledge
pattern, one of the functions of the pair c1,3/c3,1 can thus be coded
into f2 directly, which basically makes f2 a function of x1 alone (of x3,
respectively), as given above by f ′2 (by f
′′
2 , respectively). One of the links
X1 A X2 or X3 A X2 can thus be called a pseudo-link just as a directed
node connection that is removed in the process of refining the model –
going from the fully connected graph to a slimmer version – aiming at
specifying the examined situation in the most informative way for the
derivation of meaningful causal claims. In the case of slimming down the
fully connected directed graph just as in the case of deleting superfluous
pseudo-links, the principle of Occam’s razor and good implementation
practice tell us that introducing (or upholding) redundant information is
to be avoided.33 I believe this idea also appertains to the features of the
economical principle of knowledge organization called causality in this
account. As a structural rule, collider nodes in a semi-DAG linked to
more than one parent node of the same EC clique may in many cases be
reduced away for reasons of economy (unless associations along different
paths are precisely to be emphasized as in cases of decision making, see
section 4.1).
Mimicking hypothetical interventions and learning by ab-
duction
The above explications elaborate how contradictory conclusions from
knowledge represented in causal knowledge patterns can be avoided by
adding one more ingredient – default assignments. If observation is over-
ridden by external manipulation, though, testing for compatible values
in epistemic contours helps the researcher rule out contradictory exper-
iments (relative to a subset of possible worlds) or experimental designs
altogether (if two independent designs never yield consistent values or
only trivially in one marked possible world). The question, what manip-
ulations go together well and what manipulations are to be avoided for
which obtaining observations is answered by the above rules.
33Note that introducing epistemic contours is not understood as falling under this
verdict in the first place, since the variables connected by epistemic contours still
convey intensional knowledge and additional connotations that might be exploited in
the further augmentation of the causal knowledge pattern under consideration. This
does not hold for superfluous directed edges as in the example, since they can be
reduced mathematically. Also see Pearl’s short remark on model preference and
Occam’s razor in [Pearl 2009, sect. 2.3, pp. 45 ff.].
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Turning this very question around, one might consider epistemic contours
that bridge technical or descriptive frameworks within one causal knowl-
edge pattern such that, e. g., Xi
cn Xj represents this inter-framework
bridge with Xi belonging to framework A and Xj belonging to frame-
work B. When manipulating the direct causes of Xi within framework
A, a typical answer we might look for now is what the corresponding in-
tervention in framework B would be in order to bring about Xj . Causal
knowledge patterns serve as oracles of abduction for this kind of coun-
terfactual deliberations.
X1
X2 X3
X4 X5
c
do(X1 = x1)
x3 = c2,3(f2(x1)) = f3(x4, x5)
Fig. 3.6: Intervening on the variable X1 in the semi-DAG given here yields
knowledge about possible interventions “across c” that would be nec-
essary to bring about some realization of X3 directly through joint
manipulation of X4 and X5.
The illustration in figure 3.6 shows a semi-DAG with the epistemic
contour c possibly bridging two descriptive frameworks A and B with
X1, X2 situated in framework A and X3, X4, X5 in framework B. In-
tervening on X1 by doing X1 = x1 enables us to read off the graph the
value of X3 computable by x3 = c2,3(x2) (where x2 is calculated through
x2 = f2(x1)). The given causal knowledge pattern marks X4 and X5 as
direct causes of X3, setting X3’s value according to the causal mecha-
nism f3, such that x3 = f3(x4, x5) when the arrows pointing towards
X3 are not removed but kept intact. Having all this knowledge at hand
makes the causal knowledge pattern an informant about hypothetical
interventions in framework B that entail the same assignment to X3 as
the one just brought about indirectly by hypothetical intervention within
framework A. The set of possible, simultaneous compound interventions
on X4 and X5 entailing X3’s realization c2,3(f2(x1)) is the set
−1
f3 [c2,3(x2)]
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which is the set of inverse images of c2,3(x2) under f3, defined by
−1
fj [ci,j(vi)] = {paj | fj(paj) = ci,j(vi)}
with fj being the causal mechanism for Vj and paj representing the
(vector of) values of all parents (i. e., direct causes) of Vj .
34 Of course,
iterated application of this abductive step will yield information about
causal histories of any length.35
3.5 Reviewing the framework
Someone objecting to the implementation of epistemic contours in an
extension of the manipulationist Bayes nets framework might argue that
the nodes of one EC clique represent events that are not distinct – quite
on the contrary, they are even strictly correlated – and should as such
not be included in a well-designed causal model. The critic might add,
there is nothing more to causal dependence than given in Bayesian nets,
and epistemic contours or the intuition behind those should merely be
guidelines in the modeling process, which ultimately yields well-known
standard Bayes net causal models with all nodes denoting extension-
ally disjoint regions in spacetime.36 This all might be crucial consid-
erations in the business of equipping robots or inference machines with
basic constraints on what to read off the noise acquired through their
sensors – on whatever level of abstraction these might operate. In the
case of tracing the mechanics of human causal reasoning (expressed in
everyday language or specialized jargon), things lie differently. Pearl
himself emphasizes the recourse to basal causal assumptions when the
epidemiologist builds a causal model or when we discuss politics in pri-
vate. If the intuitions behind epistemic contours serve as guidelines in
this modeling process, they might as well be embedded in a suitably
modified framework that allows for making explicit how we arrive at the
blueprints of interrelated events structured by causal knowledge. Large
portions of what we know about the relations of the events surrounding
us is built upon non-causal data, i. e., as in the current proposal, deter-
ministic non-directional knowledge. Epistemic contours, as introduced
34This notation is adapted from [Link 2009, p. 433] where Link defines the set
“Urbildmenge von B unter f ” as
−1
f [B] := {x | f(x) ∈ B}.
35See also sect. 2.11 for a presentation of Pearl’s adaptation of the concept of
abduction to the analysis of actual causes in epistemically related twin networks.
36For a discussion of discerning events and times in the business of causal modeling
see [Hitchcock (forthcoming)].
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above, are included in shared bodies of information either (i) tentatively
until theories are unified or concepts matched and labeled with the same
name tag (thereby reducing the contents of the model to extensionally
disjoint denotata) or (ii) purposely to mark intensions, aspects, perspec-
tives, jargon, or frameworks or (iii) even because spatio-temporal locality
or contiguity seems to be violated in the setting under consideration and
the purely mechanistic framework fails to yield some insightful rendition.
The embedding of non-causal knowledge for causal inference and for com-
municating (indirect) causal relations is facilitated by construing causal
knowledge patterns in the unified formal system proposed above.37
The approach given here accounts for causal relations as epistemic re-
lations by which knowledge is organized efficiently. It can be understood
as a uniform account that does not treat causal claims pluralistically
within their respective domains but on the contrary facilitates the unifi-
cation of heterogeneous levels or disciplines in the same formal structure.
Causal inference remains frame-relative with the shape of those frames
being due to our cognitive faculty of carving out subsystems from what
we perceive around us.38 This does not put off events to the realm of
pure imagination (or mental representation) but allows us to retain a
solid event realism such that causal relations epistemically hold between
representations of real (i. e., physically ontological) events. Following
Pearl, analysis builds upon type knowledge and goes from there to to-
ken claims. It does so non-reductively in one sense – with causation being
defined in terms of basal causal assumptions – and reductively in another
– by deriving higher-level causal claims from lower-level ones. Causal-
ity becomes an epistemic principle of organizing knowledge efficiently by
ordering it deterministically – always with the possibility of also eval-
uating probabilistic causal claims as propagation of belief blurred by
unmeasured influences. Relying on the Bayes net framework, the CKP
toolbox can readily be applied to the same settings as causal models.
It will, however, be able to also treat examples that incorporate events
which are entangled in epistemic manner or only turn out to be so in
virtue of the extended capabilities of causal knowledge patterns.
37Point (i) above contains that in the CKP framework knowledge used for making
causal claims can be explicated formally as a basis for experts to start disentangling
(or unifying) variables – maybe of different levels of explanation – to tell us how
things work physically ontologically if this is the aim of research and if the situation
under consideration permits such an analysis, at all.
38Questions of model evocation and model revision must be put aside here to further
examinations in induction, abstraction, and belief revision.
Chapter 4
Modeling with causal
knowledge patterns
What our eyes behold may
well be the text of life but
one’s meditations on the text
and the disclosures of these
meditations are no less a part
of the structure of reality
Wallace Stevens, Three
Academic Pieces – no. 1
4.1 Causal decision theory, or:
Of prisoners and predictors
Decision theory in general examines the rational principles guiding the
decisions that aim at the attainment of one’s goals. Causal decision the-
ory does so by taking one’s act’s consequences into account – rationally
choosing an option must be based on the available knowledge about the
causal relations in the respective situation, so the argument goes. One
of the principles taken to be a measure for rationality is the option of
maximizing the utility of the outcome, i. e., by making the outcome equal
or better than if one had chosen a different alternative for action. Prob-
abilities and utilities are used to compute an act’s expected utility such
that – as emphasized in causal decision theory – dependence between
acts and outcomes are understood as of causal (asymmetrical) character
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– contrary to a merely evidential theory of decision making. A second
principle of rationality dictates choosing the course of action that is bet-
ter, regardless of what the world is like. This principle of dominance
seems to be in conflict with the above-mentioned principle of expected-
utility maximization in the curious case of Newcomb’s paradox.
Newcomb, Nozick, and a problem
Referring back to the physicist William Newcomb, who first formulated
this dilemma for decision theory, Robert Nozick elaborates on – as he
calls it – Newcomb’s problem, in which two principles of rational choice
seemingly conflict each other, at least in the numerous renditions in the
vast literature on this topic.1
In Newcomb’s problem some human-like agent plays a game against
some daemon predictor that influences the course of the game upon pre-
dicting his opponent’s move. The agent may choose to take either one
or two boxes in front of him – either box 1 only or box 1 and 2 together.
In doing so he has no knowledge about the contents of the opaque box 1,
but he can see one thousand dollars lying in box 2. If the daemon pre-
dicts that the agent will take only one box (i. e., box 1), he will put
one million dollars in the opaque box 1. The daemon will put nothing
in box 1, though, if he foresees the agent taking both boxes. The pre-
diction is reliable, or as Nozick introduces the predictor, “[o]ne might
tell a longer story, but all this leads you to believe that almost certainly
this being’s prediction about [the agent’s] choice in the situation to be
discussed will be correct.”2 Moreover, the agent has perfect knowledge
of all these features of the decision game he finds himself in.3
The possible outcomes of the game are presented in table 4.1 where the
rows stand for the agent’s options, the columns partition the world in
possible states, and each cell contains the sum our agent receives upon
choosing an action in some state of the world.
1Cf. [Nozick 1969] for the original presentation of the paradox and [Weirich 2008]
for an overview on various suggestions of how to solve the Newcomb case.
2Cf. [Nozick 1969, p. 114].
3Note that for reasons of simplicity this presentation of the Newcomb game situa-
tion slightly (but inessentially) differs from the way Nozick originally presents it in
[Nozick 1969].
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prediction: one-boxing prediction: two-boxing
take box 1 $ 1M $ 0
take box 1 and 2 $ 1M + $ 1T $ 1T
Table 4.1: Possible outcomes in Newcomb’s problem for the options of taking
box 1 only (taking boxes 1 and 2, respectively) and for correct and
incorrect predictions made by the daemon.
Now, what makes Newcomb’s case so problematic is the fact that the
choice of action seems to depend on the choice of the principle one applies
in rationalizing the situation. Two principles seem to be concurring
candidates in reasoning about Newcomb’s problem, which – although
unrealistic – seems to trigger solid intuitions about the decision theoretic
norms to be applied here.4 The rationales of maximizing expected utility
and of choosing dominating options are defined in the following.
Definition 4.1.1 (Maximum Expected Utility Principle)5
Among those actions available to a person, he should perform an action
with maximal expected utility.
The expected utility EU (A) of an action A yielding the exclusive out-
comes O1, . . . , On with probabilities P (O1), . . . , P (On) and corresponding
utilities U(O1), . . . , U(On) is calculated by the weighted sum
n
∑
i=1
P (Oi)× U(Oi).
Definition 4.1.2 (Dominance Principle)6
If there is a partition of world states such that, relative to it, action A
weakly dominates action B, then A should be performed rather than B.
Action A weakly dominates action B for person P iff, for each state of
the world, P either prefers the consequence of A to the consequence of
B, or is indifferent between the two consequences, and for some state of
the world, P prefers the consequence of A to the consequence of B.
4
Nozick himself obviously put the story on the test bench: “I should add that
I have put this problem to a large number of people, both friends and students in
class. To almost everyone it is perfectly clear and obvious what should be done. The
difficulty is that theses people seem to divide almost evenly on the problem, with
large numbers thinking that the opposing half is just being silly.” – cf. [Nozick 1969,
p. 117].
5This definition is adapted from [Nozick 1969, p. 118].
6This definition is adapted from [Nozick 1969, p. 118].
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Let us take ‘reliable’ (as ascribed to the daemon’s faculty of foreseeing
future events) at face value and compute the expected utility for the
outcome of each specific course of the game – the unit of the expected
utility being dollars in our case. Assuming a reliable daemon basically
amounts to saying that the act of taking one or both boxes and the
prediction of this very act are highly correlated such that acts in states
of the world with incorrect predictions receive a probability of 0, whereas
matching acts and predictions receive the probability of 1. Table 4.2
shows the expected utilities for all four thinkable courses of the game
with one option clearly to be preferred over all others: The agent should
take only the opaque box and can then be certain of winning $ 1M, which
clearly supercedes the alternatives as maximum expected utility.
prediction: one-boxing prediction: two-boxing
take box 1 $ 1M $ 0
take box 1 and 2 $ 0 $ 1T
Table 4.2: Computing expected utilities in the case of a perfectly reliable pre-
diction yields the utility of $ 0 for all cells representing incorrect
predictions. Maximizing this expected utility amounts to choosing
only box 1.
Pondering a different approach to maximizing the outcome of the
game, Nozick tweaks the story a little: The predictor did make his
prediction a week ago, and it is now the agent’s turn to make up his
mind and take either only the opaque box 1 or on top of that also the
transparent second box 2, which contains one thousand dollars openly
visible to the agent. The money is already there and will not be taken out
of the boxes anymore after the agent has made a decision. So, regardless
of the daemon’s prediction, adopting the principle of dominance forces
the agent to take both boxes – he will always end up with one thousand
dollars more than if he had only taken one box. Taking both boxes even
strictly dominates the act of taking only one box as can be read off table
4.1 by comparing an entry in the second line to the entry in the first line
within the same partition of the world’s states.
Obviously, the principle of maximizing expected utilities and the
principle of dominance yield opposing recommendations to the delib-
erating agent. While standard evidential decision theory seems to lean
towards one-boxing (taking an agent’s act as a sign of what the prediction
must have been), causal decision theorists clearly position themselves on
Modeling with causal knowledge patterns 119
the side of two-boxing (rejecting backward causation and understanding
the agent’s deliberate decision as cutting any connection between act
and prediction). When Judea Pearl within his interventionist account
of causal reasoning discusses model-internal observed acts and model-
altering actions from outside, he also comes to reflect upon the concep-
tual difficulties hidden in Newcomb’s problem:
The confusion between actions and acts has led to Newcomb’s para-
dox (Nozick 1969) and other oddities in the so-called evidential de-
cision theory, which encourages decision makers to take into con-
sideration the evidence that an action would provide, if enacted.
This bizarre theory seems to have loomed from Jeffrey’s influential
book The Logic of Decision (Jeffrey 1965), in which actions are
treated as ordinary events (rather than interventions) and, accord-
ingly, the effects of actions are obtained through conditionalization
rather than through a mechanism-modifying operation like do(x).7
When Pearl goes on by comparing the maxims of evidential and causal
decision theory, he baldly comments in a footnote:
I purposely avoid the common title “causal decision theory” in order
to suppress even the slightest hint that any alternative, noncausal
theory can be used to guide decisions.8
To reconcile the dominance principle with the expected-utility princi-
ple – and hence to dissolve the paradox in Newcomb’s case – has been
the aim of quite a few proposals, which nevertheless arrive at different
conclusions.
Conditionals and causal graphs
In A Theory of Conditionals (1968) Robert Stalnaker suggests a for-
mal framework for analyzing the truth of counterfactual statements (sub-
junctive conditionals) quite similar to Lewis’ proposal sketched above –
‘If A, then B’ is assigned a truth value in accordance with the following
informal condition:
Consider a possible world in which A is true, and which otherwise
differs minimally from the actual world. ‘If A, then B’ is true
(false) just in case B is true (false) in that possible world.9
7Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 108].
8Cf. [Pearl 2009, p. 108, footnote 1].
9Cf. [Stalnaker 1968, p. 169].
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The subjunctive connective ‘>’ is subsequently equipped with the more
formal semantical rules
A > B is true in α if B is true in f(A,α) and
A > B is false in α if B is false in f(A,α),
where α is a possible world, the base world, and β = f(A,α) represents
the selected world minimally differing from the actual world in which B
is evaluated (with f being the selection function operating on a suitable
similarity ordering of possible worlds).
Now, in his Letter to David Lewis (1972) Stalnaker suggests a
way of calculating expected utilities in the Newcomb problem that uses
probabilities of subjunctive conditionals instead of standard conditional
probabilities.10 The expected utility of some action A would then be
computed the following way:
EU (A) =
n
∑
i=1
P (A > Si)× U(A&Si),
where n signifies the amount of states S the world is partitioned into,
i. e., n = 2 for the two possible predictions ‘one-boxing’ (i = 1) and
‘two-boxing’ (i = 2). As Stalnaker argues, the agent’s action does not
cause the daemon’s prediction made in the past, and hence the probabil-
ity of the conditional equals the probability of the prediction alone. But
this sets all probability terms in the sum formula above to equal values
– the utilities can just be read off the corresponding cells in table 4.1.
Two-boxing’s expected utility will always be greater then one-boxing’s
expected utility. Following Robert Stalnaker’s suggestion of inter-
preting the involved probabilities causally, the maximization of expected
utility and the dominance principle recommend taking the same action:
two-boxing.
Applying causal decision theory to Newcomb’s problem has been crit-
icized by many authors – mainly because it yields the counter-intuitive
recommendation of taking both boxes, which nevertheless remains as the
only rationally explained choice given the circumstances of Newcomb’s
problem with decisions screening off acts from any previous events, as
causal decision theorists claim. In his seminal book The Foundations of
Causal Decision Theory James Joyce clearly states his position on the
issue:
10Cf. for this and the following [Weirich 2008, sect. 2.2].
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When the evidential and the causal import of actions diverge [. . . ],
the evidential theory tells decision makers to put the pursuit of
good news ahead of the pursuit of good results. Many philosophers,
I among them, see this as a mistake. Rational agents choose acts
on the basis of their causal efficacy, not their auspiciousness; they
act to bring about good results even when doing so might betoken
bad news.11
While, e. g., David Lewis and Brian Skyrms in their accounts mark
attainable situations by building causal information into states of the
world and thereby reconcile the above otherwise diverging principles of
rational choice in the recommendation of two-boxing, Ellery Eells in his
considerations arrives at the same conclusion without drawing on the no-
tion of causality. He claims that mere reflection on the available evidence
will force the agent to rationally go for both boxes – even more direct
without the recourse to any causal theory. Quite in this line of reasoning
Richard Jeffrey also eliminates any hint of a causal nexus between
the events in Newcomb’s problem for the sake of a less metaphysically
charged analysis. Pondering the Newcomb case Jeffrey seems to oscil-
late between one-boxing and two-boxing to later arrive at the conclusion
that the story, presented this way, is a somehow illegitimate decision
problem with the freely deliberating agent not capable of freeing his
decision from being correlated with the predictor’s prediction.12 Terry
Horgan and Paul Horwich take the Newcomb plot at face value and
promote one-boxing, simply because one-boxers ultimately take more
money home, as the story is told. Paul Weirich diagnoses dryly: “The
main rationale for one-boxing is that one-boxers fare better than do two-
boxers. Causal decision theorists respond that Newcomb’s problem is an
unusual case that rewards irrationality. One-boxing is irrational even if
one-boxers prosper.”13
Having developed his ranking theory as a tool for epistemology and
causal analysis,14 Wolfgang Spohn positions himself on the side of causal
(vs. evidential) decision theory and had been a strong advocate of two-
boxing for a long time before he started “Reversing 30 Years of Discus-
sion” by presenting an elaborate argumentation “Why Causal Decision
Theorists Should One-Box.”15
11Cf. [Joyce 1999, p. 146].
12Cf. e. g. [Joyce 2007].
13Cf. [Weirich 2008, sect. 2.5].
14Cf. Spohn: Ranking Theory (forthcoming).
15The quotations here refer to the title of [Spohn (forthcoming)].
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Fig. 4.1: Wolfgang Spohn discusses the usual manipulated (mutilated) causal
graph (i) employed by causal decision theorists for the analysis of the
Newcomb problem, the decision graph (ii) for the same situation, and
the reflexive decision graph (iii) augmented by the decision node B∗.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the golden thread in Spohn’s chain of reason-
ing. Time evolves from top to bottom in all three diagrams. The left
diagram (i) shows the standard rendition used by causal decision the-
orists for the analysis of the Newcomb problem – this mutilated causal
graph contains the node P representing the daemon’s prediction as the
first event in time before action node B (representing the agent taking
one or two boxes) and the bottom node M (for monetary outcome).
The diagram is mutilated quite in agreement with Pearl’s intervention-
ist framework: The hypothetical local surgery, i. e., the intervention on
B, prunes any arrows possibly pointing towards B, thereby freeing this
node from the influence of any other node in the model and making the
corresponding variable an exogenous one. The course of action can now
be chosen on the basis of this decision graph, in which the wiggled vari-
able is graphically represented by the square node. This rendition follows
the two decision theoretic principles highlighted by Spohn in this con-
text: “acts are exogenous” and – derived from the first – “no probabilities
for acts.” Of course, Spohn’s acts have to be interpreted as Pearl’s
actions (i. e., acts in mutilated models). Whatever the connection be-
tween nodes P and B might have been in some graphical rendition of the
original causal relations understood as representing the Newcomb plot
(e. g., with P as a direct cause of B), graph (i) in figure 4.1 represents
the variables’ dependencies once the agent deliberately takes action. P
and B are d-separated (by the collider in P A M B B), which makes
the choice of taking both boxes rational – whatever has been put into the
boxes (based upon the prediction early in the game) will not become less
by choosing either one or, alternatively, two boxes (later in the game).
Modeling with causal knowledge patterns 123
Spohn declares himself dissatisfied with this analysis and brings up
the mind-bugging questions about the reliability of the daemon, again:
What about the remarkable success of the predictor that suggests
that given you one-box it is very likely that she will have predicted
that you will one-box, and likewise for two-boxing? How do they
enter the picture? They don’t. [Causal decision theorists] do not
deny them, but they take great pains to explain that they are not the
ones to be used in practical deliberation calculating expected utili-
ties; and they diverge in how exactly to conceive of the subjective
probabilities to be used instead.16
If the causal graph contained one more arrow from B to P , making the
agent’s action a direct cause of the daemon’s prediction (as illustrated in
figure 4.1, diagram (ii)), we would inevitably introduce backward causa-
tion into the analysis. Spohn wants to avoid this but interprets graph (ii)
as the decision-guiding pattern which the agent uses to choose between
alternative actions – in Spohn’s terms: the ordinary decision graph for
Newcomb’s problem. How are the causal relations laid out, however?
If neither the prediction causes the agent’s act nor this act can cause
the daemon’s prediction, we have to infer the existence of an earlier
third event as a common cause of both P and B – quite in accordance
with Reichenbach’s Common Cause Principle. Spohn’s straightfor-
ward suggestion is to understand the decision situation the agent finds
himself in as the common cause in question. This decision situation
B∗ (as introduced into graph (iii) in figure 4.1) might consist of all the
agent’s beliefs, prior knowledge, or rational principles the agent may not
even be aware of (the daemon is, however) but which he will without fail
employ in deciding about his strategy B when standing before the two
boxes. In particular, B∗ also contains the full ordinary decision-guiding
pattern (ii), which makes graph (iii) a reflexive decision graph containing
a reduced version of itself.17 Making this move, Spohn openly rejects the
“acts are exogenous” principle. An agent’s strategic deliberation about
alternative courses of action does not decouple the act from past or fu-
ture events – he might, quite on the contrary, make his deliberations
depend on (i. e., graphically speaking, link them to) predecessor nodes in
the diagram. He might, on top of that, also be aware of the probabilities
of different actions he may choose from, knowing what he usually does
or intentionally avoids in normal cases etc. There might be probabilities
16Cf. [Spohn (forthcoming), p. 4].
17
Spohn gives clear rules for the step-wise reduction of a reflexive decision graph
to its ordinary counterpart possibly containing backward links – cf. [Spohn (forth-
coming), sect. 3].
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for the agent’s act, after all. Querying Spohn’s reflexive decision graph
on the ground of all these considerations ultimately yields the recom-
mendation of one-boxing – after reflecting on the current situation (in
B∗), the rational agent must come to the unequivocal conclusion that
deciding to one-box and acting accordingly simply maximizes the utility
of his act B.
Let us compare Spohn’s analysis with Pearl’s causal maxims, once
more. The ordinary decision graph (as displayed in figure 4.1.ii) fully
complies with what Pearl would devise for strategic reasoning, i. e.,
a graph that simulates possible outcomes of hypothetical interventions.
Setting B tells us the value of M . B is an exogenous variable such that
the “acts are exogenous” principle is adhered to – act and action amount
to the same consequence in this case. The evidential and the causal
approach perfectly concord in this diagram, were it not for the directed
backward edge B A P . This is the reason for Pearl to think directly
in terms of the mutilated graph (given in figure 4.1.i) and for Spohn to
call diagram 4.1.ii not causal but reduced, ordinary decision graph. In
the further step of construing the reflexive decision graph 4.1.iii, Spohn
must reject the “acts are exogenous” principle and convincingly argues
for his case: The hypothetical intervention on the variable B must not
be performed within the reflexive decision graph. This graph makes
explicit what it means for the agent to be rational, i. e., he acts on his
knowledge, principles, and rational considerations given in B∗. Pruning
the link B∗ A B would make the agent plainly irrational and ignorant of
his own situation, since the deliberation process is pushed into the model.
Technical answers to questions about how to properly reduce reflex-
ive decision graphs to their ordinary, structural counterparts can all be
found in Spohn’s explications. Conceptual questions remain, however.18
Firstly, the introduction of a common cause for B and P essentially adds
to the Newcomb’s story the idea of being (perhaps physically determi-
nately) pre-disposed. In a way, this metaphysically overloads the already
artificially construed plot with another element just by drawing on Rei-
chenbach’s principle of the common cause. Moreover, it forces Spohn
to set apart the agent’s inclinations to take certain actions from the acts
themselves. Decision making in the game is consequently re-interpreted
as only discovering one’s previously fixed inclinations (where discovery is
18I am thankful to Wilken Steiner for valuable discussions of Newcomb’s problem
and Spohn’s treatment of it.
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not something brought about actively, e. g., such that it would manifest
itself in hypothetical test interventions, but simply a feature of persistent
rationality becoming evident). This rendition seems very far from the
much more intuitive interventionist framework, which merely requires
the agent to bear a confined mini laboratory in his head and turn the
knobs therein – knowledge about the mechanisms will yield unique vir-
tual outcomes and guide decision making. Nevertheless, Spohn’s com-
plex reflexive decision graph does rest in its core on the very simple
ordinary reduced decision graph (figure 4.1.ii) to which the whole bur-
den of explanation is shifted, which shall be looked at more closely in the
following. What can be the content of this reduced graph, after all? If
the link B A P is dismissed as causal relation, of what nature can it be?
If it, on the other hand, does stand for some hidden causal connection
and is dismissed as backward causation, it must represent a causal link
through some obscure common cause. If this common parent node of
both P and B is the decision situation again – just as in the reflexive
graph on the meta level – analysis enters an infinite regress at this point.
Only the interventionist approach could prevent this from happening by
pruning B A P , but then this would already apply on the upper level
in the reflexive decision graph and conflict with Spohn’s final conclu-
sion. If the supposed common cause in figure 4.1.ii is interpreted as
some irreducible obscure past event or state whose existence just has to
be acknowledged and whose link to B shall not be interrupted, then how
would it be possible to perform hypothetical test interventions on this
very node to virtually maximize the outcome? If reflecting on this graph
ultimately comes down to just observing the propagation of values, then,
one has to conclude, Spohn’s suggestion is constrained to stay within
evidential reasoning.
Foreseeing acts, foreseeing actions19
What the backward link B A P in graph 4.1.ii can possible mean shall
in the following be made explicit within the CKP framework, thereby
ideally revealing more about the nature of the paradox and hopefully
illuminating some more features of how we reason with (non-)causal
knowledge. The causal knowledge pattern in figure 4.2 traces the story
of Newcomb’s problem by only referring to the events that actually are
in the narration. The problem is not treated by tweaking the story but
by choosing a framework fit to accommodate all relevant concepts.
19I have greatly benefitted from discussing Newcomb’s problem and the concept of
rationality with Olivier Roy for whose comments on this section I am very thankful.
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D
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Fig. 4.2: Newcomb’s problem with the act of taking one or two boxes (B) de-
terministically connected to the daemon’s reliable prediction (P1) by
an epistemic contour (c) in this causal knowledge pattern.
Our human-like agent deliberates about the situation he finds himself
in and decides what to do (D), namely if he takes one box or both boxes
(B). The daemon predicts what the agent will do (P1) and prepares
the boxes accordingly (P2). The monetary outcome (M) should finally
reward the rational agent. Time evolves from top to bottom in the di-
agram.20 The vertical positioning of P2 is inessential for the analysis of
the situation (P2 could as well come after B if the game is set up in
a way that the agent only writes down his choice on a sheet of paper
secretly in step B). The daemon’s prediction together with its reliability
is interpreted in this causal knowledge pattern as an undirected 1-1 rela-
tionship. Neither would we say that the agent’s act genuinely causes the
prediction of this very act, nor does it sound right to say the prediction
causes the predicted event.21 But there is more in the pattern: B is
not directly linked to the daemon’s preparation of the boxes P2 – this
connection is mediated by the prediction P1, which has direct causal in-
fluence on P2 in turn. This is quite in agreement with Spohn’s analysis
that the causal structure of the Newcomb problem should exhibit some
node previous to both players’ acts in the game that at the same time
takes care of the bidirectional transfer of belief. P1 and P2 are separated
in the causal knowledge pattern for this very reason. On the other side,
D (the human-like agent’s decision situation) and B (his concrete move
in the game – either taking one or both boxes) are separated, as well, to
20Note that this diagram graphically reverses Spohn’s rendition where time evolves
from bottom to top.
21Moreover, as is argued here, drawing on Reichenbach’s Common Cause Princi-
ple for an explication of ‘prediction’ is precisely a source of counter-intuitive inference.
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disentangle conceptually what it means for the agent to spontaneously
and possibly unforeseenly change his mind. This is a much-discussed
issue in the literature and does pose additional problems if the modeling
allows for the agent changing his mind and the daemon’s prediction re-
ferring to the ‘wrong’ decision. Not so in the suggested causal knowledge
pattern, which links the prediction P1 to the agent’s final act B however
often he may have made up or changed his mind before actually taking
only one or, after all, both boxes. In other words, pondering courses of
action must focus on B bearing the whole burden of explanation in the
process of finding the best strategy for the maximization of the outcome.
This is exactly as Nozick tells the story.
The modeling does not draw on the insertion of backward links that
would signify backward causal flow. Nevertheless, information is trans-
ferred back in time along the epistemic contour c, thereby formally grasp-
ing the very meaning of ‘prediction.’ c will not get cut off by any local
surgery of the graph. By suitably applying hypothetical test interven-
tions the following contents can be read off the causal knowledge pattern
– quite in accordance with intuition:
• The agent’s decision (D) causes his act (B) – in general: any causal
history of B naturally influences the agent’s act causally;
• the agent’s decision (D) is also interpreted as causing the daemon’s
peculiar prediction (P1) and thereby also as causing the daemon’s
particular move in the game (P2);
• intuition also conforms with the claim that the agent’s taking one
or two boxes (B) causes his antagonist’s preparation of the boxes
– the predictor reacts to (B), after all;
• nevertheless, the agent’s act (B) does not cause its own peculiar
prediction (P1) but determines it uniquely and – looking at the pat-
tern from above – simultaneously though backwards through time.
Now, especially the last point reveals the core of the paradox and
localizes the difficulties in reasoning about the causal relations involved.
Any attempt of solving the artificial plot of Newcomb’s problem hinges
on the question how to embed the concept of reliably predicting future
events into the formal analysis (if such an analysis is not denied in the
first place exactly because of the fictional character of the narration).
The causal knowledge pattern above presents the prediction as the very
thing it is – an image of the agent’s act. Backward links are excluded
from this rendition while querying the pattern does yield indirect causal
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claims referring back across time. This interpretation would of course
not stand physically ontologically based scrutiny, but it conforms with
our concepts of prediction (of future events) and reaction (to facts just
learned of). How pieces of knowledge are organized and beliefs propa-
gated is shown in the causal knowledge pattern devised here. Obviously,
the “acts are exogenous” principle insisted on by Judea Pearl is rel-
ativized in applying causal knowledge patterns to problems of decision
theory. The epistemic contour c is not deactivated by intervening on B,
while the one directed edge D A B is removed by the external action
do(B = b) – quite in Pearl’s sense B and P1 become jointly exogenous
(in accordance with definition 3.3.2). To sort the terms involved here:
The act B becomes exogenous by virtue of the action do(B = b), which
is itself external.22 If the prediction of events is formalized within a
model (a causal knowledge pattern, respectively), foreseeing acts can be
made explicit, while foreseeing actions cannot be given graphical expres-
sion. Reflecting on the Newcomb situation and performing hypothetical
manipulations on the basis of integrating causal and non-causal knowl-
edge finally guides the agent (who is aware of the setting) towards the
correct decision. Resorting to reflexiveness is not necessary for virtually
maximizing the outcome. The conclusion must be one-boxing.
As a last remark in this part on causal decision theory, David Lewis
shall be mentioned here once more. He examines another paradoxi-
cal puzzle of strategic thinking and finds in 1979 that the “Prisoners’
Dilemma Is a Newcomb Problem”, too.23 The story in this particular
dilemma shall be outlined briefly. Two suspects are caught by the police,
that do not have sufficient evidence for conviction and therefore question
the prisoners separately and (also separately) promise immediate release
if the prisoners betray the respective other prisoner by confessing. How-
ever, if both confess, each serves a sentence of three months – in case
both remain silent, each serves one month. Table 4.3 summarizes the
situation compactly. If prisoner A applied the principle of dominance to
his situation, he would of course confess, thereby always being off better
than if he remained silent. If both prisoners think alike in this respect,
however, they will be doomed to a sentence of another three months in
prison. This is what makes the situation a strategic dilemma: Attribut-
ing the same (degree of) rationality to both prisoners does not entail
the best outcome. If they include in their deliberations the ascription
22For clarification: exogenous remains a model-internal property of nodes (i. e.,
variables, respectively), whereas external marks transformations of causal structures.
23The quotation refers to the title of [Lewis 1979].
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of like-mindedness to their fellow inmate, both of them should remain
silent. If this ascription is reliable enough (or even deterministically cer-
tain), e. g., because of some commitment to the same gang code, then the
prediction in Newcomb’s problem and this theoretical simulation (the as-
cription) in the prisoners’ dilemma essentially amount to the same thing
– “[i]nessential trappings aside, Prisoners’ Dilemma is a version of New-
comb’s Problem, quod erat demonstrandum.”24
B stays silent B confesses
A stays silent Each serves 1 m A serves 1 y, B goes free
A confesses A goes free, B serves 1 y Each serves 3 m
Table 4.3: Each of the prisoners could go free or serve a sentence of one month,
three months, or a year – depending on their strategic decisions.
A common causal knowledge pattern might be used to capture all
(non-)causal relations as in the above rendition of Newcomb’s problem
– quite naturally and without introducing further metaphysical assump-
tions about possible background variables. In fact, tilting the time axis in
figure 4.2 by 90 degrees (such that time evolves from left to right) yields
the skeleton of the prisoners’ plot (of course, D and P2 are particular
ingredients of Newcomb’s problem and inessential for the current exam-
ination). c represents the mutual ascription of like-mindedness of both
prisoners, who must decide to cooperate during their simultaneous (but
separate) questioning to achieve the joint best result. May the Newcomb
case be some fictional construction, Lewis makes the case for analyzing
the prediction of future events and the ascription of like-mindedness to
one’s antagonist in terms of the same underlying pattern:
Some have fended off the lessons of Newcomb’s Problem by saying:
“Let us not have, or let us not rely on, any intuitions about what
is rational in goofball cases so unlike the decision problems of real
life.” But Prisoners’ Dilemmas are deplorably common in real life.
They are the most down-to-earth versions of Newcomb’s Problem
now available.25
24Cf. [Lewis 1979, p. 239].
25This final quotation borrows the concluding paragraph from [Lewis 1979, p. 240].
I agree with Lewis on the point that situations of strategic deliberations of the
kind exemplified here are “the most down-to-earth versions of Newcomb’s Problem” –
because there is nothing more to know than already said – in contrast to cases of so-
called medical Newcomb problems where research might in most cases yield additional
information and knowledge about true common causes whose influence would indeed
be rendered void by free deliberation/active intervention.
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4.2 Meaningful isomorphisms
Augmenting standard Bayes nets by adding epistemic contours might
at first seem reducible again, as sketches of causal models (in Pearl’s
sense) are refined and incorporated into scientific bodies of explanation
or into strategic groundwork for policy making. The postulate of only
admitting extensionally distinct events in the analysis poses problems,
though, as soon as intensional distinction becomes necessary or different
approaches towards measuring the same phenomenon need to be em-
phasized and unified in one frame. Epistemic contours pave the way
for such enhanced modeling. As an additional structural component in
causal knowledge patterns these 1-1 functions
• represent non-directional knowledge,
• are capable of bridging frameworks of description,
• deterministically transfer knowledge simultaneously,
• mark variables that cannot be decoupled (i. e., set separately),
• and are not deactivated by interventions, in particular.
Synonymy, strict semantical and conceptual dependencies, or logical
and mathematical relations present problems for the standard Bayes net
approach and are purposely excluded (by the expert modeler) from in-
tegration into Pearl’s causal models. Representing such relationships
as directed edges would subject them to possible local atomic surgeries,
which would immediately yield paradoxical inferences. Including non-
causal knowledge into the analysis, where information about isomorphic
relations is available, does essentially support causal inference, though,
and can be computed consistently in the framework of causal knowledge
patterns – exemplary cases shall be considered in the following.
Synonyms
Two synonyms refer to the same phenomenon or to the same observation
when they denote events, and are therefore modeled as just one node
in the graph of a causal model representing just one variable that can
be labeled differently but for which the specification of the method of
measurement fixes the extensional meaning. Epistemic contours can be
used to accommodate more than one signifiant of one and the same
event in the causal knowledge pattern, thereby bridging jargon, levels
of specialization, frameworks of distinct interests, differing aspects of
the same research object, or intended systems of neighboring theories –
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Fig. 4.3: Frameworks of differing specialization are bridged by the epistemic
contour c representing an isomorphic relation between atmospheric
electrostatic discharge and lightning.
perhaps in the process of synthesizing.26 Figure 4.3 explicates this use of
epistemic contours: Two originally separate causal models are connected
through an epistemic contour c. The upper framework shows the fine-
grained model of some bio-chemist who wants to trace the formation
of nitric acid in the atmosphere. In the graph of his causal model the
directed edges represent causal mechanisms across the disciplines (quite
in the sense of Jon Williamson, see also p. 90). Electro-magnetic
phenomena are linked to chemical processes in this scientific pattern,
which does not pose any difficulty to the proponent of the epistemic
account of causation. The lower causal model in figure 4.3 illustrates the
simple picture of how lightning and thunder might be arranged in some
naive (regularity) account (which possibly might not even be embeddable
into some more fine-grained scientific rendition). These two frameworks
do not talk about the same sets of phenomena, nor do they lie on the same
26Such epistemic bridges might lead to the discovery of more bridges between the
respective frameworks. On the other hand, formalizing assumptions about the exis-
tence of possible isomorphisms in this context can be of help for refuting these very
assumptions and for clarifying blurred differences between originally distinguished
theoretical terms or cross-disciplinary “false friends.” Pragmatic examples can be
found in pedagogical theories: One of the principles of neuro-didactics states that
learning is more effective if existing prior knowledge is activated. How new informa-
tion is connected with/augmented by/embedded in such prior knowledge or how it is
to be re-ordered/aligned can be formalized in recourse to twin CKPs.
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level of specialization, and neither do their modelers “pursue common
interests.” Nevertheless, as in this example, if the modelers agreed on
a meta level to the fact that one of the phenomena their models are
about always co-occurs, the epistemic contour c shows how the different
frameworks can be aligned side by side for mutual information exchange.
Thunder can subsequently be explained through the chain rooting in
Collision of cloud particles.
Logical and mathematical dependencies
Any association between the description of two events that comes in the
form of a parametric equation can in principle be represented by an epis-
temic contour to facilitate causal reasoning across methods of measuring
in cases where the introduction of a common cause seems far-fetched,
artificial, or controversial. Scale translations (on the same level of mea-
surement) can thus be given formal expression within causal knowledge
patterns, as well as unit conversions (e. g., of currencies) and geometric
transformations. Entities on both sides of such an epistemic contour ex-
tensionally ‘measure one coin’ but intensionally emphasize ‘its different
sides’ – especially when these different characterizations invoke differing
causal claims. E. g., temperature (in ranges) and color (in name codes)
of metal can be aligned side by side but might each be linked to different
effects or even to different causes – according to the experimental setup.
But knowledge about either tells the experimenters more about the ef-
fects across the deterministic undirected edge in the causal knowledge
pattern.27 Inversely proportional behavior is yet another candidate for
modeling by epistemic contours (if the equation contains the total quan-
tity as a parameter). When considering a certain country, the percentage
of sealed soil determines what remains within the countries boundaries
as a source of biomass and as a storage of nutrients, substances, water,
etc. Neither causes the other – intervening on one determines the oppo-
site. Both might be roots of differing causal chains, though, according
to how knowledge is organized in some causal knowledge pattern, i. e.,
within some epistemic subject.
27Transferring knowledge about the temperature over to knowledge about the color
might in addition require knowledge about the properties of the piece of metal un-
der consideration. These properties are part of the parametric formulation of the
isomorphism represented by the epistemic contour – they can be seen as a kind of
ceteris paribus conditions if the experimental setup examines normal metal under
normal conditions. Parameters that can be modified through surgeries in the model
are excluded from the framework devised here but might motivate a possible further
extension.
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Semantical and conceptual dependencies
Epistemic contours are also applicable to cases where interlevel causal
claims are to be rendered explicit – as one example of representing seman-
tical dependencies by the introduction of an epistemic contour. When
Carl Craver and William Bechtel talk about “levels of mechanisms,”
they have in mind what Pearl would call zooming into (or zooming
out of) a given model to present the situation under consideration in a
more fine-grained (or, respectively, in a more coarse-grained) variant.28
In their sense, a mechanism is a process as structured in a given causal
model (in Pearl’s sense) and can as such be related to a more detailed
or less detailed structure describing the same situation:
[L]evels of mechanisms are a species of compositional, or part-
whole, relations. In contemporary debates about reduction and in-
terlevel causation, it is common for authors to talk about ‘levels
of aggregation,’ ‘levels of organization,’ ‘levels of complexity,’ and
‘mereological levels.’ Such descriptions apply to levels of mecha-
nisms as well. Higher levels of mechanisms are aggregated (i. e.,
built up from) or composed from parts that are organized into more
complex spatial, temporal, and causal relations.29
In their discussion of both top-down and bottom-up causation they
claim that causation across levels is described by what they call mecha-
nistically mediated effects, which “are hybrids of constitutive and causal
relations in a mechanism, where the constitutive relations are interlevel,
and the causal relations are exclusively intralevel.” They maintain fur-
ther that the “[a]ppeal to top-down causation seems spooky or incoher-
ent when it cannot be explicated in terms of mechanistically mediated
effects.”30 In saying that, Craver and Bechtel refer back to David
Lewis who fixes intuitions about the distinctness of cause and effect in
his influential Causation as Influence:
C and E must be distinct events – and distinct not only in the
sense of nonidentity but also in the sense of nonoverlap and non-
implication. It won’t do to say that my speaking this sentence
causes my speaking this sentence or that my speaking the whole of
it causes my speaking the first half of it; or that my speaking causes
my speaking it loudly, or vice versa.31
28See also [Machamer et al. 2000] for a detailed overview of the concept of mech-
anism in the sciences.
29Cf. [Craver & Bechtel 2007, p. 550].
30Cf. [Craver & Bechtel 2007, p. 547].
31This quotation is from the unabridged version of [Lewis 2000] as reprinted in
[Collins et al. 2004].
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The least disputed cases of genuine top-down or bottom-up causal rela-
tions, where changing the system prima facie causally influences (at least
one of) its parts or vice versa, are figures of pars-pro-toto and totum-pro-
parte reasoning. These cases can straightforwardly be translated into the
framework of causal knowledge patterns by marking the level transition
with an epistemic contour that represents the constitution (in Craver’s
and Bechtel’s words) or the (mutual) constraint (as suggested by Max
Kistler as a conceptual refinement in his comment32 on Craver and
Bechtel). Two examples shall be considered in the following.33
The general’s heart attack can be understood as a genuine pars-pro-
toto figure, where the defect of the heart as part of the general’s body
determines the general’s state of being alive or dead. The biological
intra-organism level and the level of the organism as a whole are linked
here through 1-1 functional information exchange, not by any causal
process. The general remains alive as long as (and only as long as) his
heart continues beating. This isomorphism is expressed in the pertaining
causal knowledge pattern as a simple epistemic contour, consequently.
The story of Ignatius and his hotdogs on the other hand presents a clear
totum-pro-parte case where Ignatius maneuvers his hotdog cart to the
corner of the street to market his hotdogs there. Craver and Bechtel
ask: “What caused the hotdogs (and the molecules in the hotdogs, and
the atoms comprising the molecules, and so on) to arrive at the corner?
Ignatius.” Although on different levels, Ignatius’ pushing the cart causes
the cart to move – and its parts and contents along with it. They are
simply “carried along for the ride.”34 An epistemic contour marks the 1-1
non-causally interrelated positions of cart and hotdogs. Making Ignatius
move the cart (“using a do(·)-operation on him”) will ultimately move his
goods as well, which licenses the above claim about Ignatius as causee
on the lower level, too.
4.3 Epistemic contours and the Markov assump-
tion, revisited
Introducing epistemic contours as bridges of non-directional knowl-
edge transfer into structures of causal reasoning was possible because
these structures were understood as schemata of knowledge organization
32See [Kistler 2010] for Kistler’s explications.
33For this and the following cf. [Craver & Bechtel 2007, pp. 557 ff.].
34Cf. [Craver & Bechtel 2007, p. 558] for both quotations.
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shaped by the structuring power of the epistemically interpreted princi-
ple of causality. The interventionist characterization of causation could
be maintained by explicitly overriding the requirement that all variables
have to be modifiable separately – this is not the case for variables of an
EC clique, where intervening on one distinguished variable strictly for-
bids any opposing intervention on other variables in the same EC clique.
Epistemic contours precisely postulate non-interruptibility of the deter-
ministic functional connection they stand for. Their integration clashes
with the Markov assumption, because such epistemic contours might con-
tradict the assignment of values through the causal mechanisms at work.
By introducing the epistemic principle of explanatory dominance consis-
tency is taken care of, again. Explicating causal with closely intertwined
non-causal knowledge in one unifying network makes the underlying as-
sumptions concrete, transparent, and operative on the surface. Finally,
the formal framework of causal knowledge patterns offers a means for
consistently deriving higher-level causal claims from basal data of dif-
ferent types and might offer insight into dialectics of communication
and processes of learning. Adding structural ingredients and intensional
markers of default knowledge to standard Bayes net causal models along
with the rules for implementation counters Pearl’s skepticism:
The Markovian assumption [. . . ] is a matter of convention, to dis-
tinguish complete from incomplete models. By building the Marko-
vian assumption into the definition of complete causal models [(def.
2.7.1)] and then relaxing the assumption through latent structures
[(see p. 66)], we declare our preparedness to miss the discovery
of non-Markovian causal models that cannot be described as latent
structures. I do not consider this loss to be very serious, because
such models – even if any exist in the macroscopic world – would
have limited utility as guides to decisions. For example, it is not
clear how one would predict the effects of interventions from such
a model, save for explicitly listing the effect of every conceivable
intervention in advance.35
What it means for an event A to cause some distinct event B is
explained above in terms of doxastic structures – how one predicts the
effects of interventions in causal knowledge patterns as compounds of
causal and non-causal knowledge is described in interventionist vocabu-
lary by extending the rules for the do(·)-operation. Drawing upon bodies
of epistemically organized relations precisely guides the epistemic sub-
ject to decisions that might not be explainable as straightforwardly from
plain Bayes net structures.
35This quotes [Pearl 2009, p. 61] without footnotes.
Appendix A
Random variables
(stochastic variables)
The Σ-random variable V over Ω is an 〈F ,X〉-measurable (total)
function of the outcome of a statistical experiment, mapping possible
outcomes to values (realizations, e. g., real numbers). The meaning
of the random variable lies in the linkage between the outcome of an
experiment and its mathematical representation:1
V : Ω→ Σ
such that
V (ω) = σ or in short: V = σ or also
V (ω) = v or in short: V = v (as commonly used),
with a probability space 〈Ω,F , P 〉 and an observation space 〈Σ,X〉, as
explained in the following.
The probability space is a triple 〈Ω,F , P 〉, where Ω is the sample
space Dom(V ) of a random process (sometimes also S for ‘sample space’
or U for ‘universe’), and F ⊆ P(Ω) is the set of events (where each
event is a set containing zero or more outcomes), the event algebra,
a σ-algebra (σ-field or also borel field) over the set Ω, by definition a
nonempty collection of subsets of Ω (including Ω itself) that is closed
under complementation and countable unions of its members.
1Cf. for this and the following e. g. [Fahrmeir et al. 2000].
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E. g., for a given sample space Ω = {a, b, c, d}, F might be the subset of
P(Ω) specified as {∅, {a, b}, {c, d}, {a, b, c, d}}. If we have F = P(Ω) in
the case of a finite sample space Ω, V is always measurable.
The probability function (the measure) P : F → [0, 1] defines a measure
over F , satisfying the Kolmogorov axioms:
(K1) P (A ∈ F) ≥ 0,
(K2) P (Ω) = 1,
(K3) P (
⋃
iAi) =
∑
i P (Ai) for any countable sequence of pairwise dis-
joint (i. e., mutually exclusive) events A1, A2, . . . (∈ F).
The measurable observation space (state space) 〈Σ,X〉 typically
couples the real numbers R, the integers N, or any finite set of values
with a suitable σ-algebra X over Σ with X ⊆ P(Σ):
for real-valued (continuous) random variables: V : Ω→ R;
for discrete random variables yielding values of countable sets, e. g.,
of the set of natural numbers: V : Ω→ N;
and for dichotomous random variables: V : Ω→ {0, 1}.
In this representation events are subsets of some sample space Ω, which
are also often written as propositional formulas containing random vari-
ables, e. g., {ω |u1 ≤ V (ω) ≤ u2}, or shorthand: {ω |u1 ≤ V ≤ u2}.
For the sample space Ω = {ω0, ω1, . . . , ωn−1} with size n, the singletons
{ω0}, {ω1}, . . . , {ωn−1} are called ‘atomic events.’ Events A ⊆ Ω are
determined by the random variable V , e. g., through formulations of the
following kind:
{V = v} := {ω ∈ Ω |V (ω) = v},
{V ≤ v} := {ω ∈ Ω |V (ω) ≤ v},
{u1 ≤ V ≤ u2} := {ω ∈ Ω |u1 ≤ V (ω) ≤ u2},
{V ∈ I} := {ω ∈ Ω |V (ω) ∈ I},
where I is some specific interval.
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Example (Tossing a coin twice)
A double coin toss may be modeled in the following probability space
〈Ω,F , P 〉:
• Ω is the set of four possible outcomes:
{〈Heads,Heads〉, 〈Heads,Tails〉, 〈Tails,Heads〉, 〈Tails,Tails〉};
• F = P(Ω);
• for a fair coin, all possible atomic events are assigned equal proba-
bility: P ({〈N1,N2〉}) =
1
4 for N1,N2 ∈ {Heads,Tails}.
The random variables X1, X2, and V are defined as follows:
1. X1 : Ω→ R such that 〈N1,N2〉 7→ 0, if N1 = Heads, 1 otherwise;
2. X2 : Ω→ R such that 〈N1,N2〉 7→ 0, if N2 = Heads, 1 otherwise;
3. V : Ω→ R such that V (ω) = X1(ω) +X2(ω) for any ω ∈ Ω;
and X is the borel algebra over the real numbers R.
Nota. For many applications it is not necessary – maybe not even
possible – to find an underlying sample space (as it is in the examples
of tossing a coin or rolling a dice). Nevertheless, parameters of interest
(e. g., stock yield) may formally be interpreted as random variables V in
the form of functions as well: Let Ω ⊆ R be the set of possible values of
such a V with the assignment ω = v = V (ω) (for any ω ∈ Ω), i. e., V
formally becomes the identity function.
Appendix B
Technicalities:
Implications of d -separation
The sprinkler example in chapter 2 demonstrates how the conditional
dependencies represented by the graph can be recovered through the use
of the d-separation criterion. Pearl fixes this idea in the following
theorem due to Verma and Pearl in [Verma & Pearl 1988].1
Theorem B.0.1 (Probabilistic Implications of d-Separation)2
If sets X and Y are d-separated by Z in a DAG G, then X is inde-
pendent of Y conditional on Z in every distribution compatible with G.
Conversely, if X and Y are not d-separated by Z in a DAG G, then
X and Y are dependent conditional on Z in at least one distribution
compatible with G.
We shall have a look at the first part of definition B.0.1 and formalize
it (referring back to what Pearl says about Markov Compatibility in
prose) through the following formula:
∀gp∀XY Z
(
G(g)∧P (p)∧C(g, p)∧(X ⊥ Y |Z)G[g] ⇒ (X ⊥ Y |Z)P [p]
)
, (B.1)
where G is to be read as is.a.directed.acyclic.graph, P is to be read as
is.a.probability.distribution, and C means are.compatible (in accordance
with definition 2.6.2). Compatibility requires the existence of a factor-
ization of the joint probability function p under consideration as dictated
by the corresponding graph g. Moreover, the lower index G[g] indicates
independence (i. e., the graphical – hence G – notion of d-separation) in
1See also [Geiger et al. 1990].
2In [Pearl 2009, p.18]: theorem 1.2.4.
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the graph g, whereas the lower index P [p] indicates probability-theoretic
– hence P – independence between the random variables p ranges over.
3
Although Pearl actually uses X, Y , and Z in one formula referring
to nodes in a graph (by the lower index G) and to variables in joint
distributions (by the lower index P ) at the same time, this use of vari-
ables needs to be looked at carefully again, especially when quantifying
X, Y , and Z. E. g., X cannot simply refer to nodes, since nodes can-
not be independent in a probability-theoretic sense, as suggested in the
consequent of formula B.1. On the other hand, X cannot strictly refer
to random variables, since there is no explanation as to what it means
for a random variable to be d-separated (as suggested by the term with
the lower index G). The question remains: What does X refer to if we
still want to use it in quantified formulae and attribute some meaning
to it? One possible answer might be that X merely refers to a rather
abstract label that only gets evaluated by the construct (· ⊥ · | ·) accord-
ing to the lower index, thus shifting the problem of denotation to the
question, how exactly the notion of compatibility links the nodes in a
graph to the corresponding random variables of a certain joint probabil-
ity function. Following this suggestion a possible reading of a term such
as (X ⊥ Y |Z)G might be: The nodes I, J , and M are arranged in the
graph in such a manner that the nodes which are functionally assigned
the labels X and Y are d-separated by the node which is functionally as-
signed the label Z. A similar reading applies to terms as (X ⊥ Y |Z)P .
Now, if the graph in which the d-separation statement is evaluated is
compatible with the joint probability function where the conditional in-
dependence term is evaluated (as demanded in the antecedent of formula
B.1), then the functional assignment of labels to nodes in the graph is
interlinked with the functional assignment of the same labels to random
variables of the joint probability function. This expresses the intention
of the notion of Markov Compatibility.4
Since the definition of Markov Compatibility (definition 2.6.2) relies
on the explication of Markovian Parents (definition 2.6.1), which in turn
uses a certain ordering of the variables under consideration, we should
3This notation extends Pearl’s use of the lower index – he merely considers
unquantified formulae, such as (X ⊥ Y |Z)G ⇒ (X ⊥ Y |Z)P .
4To formalize these remarks, the connection between d -separation in the graph and
conditional independence between random variables must be restated with function
terms in the following manner: (f(X) ⊥ f(Y ) | f(Z))G ⇒ (h(X) ⊥ h(Y ) |h(Z))P ,
where f is a function from abstract labels to nodes and h is a function from abstract
labels to random variables.
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be able to ground the idea of variable interlinking on a more basal notion
by employing an ordering of the variables, too. In [Verma & Pearl 1988]
Pearl introduces the notion of a causal list (or causal input list when
referring to the algorithmic import) for this very purpose. Such a causal
list is based on a specific dependency model that provides the variables
– in our case the joint probability distribution we are examining:5
Definition B.0.2 (Causal List)
A causal list of a dependency model contains two things: an ordering of
the variables and a function that assigns a tail boundary to each vari-
able x. For each variable x let Ux denote the set of all variables which
come before x in the given ordering. A tail boundary of a variable x,
denoted Bx, is any subset of Ux that renders x independent of Ux −Bx.
A unique DAG can be generated from each causal list by associating the
tail boundary of the variable x in the list with the set of direct parents of
any node x in the DAG.6
From such a causal input list an edge-minimal graphical representation
can be derived algorithmically.7 The following theorem postulates the
existence of a causal input list under given circumstances:
Theorem B.0.3 (Existence of a Causal List)8
If M is a dependency model which can be perfectly represented by some
DAG D, then there is a causal list LΘ which generates D.
Example. The right graph in figure 2.5 (page 49) could have been built from
the following causal list L with the variable ordering Θ and the tail boundary
function B:
L = 〈Θ, B〉, where
Θ = 〈X ′2, X
′
3, X
′
4, X
′
5〉,
B = {〈X ′2, {}〉, 〈X
′
3, {}〉, 〈X
′
4, {X
′
2, X
′
3}〉, 〈X
′
5, {X
′
4}〉}.
The given explication is not the only possibility, since, e.g., X ′3 could be listed
before X ′2 in the variable ordering Θ – the only requirement being that, if Xi
is an ancestor of Xj in the graph (which is an unambiguous relation in any
DAG), then Xi <Θ Xj .
5Cf. [Verma & Pearl 1988, p. 71].
6As Pearl adds: An equivalent specification of a causal list is an ordered list of
triplets of the form I(x,Bx, R), one triplet for each variable in the model, where R is
Ux −Bx.
7Cf. [Verma & Pearl 1988, p. 71].
8In [Verma & Pearl 1988, p. 72], with proof.
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Having lifted the compatibility requirement C(g, p) of our an-
tecedent in formula B.1 to a more generic level, we can proceed
with the universally quantified most inner implication of formula B.1:
(X ⊥ Y |Z)G ⇒ (X ⊥ Y |Z)P . This statement is of course directed
from the graphical representation g to the underlying dependency model
p, our probability distribution, since we are examining soundness. It im-
plies that all independencies read off from the graph g are also present in
the probability distribution p, but – in general – not all independencies
of p are represented by g. Graphs with this property (relative to a given
dependency model) are called I-maps (of that model).9
Definition B.0.4 (I-map)10
It is not always necessary nor feasible to have an exact representation of
a dependency model; in fact, an efficient approximation called an I-map
is often preferred to an inefficient perfect map. A representation R is
an I-map of a dependency model M iff every independence statement
represented by R is also a valid independence of M . Thus, R may not
represent every statement of M , but the ones it does represent are correct.
One remark, before we turn to the ’88 version of the proof of sound-
ness: The probability distributions we are dealing with here are so-called
graphoids due to the list of four common graphoid properties they obey:11
(B.2)
symmetry (X ⊥ Y |Z)⇐⇒ (Y ⊥ X |Z) (a)
decomposition (X ⊥ YW |Z) =⇒ (X ⊥ Y |Z) (b)
weak union (X ⊥ YW |Z) =⇒ (X ⊥ W |ZY ) (c)
contraction (X ⊥ W |ZY ) & (X ⊥ Y |Z) =⇒ (X ⊥ YW |Z) (d)
where X, Y , and Z represent three disjoint subsets of objects (e.g.,
variables or attributes) and the notation YW is a shorthand for Y ∪W .
Having gathered these notional explications we can proceed to
Pearl’s proof of theorem B.0.1, for which he uses a formalization dif-
ferent from formula B.1, given in the following theorem:
Theorem B.0.5 (Connection between Causal List and I-map)12
If M is a graphoid and LΘ is any causal list of M , then the DAG gen-
erated by LΘ is an I-map of M .
9This pertains to undirected and directed graphs – each with corresponding sep-
aration criteria.
10Cf. [Verma & Pearl 1988, p. 70].
11Cf. [Verma & Pearl 1988, pp. 69 ff.].
12In [Verma & Pearl 1988, p. 72]: theorem 2.
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Employing the explications above we see that the proof of theorem B.0.1
can be reduced to the proof of theorem B.0.5: Our dependency model M
is a joint probability distribution p obeying the four graphoid axioms in
equation B.2. What we required of the Markov Compatibility statement
C(g, p) above, we see now encoded in the demand for existence of such
a causal list LΘ generating the DAG g, which now needs to be shown to
be an I-map of p.13
Proof. To prove the soundness of d-separation we induct on the number
of variables in the graphoid M . Let Θ have k variables. In the inductive
step we will have to show for some initial segment of Θ with length n
that the DAG generated from it is an I-map of M , assuming we have
already proven the DAG generated from the initial segment of Θ with
length n− 1 to be an I-map of M (n ≤ k).
Induction Basis. If our graphoid M merely consists of one variable,
the DAG generated by LΘ is an I-map of M trivially.
Induction Hypothesis. Let LΘ′ be based on LΘ in such a manner
that only some initial segment of Θ with length n (called Θ′ in the
following) is considered in the declaration of boundaries by B′. Since
we are following the ordering Θ′, we will be concerned with the last
variable in this ordering, v. Let LΘ′−v be the causal list LΘ′ formed by
removing v from Θ′ and all entries containing v from B′ (this will only be
a single entry, since v cannot appear in any boundaries, yet, by method of
construction).14 Moreover, let the DAG generated from LΘ′−v be G
′−v.
Graphically, expanding G′−v to G′ will mean the addition of the v node
and its incident edges (v cannot be parent to any other node in the DAG
G′ at this step in the construction process, guaranteed by the ordering
of variables being consistent with the parentship relation in the DAG).
Last, let MG′ be the dependency model (a graphoid) corresponding to
G′ and LΘ′ (with n variables).
We suppose that the DAG G′ − v is an I-map of M .15
13The proof given here follows [Verma & Pearl 1988, pp. 72 ff.] and [Geiger et al.
1990, pp. 517 f.].
14In the following, these derived concepts will also be referred to as Θ′ − v and
B′ − v.
15This in turn entails that the DAGG′−v is also an I-map of MG′−v, since the same
n− 1 variables appear in both, MG′−v contains a thorough list of all independencies
between these variables, and no independence information will be overwritten on
the way to building up M by adding further variables to MG′−v. M contains all
d -separated triplets of G′ − v, and so does MG′−v as the minimal case.
146 Implications of d-separation
Inductive Step. By the induction hypothesis we can assume that
MG′−v ⊆ M , i. e., there are no independencies in MG′−v which are not
contained in M as well.
The following schema symbolizes the step from n − 1 to n and lists the
target objects for each of the aforementioned concepts:
G′ − v
adding the node v together with all its incident links
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ G′
MG′−v
adding the variable v plus all independence triplets containing v
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→MG′
LΘ′−v
extending Θ′ − v by v and B′ − v by the boundary assignment for v
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ LΘ′
Now, each MG′ triplet T of the form (A ⊥ B |C) falls into one of
three categories: Either the newly added variable v does not appear in
T , at all, or it appears in the first position A (in the second position B,
respectively – by symmetry, as in equation B.2.a) or in the third position
(i. e., C) of T . These three cases will have to be treated separately for all
such triplets T of MG′ . We have to make sure that no triplet, introduced
by the addition of v to LΘ′−v and evaluated in the graph, is off M , to
finally conclude that MG′ ⊆M :
Case 1. If v does not appear in T , T must be of the form (X ⊥ Y |Z),
where X, Y , and Z are three disjoint subsets of variables (none contain-
ing v). If T is inMG′ it must already have been inMG′−v, since otherwise
there would have been at least one active path in G′ − v (between X and
Y when Z is instantiated) which would have been deactivated by adding
v. But the mere addition of nodes and further links cannot deactivate
formerly active paths in a DAG. We know that G′ − v is an I-map of
MG′−v, so T must be an element of MG′−v, which in turn is a subset of
M , hence T is in M .
Case 2. The sub-case of v appearing in the first position of the triplet
can be treated equally to the sub-case of v appearing in the second
position by symmetry. The following argument goes for the first position,
i. e., we are considering a triplet T of the form (Xv ⊥ Y |Z). Again, X,
Y , and Z are three disjoint subsets of variables. Let 〈v,B,R〉 be the last
triplet in LΘ′ .
16
16Here, B denotes the Tail Boundary, R the Rest, i. e., the set of preceding variables
separated from v by the set B.
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v
B0
R0
RX
BX
RZ
BZ
RY
BY
last variable v
in Θ′
Btotal
Rtotal
Fig. B.1: Graphical, schematic overlay of the two independence statements
(v ⊥ Rtotal |Btotal) and (X ⊥ Y |Z).
Figure B.1 displays the schematic overlay of T and the last triplet in
LΘ′ : The background (mirroring the last entry in LΘ′) is divided into
three areas – {v}, Rtotal, and Btotal – in which v, X, Y , and Z have to
be accommodated. X, Y , and Z itself are partitioned into RX ∪ BX ,
RY ∪BY , and RZ ∪BZ , thereby marking possible overlaps with B and
R (set-theoretically interpreted as the possible existence of shared el-
ements). B0 and R0 collect all nodes not named explicitly, so that
Btotal = BX ∪BY ∪BZ ∪B0, Rtotal = RX ∪RY ∪RZ ∪R0 (both of which
are partitions), and U = {v} ∪ Btotal ∪ Rtotal. Undirected edges indi-
cate the (possible) existence of active paths between two sets of nodes.17
17Note that sets of nodes dividing two active paths are not deactivating the com-
pound path, in general, the only difference being v itself, which acts as a collider node
for any pair of incident links due to the method of construction and hence deactivates
any traversing paths.
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Additionally, edges with arrowheads between two sets of nodes exclude
directed edges pointing in the inverse direction.
By definition of the causal list LΘ′ , we have given that there are no
active paths between Rtotal and v. On the other hand, all nodes in Btotal
are necessarily connected to v by method of construction. Moreover, all
nodes within Btotal might be interconnected, as well as all nodes in Rtotal.
Also, the last entry in LΘ′ does not exclude any active paths between a
node in Btotal and a second node in Rtotal, so these have to be included,
too.
By application of decomposition (equation B.2.b) to (Xv ⊥ Y |Z) we
get
(X ⊥ Y |Z) ∈M, (B.3)
because v does not occur in this independence statement. Following this
statement, we can take four edges (marked by dashed lines) out of the
schema in figure B.1:
1. The path RY A R0 has to be deleted – otherwise it would possibly
open an active path Y A R0 n X thereby contradicting equation
B.3.
2. The path RY A RX has to be deleted, too, because all paths from
Y to X have to be intercepted by Z.
3. The path BY A BX must be omitted by analogy.
4. Finally, the path BY A B0 would possibly open the path along
BY A B0 n BX and thus circumvent Z on the way from Y to X.
It has to be cancelled to avoid contradicting equation B.3, again.
The only path that remains untouched by the above considerations is
BY A v, because v acts as a collider due to the method of construction
(i. e., it cannot be parent to any other node, yet) and deactivates any
traversing paths. Hence this path must stay in the graph as a possible
link.
Since we find in the graph G′ the independence statement
T = (Xv ⊥ Y |Z), we also find (v ⊥ Y |Z) (by decomposition as
in equation B.2.b). Moreover, we know that BY has to be connected
to v by an arrow pointing towards v. Now, the only way Z alone
would d-separate BY from v would be by functionally determining BY
(indicated by the bold arrow in the diagram), since we have the chain
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Z n BY A v with Z not lying on the path from BY to v. Functional
determination means that the value of any node in BY is fixed once
we know the value of (all nodes in) Z, i. e., BY has no other parent
nodes than Z, and any interconnections with other sets of nodes have
to be directed edges emanating from BY : Z is screening off BY from
any influences of non-descendants.18 This can easily be seen, because
if we have (v ⊥ BY |Z) and functional determination of BY by Z, we
can infer (v ⊥ BY |BY ) by collapsing the path Z A BY . The last
statement can be paraphrased: Once we know the value of BY , learning
the value of BY (which is not new to us at that point) does not change
our degree of belief in a certain value of v. In fact, this holds for any
node or set of nodes replacing v in that context. This in turn means
that (BY ⊥ U\(BY ∪ Z) |Z) must already have been an element of
MG′−v ⊆M .
19
We thus get in particular
(BY ⊥ Xv |Z) ∈M. (B.4)
Since all constraints imposed onto the schema so far hold in M , we can
now read off directly from the resulting graph that
(RY ⊥ Xv |ZBY ) ∈M. (B.5)
Referring back to the declaration of the partitions in the schema and
applying contraction (equation B.2.d) to equations B.4 and B.5, we con-
clude (BYRY ⊥ Xv |Z) ∈M , which yields (Xv ⊥ Y |Z) ∈M .
Case 3. If v appears in the third entry of the triplet, then T must
be of the form (X ⊥ Y |Zv). As we saw in case 1 above, the addition
of v and its incident links alone cannot serve to deactivate a formerly
active path in G′. So (X ⊥ Y |Z) already holds in G′ − v and therefore
also in G′. Together with the weak transitivity property of DAGs these
two independence statements result in (Xv ⊥ Y |Z), or (X ⊥ Y v |Z)
by symmetry. In case 2 we saw that triplets of this form must also be
in M . Finally, applying the weak union conversion (equation B.2.c) to
(Xv ⊥ Y |Z) yields T ∈M . 4
18The notion of functional determination is explicated in [Geiger et al. 1990, pp.
517 f.] where Pearl’s proof of the soundness of d -separation is given reformulated.
Case 2 of the proof, as stated here, follows this alternative route, too.
19We are considering the general case of BY not being empty. Functional determi-
nation nevertheless also holds for the case BY = ∅.
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Due to the asymmetry in the I-mapness relation, not all indepen-
dencies contained in a dependency model M can necessarily be read off
from a graph G, even if M and G are compatible. This is the content
of the next theorem concluding the discussion about the probabilistic
implications of d-separation and referring back to where we started with
Markov Compatibility :
Theorem B.0.6 (Implications of Markov Compatibility)20
For any three disjoint subsets of nodes (X,Y,Z) in a DAG G and for all
probability functions P , we have:
(i) (X ⊥ Y |Z)G =⇒ (X ⊥ Y |Z)P whenever G and P are compati-
ble; and
(ii) if (X ⊥ Y |Z)P holds in all distributions compatible with G, it
follows that (X ⊥ Y |Z)G.
20In [Pearl 2009, p.18]: theorem 1.2.5.
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